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Abstract
This dissertation investigates how political instability is related to the probability of civil war.
According to the literature in comparative politics, regime breakdown is caused by critical events
such as economic decline, defeat in interstate war, death of a leader in office, or changes is the
international balance of power. Drawing on Powell (2004, 2006), I conceptualize such critical
events as shifts in the domestic distribution of power that can lead to a bargaining breakdown
and, in consequence, military conflict. Following a shock to government capabilities, current
leaders and the opposition are bargaining for a share of authority. The government has incentives
to grant concessions to other groups within the state, yet such promises are not credible given
that the leadership may regain its strength. Similarly, opposition groups lack the ability to make
credible commitments as they expect to be more powerful in the future. Both the government and
opposition groups could benefit from striking bargains, but cannot credibly commit because of
incentives to renege on agreements in the future. Unable to commit, both actors may use force to
achieve their preferred outcome. The dissertation then shifts the focus to solutions to such
commitment problems. I expect that (1) the institutional structure of government and opposition
groups and (2) the distance between groups have important consequences on the range of
feasible agreements during this bargaining process. The arguments are tested in a statistical study
of all countries for the 1960-2004 time period and in a small-sample analysis of democratization
processes in Algeria and Chile. Findings show that critical events increase the probability of civil
war as hypothesized and empirical evidence also provides strong support for the proposed
solutions to the commitment problem.

Keywords: Civil war, critical events, credible commitment
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Over the course of his 28-year stay in power, Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe has
led his country to the verge of economic collapse. Zimbabwe’s economy has shrunk by one-third
since 1999, and disastrous economic policies have resulted in inflation rates exceeding 100,000
percent in early 2008.1 Mugabe’s continued rejection of international pressure for reform turned
the country into a pariah in international relations. Amid these destabilizing conditions,
presidential elections were held in March 2008. The contest pitted long-serving autocrat Mugabe
against the leader of the main opposition party, Morgan Tsvangirai. Following the election, local
democracy advocates projected an election victory for the opposition candidate. The country’s
electoral commission, however, failed to publish official results for more than three weeks after
the election. Mugabe’s party then offered that he would participate in a runoff election with the
opposition leader if neither candidate received an absolute majority in the elections.2 This
proposal was swiftly rejected by opposition leaders, who argued that Mugabe’s past history of
election rigging made such promises incredible, as the offer was simply a tool to buy more time
to distort election results. Over the next few days, reports of violence against opposition
supporters spread in Zimbabwe, seemingly confirming the opposition’s fears.3 Lacking
credibility to negotiate with opposition groups for future influence, the government used force to
secure its continued power.
In late 2007, Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide bombing
at an election rally. Her death occurred only two weeks before Pakistan’s first democratic
elections since President Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999. With her party leading in the
polls, her assassination unleashed street violence and riots with over 50 deaths. Throughout his
1

Angus Shaw, “Zimbabwe Inflation Passes 100,000 Percent,” The Guardian, February 22, 2008.
Celia W. Dugger, “Leaders of Ruling Party Say Mugabe Will Fight On,” New York Times, April 5, 2008.
3
Celia W. Dugger, “Accounts of Violence Spread in Zimbabwe,” New York Times, April 9, 2008.
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leadership, Musharraf had repeatedly promised to hold elections and return power to a civilian
government, but never put reforms into practice. In November 2007, he proclaimed emergency
rule, dismissed all Supreme Court justices, and replaced them with followers when the court
challenged his quest for a third term as president. Intended as an attempt to strengthen his
waning power, the declaration of emergency rule triggered intense domestic and especially
international pressure by Pakistan’s allies, and Musharraf eventually agreed to hold elections in
January of 2008. His regime’s credibility, however, was severely tainted, and many doubted his
true commitment to reform.4 Immediately following Bhutto’s assassination, supporters of
opposition parties instantly blamed members of the military regime for her death. While
responsibility for the attack has not been determined, Bhutto and other observers have criticized
her security protection by the government as insufficient in the past.5
The above discussion of recent events in Pakistan and Zimbabwe shows how political
instability contributes to the eruption of violence. In both countries, the regimes’ past actions and
subsequent credibility problems seemingly contributed to the occurrence of violence at election
time. It is the goal of this dissertation to demonstrate that the current events in Zimbabwe and
Pakistan are examples of a more general class of events. To develop a general explanation of the
consequences of political instability on the occurrence of violence within states, the dissertation
asks two key questions.
First, why does political instability increase the probability of civil war? The argument
developed here expects that critical events weaken the government’s capabilities and result in
bargaining over the future distribution of power. When a shock or critical event weakens the
4

Ironically, Musharraf’s campaign used the slogan “confidence and credibility.”
Randall Mikkelsen, “Musharraf: Bhutto Bears Responsibility for Her Death,” Reuters, January 5, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL1624120080105 (accessed April 26, 2008). In an interview for the
CBS show “60 Minutes” broadcast on January 6, President Musharraf also suggested that the opposition leader
exposed herself to danger and bears responsibility for the attack.
5

2

government’s capabilities, neither the current regime nor the opposition can credibly commit to a
regime with shared powers. Once domestic authority is challenged through a shock to its strength
(such as a change in the international balance of power, economic crisis, war defeat, or the death
of a leader), uncertainty over the future distribution of power dominates, and relevant groups in
society will compete for a piece of the domestic pie. Although a regime challenged by a shock
has incentives to provide concessions to other groups in society, such promises lack credibility,
as the regime has incentives to renege since it may regain its strength in the future. Equally, an
opposition group can expect to be more powerful in a future government, thus also having
incentives to renege on agreements in the future. Commitment problems experienced by
government and opposition groups thus increase the risk for bargaining failure and, in
consequence, civil war.
Second, how can actors solve the commitment problem caused by political instability? To
develop solutions to the commitment problem, variations in the type of government and
opposition group are analyzed. In particular, it is expected that (1) the institutional structure of
the government, (2) the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and (3) the distance between actors
influences their ability to make credible commitments. First, leaders in authoritarian regimes that
rely on a small group of supporters and are therefore more likely to be punished when challenged
will face greater difficulty in making a commitment to peaceful settlements than other
authoritarian leaders. Leaders in single-party regimes or democracies, on the other hand, will be
more successful at securing a role in future governments at least for the short term, as can be
seen in the case of Communist parties in the recent transitions in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Second, opposition movements with cohesive organizational structures and links
to existing social organizations are more likely to make credible commitments to sharing power.

3

Cohesive, hierarchical organizations are better at in-group policing and can therefore coerce
more radical opposition members and enforce compromises (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 715-35).
In addition, linkages with existing social institutions such as the church or unions make it easier
for opposition movements to keep extremists at bay (Kalyvas, 2000). Finally, groups with
divergent preferences will have greater difficulty at making credible commitments. Ethnic
divisions, for example, can result in competing preferences over possible agreements and will
therefore reduce the possibility of credible and peaceful negotiation.
The dissertation develops important insights for international organizations and
policymakers engaged in the areas of democracy promotion, state failure, and conflict resolution.
Civil wars are the most common form of military conflict today, cause tremendous suffering, and
have the potential to undermine regional stability (Sambanis, 2002). In addition, democratization
and regime transitions more generally have attracted increasing interest in the international
community. The dissertation’s focus on the conflict-exacerbating effects of political instability,
therefore, is of great importance for the international community. By demonstrating what types
of actors or mechanisms are susceptible to the risk of violence change, this research will help in
identifying the set of cases in which political instability will be most dangerous, and
precautionary measures by international actors can be taken.
The arguments developed in the dissertation fit into the broader literature on the
relationship between political instability and civil war. Three different arguments can be
distinguished in the existing literature. First, political grievances and changes in states’ political
opportunity structures are expected to influence the probability of civil war (Hegre et al., 2001;
Gurr, 2000). States that are neither strongly authoritarian nor true democracies are expected to
experience more grievances and therefore greater conflict propensities. In addition, regime
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change represents a change in states’ opportunity structure and thus provides incentives for
violent mobilization. A second explanation argues that diversionary tactics prompt leaders’ use
of domestic violence (Snyder, 2000; Figuerdo and Weingast, 1999). Threatened leaders incite
nationalist violence in order to deflect challenges to their power. Third, the security dilemma has
been applied to the domestic sphere (Posen, 1993; Walter, 1999). When domestic authority
breaks down, uncertainty and fear trigger militarization and the occurrence of conflict.
The dissertation makes two important improvements to the literature on the political
causes of civil war. First, current arguments suffer from endogeneity problems. Regime change,
democratization, or the collapse of government authority may already entail the use of force. For
example, violence is common in coup d’états, which clearly represent instances of regime
change. The critical events (such as economic crisis or leader death) emphasized in the
theoretical argument and operationalized in the empirical section avoid endogeneity problems.
While critical events function as triggers of the bargaining process between government and
opposition, they do not include the use of force between domestic groups. Second, existing
arguments fail to explain why actors choose violence – a costly and risky strategy – over the
peaceful negotiation of agreements (Fearon, 1995). The bargaining argument developed here
lays out how rapid power shifts can result in bargaining inefficiencies and conflict, thus
demonstrating how instability can lead to violence among rational actors (Fearon, 1995; Powell,
2004).
More generally, the dissertation makes three key contributions to our understanding of
civil war. First, by focusing on the effects of shocks on civil war, the argument takes the dynamic
nature of civil war seriously. Many theories of civil war look at concepts that change little or not
at all over time, such as relative poverty, ethnicity, or natural resources. While such arguments
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are valuable in the sense that they can tell us which states are expected to have a higher baseline
probability of civil war, they do not explain why countries move from peace to war. An analysis
of critical shocks (such as economic crisis, the death of a leader, or defeat in interstate war)
identifies events that help understand a shift from a stable equilibrium to war.
Second, the argument shows that shocks to government capabilities represent a shift in
the domestic distribution of power and thus provide a valuable empirical referent for the
commitment problems described in Powell (2004, 2006). Economic decline, the death of a
leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of power are identified as events
leading to regime weakness, and, in consequence, civil war. Identifying critical events as rapid
power shifts helps specify the micro-foundations for the inefficient use of force and avoids
“black-boxing” these changes (Powell, 2004: 237).
Third, while work on commitment issues provides a compelling explanation of interstate
or intrastate war occurrence, it does not lay out the conditions under which actors can avoid such
inefficiency. As outlined above, the dissertation expects that variations in the type of government
and opposition group influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments. Identifying
solutions to the commitment problem has important consequences for international organizations
and policymakers alike.
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter two provides an overview
of existing explanations of civil war onset. To place the central questions of this dissertation
within previous research, economic, ethnic, political, and bargaining theories on the occurrence
of civil war are reviewed in this chapter. Since the dissertation puts forward a political
explanation of civil war onset, such theoretical accounts are reviewed in more detail. Three
distinct arguments can be distinguished. First, grievance and opportunity structures have been

6

argued to explain the relationship between regime change and conflict. Secondly, research has
analyzed situations of government collapse as an intrastate security dilemma. Finally,
diversionary-conflict arguments claim that leaders divert from their temporary weakness by
engaging in violence at the domestic level. After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each
approach, I develop an argument based on a commitment problem between the incumbent
regime and opposition groups. To place the argument into the larger literature on commitment
problems, I assess recent work in this area.
Chapter three presents a detailed account of the two-sided commitment problem that
arises following shocks to domestic authority. When a critical event such as economic decline,
defeat in interstate war, the death of a leader, or a change in the international balance of power
threatens the domestic equilibrium, the incumbent regime and opposition groups will bargain for
a share of authority. However, neither the current leadership nor opposition groups can credibly
commit to peaceful agreements following such events. The incumbent regime, while having
incentives to buy off the opposition, cannot credibly grant concessions since it expects to regain
its strength in the future. Opposition groups, on the other hand, may expect to become more
powerful in the future, and thus have incentives to renege on agreements. Lacking the ability to
credibly commit to negotiated agreements, both actors have the option of using force to achieve
their most favorable outcome.
I then analyze solutions to the commitment problem. What types of actors or strategies
will be most successful in making credible commitments? Since not all shocks lead to the onset
of violence, better knowledge of the types of actors that enable such nonviolent outcomes is
crucial for researchers and policymakers alike. I expect that the organizational features of
government and opposition and the distance between actors affect their ability to make credible
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commitments. Specifically, I argue that military and personal regimes have smaller winning
coalitions than single-party or democratic regimes and are therefore less credible when
threatened in their power. Military and personalist dictators cannot easily extend their circle of
supporters and therefore have little to offer when their power is challenged. Unable to credibly
grant concessions, leaders of such regimes are therefore more likely to use force. For the
opposition, groups possessing strong, hierarchical organizational structures will better be able to
police demands by radicals, thus enhancing their credibility and reducing the potential for
violence. Finally, greater distance between groups in society (arising because of ethnic, religious,
or ideological differences) reduces the range of acceptable agreements and thus makes peaceful
agreements less likely.
Chapter four provides a statistical test of the commitment problem outlined in the
previous chapter. The empirical implications of the hypotheses are tested in a cross-sectional
dataset including all leaders for the 1960-2004 period. The dataset includes information on all
types of critical events during the time period analyzed, as well as information on the
institutional structure of actors and the distance between them. Results show that critical events
increase the risk of civil war as hypothesized, and this result is consistent across different model
specifications. Economic decline, war defeat, and changes in the international balance of power
lead to an increased probability of civil war onset.
Analyzing only countries that experienced such critical events, I then assess whether
military and personalist regimes are more likely to experience civil war. Empirical results
confirm the hypothesis, showing that both types of regimes have greater conflict propensities
than single-party and democratic regimes. In addition, it is shown that cohesive opposition
groups are less likely to use force following critical events. As hypothesized, countries with

8

established opposition parties have a reduced risk of civil war onset. Finally, countries with
greater ethnic diversity have increased probabilities of civil war, confirming the hypothesis on
the distance between actors.
Chapter five provides a more detailed historical account of the theoretical expectations by
examining transition processes in Algeria and Chile. The case studies focus on variation in the
organizational structure of opposition groups for two reasons. First, little research on opposition
groups in authoritarian regimes exists, despite the fact that such groups operate in many
noncompetitive regimes. Second, the cohesion of opposition groups is a concept that is difficult
to measure in a large-N quantitative analysis. While the statistical results support the theoretical
argument, detailed process-tracing of historical cases allows for a more accurate
operationalization of the concept. Therefore, I chose cases that exhibit variation in the
organizational structure of opposition groups, but are similar in the other independent variables
emphasized in the theoretical section.
In the 1980s, critical events altered the domestic balance of power in Algeria and Chile
and triggered moves toward liberalization by the military leadership. In Algeria, economic
recession and youth protests forced the military regime to negotiate with opposition groups
(Quandt, 1998). The authoritarian regime decided to liberalize and called for elections, only to
later cancel the election results and use force against the Islamist opposition. In contrast,
Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 plebiscite was followed by a peaceful transfer of power and
successful democratization in Chile. I argue that institutional structure of opposition groups
explains these divergent outcomes. The Islamist Salvation Front (FIS), the primary opposition
party in the Algerian elections, suffered from competition between radical and moderate forces.
Marred by internal divisions, organizational deficiencies, and the lack of a clear program, the FIS
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was unable to define itself as a unified and credible alternative to the authoritarian regime.
Fearful that the opposition movement would renege on its commitment to a democratic regime
and establish an Islamist state, the military canceled election results and took up arms against the
Islamists. In addition, the FIS failed to establish coalitions with other opposition parties (Roberts,
1994a; Martinez, 2000). Conversely, opposition groups in Chile were able to overcome divisions
and polarization that had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the early 1970s.
Socialist groups, long beset by internal tensions, united behind a moderate message after a failed
coup attempt on Pinochet’s life. This development opened up the door for negotiations with
Christian Democrats. Parties in the center and on the left eventually formed a united, cohesive
coalition against the military regime. Moreover, party ties to the Catholic Church and unions also
facilitated the emergence of a unified opposition. The Church, while traditionally closer to the
Christian Democrats, attracted Socialists because of its engagement in human rights issues.
Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy in the late 1980s thus can be credited to the unified
appearance of opposition elites, which signaled credibility to the incumbent military leadership.
Chapter six offers concluding remarks on the relationship between political instability
and civil war. In addition to summarizing key findings, the chapter also advances suggestions for
policymakers and addresses recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Do shocks to the government increase the probability of violent internal conflict? If so,
how can actors avoid the onset of violence following a weakening of the government? To place
the central questions of this dissertation within previous research, existing theoretical
explanations on the occurrence of civil war are reviewed in this chapter. The chapter proceeds in
six sections. The first section analyzes the intersection of international relations and comparative
politics with respect to the study of civil war. The second section addresses theoretical and
methodological challenges in the civil war literature. The subsequent three sections summarize
economic, ethnic, and political explanations of civil war.6 Multiple theoretical explanations and a
large body of empirical research exist on the causes of civil wars (Sambanis, 2002). Since this
dissertation puts forward a political explanation of civil war onset, such theoretical accounts are
reviewed in more detail. Bargaining theories and their applicability to the study of internal
conflict are the subject of the sixth section of this chapter. A final section summarizes the main
theoretical approaches and addresses linkages to the theoretical argument developed in the
subsequent chapter.

The Intersection of International Relations and Comparative Politics in the Study of Civil War
Academic interest in civil wars has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold
War. While scholars in comparative politics have long studied insurgency and political violence
at the domestic level - such as revolutions, social movements, riots, and other forms of protest the last two decades have witnessed increasing contributions by international relations scholars.
Traditionally focused on military conflict between states, international relations researchers have

6

Consistent with the focus of this analysis, the review of the civil literature centers on explanations of civil war
onset, not duration or termination.

11

extended their research to explanations of violence within states, thereby challenging the
traditional distinction between comparative politics and international relations.
Traditionally, the study of international politics has concentrated on relations between
sovereign states and their interactions, while comparative politics engages in the comparison of
states’ domestic structures. Recent developments within both research areas, however,
increasingly question the validity of this demarcation line. First, international relations scholars
today explicitly consider the influence of domestic factors on the relations between states. This
shift is evident in research on the democratic peace or economic interdependence, which stresses
the influence of domestic political institutions and economic structures on the relations between
states (Oneal and Russett, 2001). Similarly, comparative scholars now acknowledge the impact
of international factors on the domestic structure in areas as diverse as democratization,
globalization, and the emergence of the state system (Gourevitch, 1978). Second, the anarchy
assumption, often argued to be the main primary boundary line separating domestic and
international politics, has been questioned by critics such as Milner (1991). Neorealist theory
argues that anarchy at the international level results in decentralized competition among
sovereign equals, where the absence of centralized control results in a self-help system with
states relying on the use of force for survival (Waltz, 1979). Yet this argument neglects the fact
that groups - at times violently - compete for power in the domestic sphere. The occurrence of
civil wars, for example, demonstrates that anarchy does occur at the domestic level.
While the theoretical distinctions between international relations and comparative
politics with respect to domestic violence seem blurry at best, some important differences
remain. First, unlike military competition between states, where states (or leaders) are the main
parties to a conflict, civil wars lack a stable set of actors. Therefore, research on civil wars needs
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to address the question of how and why rebel groups emerge and survive (Gates, 2002). Second,
anarchy is not a constant condition at the domestic level. This limits the applicability of
international relations theories such as neorealism, which assumes a permanently unregulated
environment in the international system (Waltz, 1979). As such, research on civil wars, unlike
that on international relations, needs to consider the conditions leading to the breakdown of
order.

Theoretical and Methodological Issues in the Study of Civil War
Before proceeding to an evaluation of theories of civil war onset, I present a brief outline
of challenging theoretical and methodological issues in the civil war literature. Among
theoretical approaches, one can distinguish between macro- and micro-level explanations, with
the main emphasis until recently on macro-level arguments.7 Examples of such macro-level
theories of internal conflict are approaches stressing the importance of political or economic
grievances or ethnic divisions (Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 1985). Yet such approaches leave
questions on individuals’ motives and actions largely unaddressed – why, for example, do
individuals take the risk of joining rebellion, and how is violence sustained over time?
Recent research by Kalyvas (2006) and Gates (2002) has started to fill in these gaps.
Kalyvas (2006) explores the logic of violence in civil wars at the individual level. In his
argument, actors use selective violence because it functions as a powerful deterrent, as it creates
the perception that actors can monitor and sanction behavior. Using selective violence, however,
is costly since it requires verifying of collaborators’ information. Random violence, while less
7

A similar divide exists in the literature on revolutions. Macro-level approaches, such as relative deprivation
arguments or structural analyses rooted in Marxism dominated revolutionary analysis until the 1980s, but came
under increasing criticism for failing to explain and predict the “surprise” revolutions in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union (Kuran, 1991; Goldstone, 2001). Subsequent research stressed the importance of agency and
analyzed the motives of revolutionaries (Kuran, 1991; Weede and Muller, 1998; Wood, 2003).
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difficult and costly to use, cannot induce compliance. It is therefore used only when selective
violence is infeasible. A combination of quantitative and qualitative data on the Greek civil war
is used to test his arguments, and results show that the type and level of violence used varies as a
result of change in actors’ control over territory. Gates (2002) examines (1) why individuals
make the costly decision of joining a rebel group and (2) why they remain members of the group
despite having to engage in violence and endure personal hardship. Gates concludes that
geographical proximity, shared ethnicity, and a common ideology are mechanisms facilitating
compliance and enforcement in rebel organizations.
In addition, bargaining theories of war provide theoretical accounts that help understand
individuals’ actions. By emphasizing the strategic nature of civil war, they explicitly focus on the
motivations of actors and the interactions between them. Informational approaches, for example,
outline how actors in civil war have incentives to misrepresent their own capabilities and resolve
to gain a military advantage (Fearon, 1995, 2004). Economic models of civil war have stressed
the opportunity costs of rebellion, where the availability of rents (such as natural resources,
foreign aid, or donations from diasporas) and the capacity of the state influence individuals’
decisions to rebel (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Skaperdas, 2002).
Yet while bargaining and economic models of civil war provide increasingly detailed
accounts for individual and group behavior, a gap persists between theoretical explanations and
the empirical tests. The vast majority of empirical evidence is based on the state, or macro-level
of analysis. Both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose micro-level
theories, but use macro-level data to test their expectations. To date, two possible solutions to
this problem exist. First, as Sambanis (2004a) suggests, researchers can use case studies to
develop and test micro-level theories. Collier and Sambanis (2004), for example, present a two-
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volume collection of case studies that provides a systematic application of the Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) model of civil war onset. A focus on individual cases allows for an
understanding of the dynamic and strategic nature of civil war and does not constrain its focus to
variables that change little or not at all over time. However, a drawback of this approach is the
limited generalizability of case studies.
A second solution would be to use data more appropriate for micro-level arguments.
Cunningham et al. (2007), for example, take the strategic nature of civil war seriously when
modeling it as a dyadic phenomenon between a state and a rebel actor. The authors investigate
the effect of rebel strength, group location, and alternative means of participation on civil war
duration. Yet a shortcoming of this approach is that it does not allow studying civil war onset –
how can one know ex ante which group will rebel against the state? Also, since the onset and
duration of conflict may not be independent events, such analyses may suffer from selection bias
(Lemke and Reed, 2001). Data collected by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project provide
another possible alternative, as they allow one to model empirically interactions between the
state and minority groups. Since not all internal conflict is ethnically motivated, however, this
approach might leave out a large number of potentially relevant cases.

Economic Theories of Civil War
Among economic theories of civil war, two competing explanations can be distinguished.
I will first discuss economic approaches based on rational choice theories that understand civil
war as a result of utility calculations. A second part will analyze approaches emphasizing
economic grievances in society and their effect on the probability of civil war.
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Studies by Grossman (1995) and Hirschleifer (1995) mark the beginning of the use of rational
choice theories in the study of civil war. Both see civil war as a result of economic tradeoffs by
actors, where the expected utility gained from conflict influences the decision to rebel.
Hirschleifer (1995) argues that parties calculate potential net benefits from a conflict and engage
in it when a successful outcome is likely. Grossman (1995) models rebellion as an industry that
generates profits from looting and that is motivated by greed. When the opportunity of rebellion
seems profitable, it will not be passed up.
Both Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the expected
gains from rebellion influence actors’ decisions regarding violence. In Collier and Hoeffler’s
(2004) model, the opportunity costs of rebellion determine the demand and supply of civil war.
Countries with low levels of per capita income have a higher probability of civil war since the
opportunity costs for rebellion are small. In addition to income and development levels, the
opportunity cost of rebellion is also influenced by the availability of natural resource extortion,
donations from diasporas, and subventions to rebel movements from hostile foreign
governments. Testing these expectations against country-level data, the authors find support for
their greed-based explanation. Fearon (2004) and Ross (2004), however, are critical of the
authors’ measure of natural resources, which is operationalized as the ratio of primary
commodity exports to GDP. As Fearon (2004) points out, oil is the major component of primary
commodities. He argues that oil increases the risk of civil war because oil producing states
exhibit lower state capacity, and not because it is used to finance rebellion.8

8

While theories of civil war have become increasingly elaborate and fine-grained, empirical tests often use the same
variables for different underlying theoretical concepts (Sambanis, 2002). Per capita income, for example, is used as
a measure of the opportunity for rebellion in Collier and Hoeffler (2004), whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue it
to be a proxy variable for state strength.
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Fearon and Laitin (2003) expect that the size and likelihood of insurgency is influenced
by the opportunity for insurgency and the government’s response to insurgents. Opportunities
for rebellion are greater when rebels are able to hide from the government (such as in rough
terrain or mountainous areas), when they receive support from foreign actors, or when the local
population supports the rebels. The government’s ability to contain insurgencies is a function of
its strength, which Fearon and Laitin (2003) see influenced by income levels, the degree of
political stability, and whether or not states are oil exporters. Empirical tests show that per capita
income strongly increases the probability of civil war. In addition, newly independent states and
states experiencing political instability are at greater risk of civil war. Finally, Fearon and Laitin
(2003) also show that states in which oil revenue produces more than one-third of all export
revenue are more likely to be involved in civil conflict.
Skaperdas (2002) develops an economic model of warlord competition in which warlords
compete over rents (such as diamonds, gold, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment). This
competition over rents results in the crowding out of other production, reduces the overall
welfare of the state, and increases the probability of civil war. Addison and Murshed (2002) and
Buhaug and Gates (2002) find support for this expectation, showing that the presence of natural
resources increases the overall probability of civil war and also prolongs its duration. De Soysa
(2002) demonstrates that a shortage of renewable resources (such as water or timber) relative to
an abundance of non-renewable resources (such as diamonds or oil) increases the risk of civil
war. Evidence by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) on the availability of natural resources and their
effects on the opportunity of rebellion also seemingly supports Skaperdas’ (2002) model, but the
authors make a different theoretical argument.
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Apart from economic approaches based on rational-choice theories, scholars have
emphasized the importance of economic grievances and their effect on rebellion. Gurr (1970,
2000) sees relative deprivation as a primary cause of violence, and feelings of deprivation are
influenced, among other factors, by economic inequality. In this model, relative deprivation
results from a discrepancy between perceived rewards and actual rewards. Violence is
subsequently triggered by changes in the perceived level of income compared to people’s actual
income level. Empirical evidence for the expected relationship between inequality and civil war
is inconsistent at best. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Sambanis (2004b) find no support for the
conflict-exacerbating effect of inequality on civil war. More recently, research has suggested that
this non-finding may be the result of an indirect relationship between economic inequality and
internal conflict (Cramer, 2003; Sambanis, 2004b; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Sambanis argues
that inequality may result in greater political instability, which has been shown to influence civil
war likelihood and thus indirectly influences the risk of violence. Similarly, Alesina and Perotti
(1996) argue that inequality can lead to violence through political effects. In unequal
democracies people push for greater redistribution, which consequently discourages investment,
hampers growth, and thereby increases the chances of domestic violence. The evidence
supporting this conjecture remains inconclusive. These expectations, however, have not been
subject to thorough empirical testing.

Ethnicity and Civil War
Theoretical arguments on ethnicity and civil war generally stress the role of ethnic
identity as a negotiation and enforcement mechanism within groups. Horowitz (1985) argues
that ascriptive differences (such as language, appearance, or religion) shared by a group result in
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the development of trust, and facilitate coordination and enforcement of agreements within the
group. A similar argument is developed by Gates (2002), who expects that shared ethnicity
contributes to rebel groups’ ability to motivate and sustain participation. While Gates (2002) also
considers geographic proximity and shared ideology, he thinks of ethnicity as the strongest
mechanism. Ethnic identity cannot be changed easily and thus carries a lower risk of defection.
Ethnicity, therefore, facilitates intra-ethnic cooperation, but makes the negotiation of conflicts
between different ethnic groups – lacking trust and coordination and enforcement mechanisms more difficult.
Caselli and Coleman II (2006) provide an explanation of ethnicity and conflict that
conceptualizes society as group competition over the control of wealth-creating assets. Groups
that succeed in controlling the country’s riches will suffer from infiltration by joiners who
attempt to free-ride on the group’s efforts. Absent easy detection of such free-riders, the group
faces the dilution of benefits provided to its members. However, in societies with ethnic
heterogeneity, groups and coalitions can be formed along ethnic lines. Ethnicity then functions as
a marker for identifying infiltrators and lowers the cost of enforcement. Group competition over
resources will therefore be more intense in ethnically diverse societies, resulting in a greater
probability of civil war in such countries.
Empirical results for the consequences of ethnic heterogeneity on the probability of civil
war, however, are mixed. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for example,
do not find that ethnic heterogeneity increases the probability of conflict. Some authors argue
that this may be due to a parabolic relationship between ethnic fractionalization and civil war
(Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Blimes, 2006). According to this
research, ethnic dominance, rather than heterogeneity itself, raises the potential for violence.
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Data on ethnic polarization (measuring the size of groups and the nominal distance between
them) presented in Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that
such societies indeed are at a greater risk of civil war. Their research argues that the greatest risk
of conflict occurs at a critical threshold of ethnic polarization, when societies are dominated by
two large ethnic groups. Highly fractionalized societies incur a lower risk of civil war as
coordination costs for rebellion are higher.
Blimes (2006) presents a different explanation for the inconclusive findings on ethnicity
and civil war. He argues that ethnic diversity does not present a constant cause for conflict and
affects conflict only indirectly. Ethnicity becomes salient only when other causes of civil war are
present, such as a weakening of the state or low economic development. Using a heteroskedastic
probit model, Blimes (2006) shows that ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance increase
the probability of civil war when other variables known to increase the likelihood of civil wars
are present. Finally, some authors have argued that non-findings on ethnicity may be a function
of a more fundamental difference between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars (Sambanis, 2001,
2004a). According to this view, ethnic wars arise over issues related to ethnicity. Ethnic diversity
lends itself to manipulation and can be used to generate collective action. For this reason, ethnic
diversity increases the probability of ethnic wars, but does not affect the likelihood of civil wars
lacking an ethnic component.

Political Explanations of Civil War
This dissertation puts forward a political explanation of civil war, and existing
explanations of this kind will therefore be evaluated in more detail. I will first review three
arguments on the relationship between political instability and civil war in the international
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relations literature. Authors have emphasized the role of political grievances and opportunity
structures, elite persuasion tactics, and the security dilemma. In addition to research in
international relations, an extensive literature on regime change, revolutions, and other forms of
protest exists in the field of comparative politics. While most authors do not explicitly address
the issue of violence during these processes, I will review research to the extent that it informs
the research questions posed here.
The first group of arguments in the international relations literature highlights political
grievances and opportunity structures as determinants of civil war. Focusing on opportunity
structures and grievances, Lichbach (1987) expects that dissident groups will substitute violent
protest for nonviolent protest depending on the state responses of repression. Groups will pursue
the most effective strategy as a function of the state’s response. If the state represses in response
to nonviolent behavior, groups will choose violence. If the state, however, represses violent
behavior, movements will switch to nonviolent forms of protest. Gupta et al. (1993) add a
regime-type dimension to Lichbach’s (1987) model. They expect that repression is more likely in
authoritarian regimes, and dissidents are therefore more likely to engage in violent internal
conflict. Dissidents in democracies, however, can select from nonviolent forms of expression,
and this freedom reduces the potential for violence. Moore (1998) empirically tests both
Lichbach’s (1987) and Gupta et al.’s (1993) models. He finds support only for Lichbach’s
argument, which does not differentiate among different types of regimes. Moore’s (1998) test,
however, uses only two cases and selects Peru as a democracy for the 1955-1991 period,
although it is debatable whether Peru should be considered a stable democracy for this time
frame. The selection of this case is especially problematic since Gupta et al. expect variation in
group behavior across different types of regimes.
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Building on work by Lichbach (1987) and Gupta et al. (1993), Hegre et al. (2001) argue
that the probability of violence will depend on the existing level of grievances within a society.
Democratic regimes prevent grievances since the expression of needs and demands is guaranteed
in the political process. Regimes in the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum, however,
do not have similar mechanisms and will therefore have greater chances of civil war occurrence.
Authoritarian regimes are able to suppress grievances through repression. Combining these
expectations, the authors expect a U-shaped relationship between level of democracy and the
probability of civil war. In addition to their argument on the level of democracy, Hegre et al.
expect that domestic regime change provides an opportunity for dissatisfied groups to struggle
against the regime in power. Finally, while authoritarian regimes can curb grievances through
repression, they are also less stable than democratic regimes and therefore more susceptible to
violent regime transitions. Hegre et al.’s (2001) expectation on the role of regime change is
similar to that of Fearon and Laitin (2003: 81), who argue that conditions for insurgency are
favorable in situations of “political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization
and weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion.” Gurr (2000)
develops a related argument, in which civil war is understood as a function of the salience of
ethno-political identity, the level of grievances in society, the capacity for mobilization, and
opportunities for action. The level of grievances is approximated by the level of democracy,
since groups in democratic societies are provided with nonviolent means of conflict resolution.
Empirical findings in Hegre et al. confirm a U-shaped relationship between democracy
level and civil war and show that regime change increases the risk of civil war. Combining these
findings with evidence of lower survival rates for non-democratic regimes, Hegre et al. (2001:
44) expect that all states will eventually reach a “democratic civil peace.” Their findings
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regarding the effect of level of democracy and instability on conflict receive mixed support in
other research. Subsequent research has largely confirmed Hegre et al.’s results on the conflictexacerbating effects of political instability. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Strand (2006), and Hegre
and Sambanis (2006) all demonstrate that political instability increases the probability of civil
war, thus demonstrating consistency across different model specifications. Results regarding the
conflict proneness of semi-authoritarian regimes, however, are not as consistent. Elbadawi and
Sambanis (2002) find that the level of democracy influences the risk of civil war, and ReynalQuerol (2002) shows that greater political rights, especially regarding representation, reduce the
probability of civil war. Yet Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not
find a significant relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood of civil war.
More recently, Buhaug (2006) has shown that the U-shaped relationship between democracy and
civil war holds only for insurgencies that target the state. He argues that group capability relative
to the state influences whether rebels will target the state or attempt secession. States that are
transitional and politically inconsistent will more often face challenges to the government.
Approaches focusing on grievance and opportunity suffer from two weaknesses. First, the
institutional logic of semi-authoritarian regimes may help us understand why grievances are
likely to result in group mobilization, but need not imply the occurrence of a civil war. A regime
facing domestic opposition could, for example, decide to accommodate group demands and thus
attempt to avoid the eruption of violence. It is not clear under what circumstances groups would
choose violence – admittedly a dangerous and costly strategy - over peaceful opposition. In
addition, what level of grievance is sufficient to trigger violent mobilization? Considering the
large number of semi-authoritarian regimes, we certainly do not observe continuing violent
struggle in all such states. Second, while regime change certainly creates a window of
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opportunity for opposition groups, it is not clear why actors would engage in costly civil war,
rather than negotiating with the ruling elite (Fearon, 1995).
A second line of arguments in international relations is the diversionary-conflict
argument developed in Snyder (2000) and Figuerdo and Weingast (1999).9 Snyder’s “elitepersuasion” argument maintains that threatened elites in democratizing states use nationalist
violence as a tool to generate public support and secure their power. According to this view,
ethnic nationalism is usually not developed before a political opening occurs. Democratization
creates the opportunity for the promotion of exclusionary nationalism and, in turn, civil or
interstate war. Snyder argues that nationalism allows for generating effective collective action on
a national scale, yet can be achieved only through the exclusion and repression of some groups in
society. Conflict is thus not caused by inherent tensions or ancient hatreds between groups, but is
“constructed” by weakened political elites. De Figuerdo and Weingast (2000) argue that people
may act irrationally and support civil war when elites manipulate their latent fears. Threatened
leaders will exaggerate citizens’ uncertainty about the probability of victimization by another
group, and thus motivate the preemptive use of violence.
Such arguments, however, seem based on the irrationality of the masses and a positive
level of victimization (Sambanis, 2002). Why should individuals pay the high price of
mobilization for politicians’ selfish objectives absent any preexisting tensions between groups?
Elite persuasion arguments, probably for this reason, are often combined with arguments on
ethnicity. It seems that such approaches, in order to be compatible with rational behavior, assume
that there is preexisting fear and distrust among groups, which can then be utilized by political
9

A related research program focuses on the linkage between regime change and interstate conflict. The argument
claims that threatened elites initiate conflicts abroad in order to divert attention from domestic problems (Mansfield
and Snyder, 2005). Colaresi (2004) also finds evidence that elites pay a domestic-political price for acting dovishly
in relations with rivals. Thus, inter-state conflict is exacerbated by weak elites that opt for hawkish policies to
remain in power.
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elites.10 In addition, the use of violence is only one of several options leaders may choose to
maintain power, and it is not clear why leaders would engage in a risky gamble rather than using
repression or offering concessions (Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000). Finally, while elites’
diversionary motives cannot be empirically observed, the argument nevertheless suggests that
such strategies are successful in lengthening an embattled leader’s tenure. This expectation,
however, is not borne out in recent research on diversionary war (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003;
Chiozza et al., 2006). Snyder (2000) finds empirical support for his argument in several case
studies, yet this finding suffers from selection on the dependent variable, since only countries in
which conflict occurred are analyzed.
A third political explanation of civil war is developed in research on the domestic
security dilemma. Influenced by research on the interstate security dilemma, Posen (1993)
compares the collapse of multiethnic states to the problem of anarchy in the international realm.
Absent domestic authority, he argues, groups provide for their own security, but greater security
is perceived as a threat by nearby groups. Actors strive for territorial integrity and political
autonomy, yet because of domestic anarchy, they are not granted sovereign status. Similarly,
Walter (1999) argues that the breakdown of domestic authority leads to the absence of
enforcement and arbitration mechanisms within the state. Absent a central enforcement
authority, groups are uncertain about the future distribution of power. The parties involved may
fear that their status will be challenged, or that others may take advantage of the power vacuum,
resulting in an intra-state security dilemma. Even if actors prefer to settle conflicts peacefully,
they may feel threatened and militarize to protect themselves (Walter, 1999: 262). Approaches
emphasizing this security dilemma, however, have not been subjected to thorough empirical
10

At the interstate level, Mitchell and Prins (2004) show that rival states use military force abroad to divert from
domestic problems. Rivalry, as it is characterized by mutual fear and distrust, presents an environment with ample
opportunity for the use of diversionary force.
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testing (Sambanis, 2002: 233). In addition, the analogy to the international system suffers from
the problem that anarchy is not a constant in the domestic realm and therefore cannot explain
why regimes fail in the first place.
I now turn to a discussion of arguments developed in the field of comparative politics, in
which I evaluate the literature on regime change and democratization as it relates to the question
of violence. A subsequent section discusses research on revolutions and social movements. A
final part assesses the small but informative literature on elections and violence.
While most research on democratization does not focus on the question of violence,
authors such as Przeworski (1991) and Colomer (2000) include civil war as one possible
outcome in their game-theoretic models of democratization. Przeworski’s (1991) model of
democratization processes discusses three potential scenarios that affect the outcome of
bargaining in transitional democracies.11 First, the distribution of forces (among actors) can be
known and unbalanced. In these cases, institutional choice is usually biased toward the interest of
a particular person, party or alliance, and they will consequently fail to maintain long-term
stability (Przeworski, 1991: 82). Second, the distribution of forces can be known and balanced.
Przeworksi (1991) considers this scenario the most unlikely for democratic consolidation. In this
setting, civil war is an option available to the parties. Yet, actors may foresee the instability and
danger of such situations and therefore negotiate temporal agreements involving suboptimal
outcomes. The final scenario concerns cases in which the relation of forces is not known.
Przeworski considers these cases the most promising for democratic stability, since uncertainty

11

Przeworksi (1991: 67) distinguishes between two aspects of democratization: Transitions from the authoritarian
regime (extrication) and a second phase that deals with the establishment democratic rule (constitution). He admits
that these two phases can coincide temporally, and may be difficult to distinguish empirically.

26

on actors’ strength will induce all actors to support institutions with checks and balances,
institutions that provide guarantees against political adversity.12
Colomer (2000), also using a game-theoretic model, sees two possible outcomes to
political liberalization. First, groups may compete for mutual elimination, leading to civil war
and an eventual victory of one side. Second, actors may foresee the risk of losing the conflict, as
well as the level of destruction involved in civil war, and negotiate intermediate agreements
between democracy and dictatorship (Colomer, 2000:1). These intermediate agreements, or
“semi-democracies,” are Colomer’s (2000) main focus. He argues that such negotiated
transitions fall short of consolidated democracy, yet can be beneficial immediately after
authoritarian breakups as they avoid the eruption of violent conflict. The absence of
“maximalist” actors (such as radical opposition or radical hardliners) is crucial for the possibility
of peaceful agreements. Colomer (2000) identifies three factors that influence the presence of
such extremist factions: Relative deprivation, utopian expectations, and restrictive institutions.13
In addition to the models presented in Przeworski (1991) and Colomer (2000), research on the
conditions for successful democratization and consolidation can be informative for the research
questions analyzed here. Regimes that successfully transition to a stable democratic regime have
presumably avoided the risk of violence. Burton et al. (1992) emphasize the importance of elite
settlements for democratization success. The authors contend that such settlements enable
peaceful competition among elites and allow for the eventual emergence of stable democracy
(Burton et al., 1992: 14). This emphasis on elite settlements is similar to other work focusing on
the importance of power-sharing and elite pacts (Lijphart, 1999; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
12

Uncertainty, however, may well have the opposite effect. If the distribution of power and bargaining strength of
actors are not known, parties may miscalculate each other’s strength and pursue institutions that will favor their own
estimated position. In addition, uncertainty makes it impossible for actors to credibly commit to a certain outcome,
and actors cannot anticipate that institutional choices will be abided by on the part of all actors.
13
Yet these factors are quite ambiguous and not clearly defined in the text.
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O’Donnell, 1992; Przeworski, 1992). Lijphart (1999) argues that consociational democracy is the
best way to successful consolidation. His work also stresses the need for elite negotiation, but it
is narrower in its applicability because of its detailed outline for the necessary institutional
arrangements. Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy requires the adaptation of certain
institutional mechanisms (such as grand coalitions, minority representation), which limits its
scope compared to other research focusing on elite agreements.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that elite pacts are important for democratic
consolidation as they lay out “rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual
guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of the actors entering it” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 37).
The authors support this with evidence on Latin American democracies, where countries with
pacted transitions were able to withstand authoritarian reversals. In later work, however,
O’Donnell (1992) seems more skeptical of pacts as a means to stable democracy. He sees
extensive “accordism” as a threat to democratic competition and successful consolidation and
argues that such pacted transitions often lead to the slow death of democracy. Yet he also points
out that intense elite competition (following democratic ruptures) bears the danger of immediate
reversals to authoritarian rule. Striking the right balance between agreement and competition
seems to be the difficult task to manage. Przeworski (1992) sees political pacts as a (short-term)
solution to the instability and uncertainty arising in democratic transitions. He acknowledges that
pacts can offer short-term stability and the protection of embryonic democratic institutions, yet
cautions that the long-term consequences of such pacts contradict democratic values.
Existing research on democratization, therefore, sees pacted transitions as a way to avoid
coups or authoritarian reversals. It seems that negotiated transitions, even though falling short of
democracy, can offer the stability necessary to avoid periods of prolonged violence. Yet largely
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unanswered remains the question under what circumstances actors can find such negotiated
solutions. Przeworski (1991) points to uncertainty as a factor, and Colomer (2000) stresses the
absence of extremist factions, yet these scenarios remain underdeveloped.
The extensive literature on revolutions and social movements speaks to the question of
violence as a response to political change. Structural theories of revolutions dominated the field
up until the 1980s. These arguments, often rooted in Marxist theory, emphasize the role of class
struggles, state conflicts with elites, and external military competition (Moore, 1966; Skocpol,
1979). This research defines revolutions as major transformations of socio-economic and
political institutions that are accompanied by class upheavals from below, thus focusing on a
small set of “great revolutions” in Europe and Asia (Skocpol, 1979). In addition, the occurrence
of violence is an important facet of revolution in structural analyses. Skocpol’s (1979) theory of
social revolutions, the seminal work in this research tradition, stresses the importance of
international factors in combination with social transformation and its consequences for
mobilization.14 Investigating revolutions in China, France, and Russia, Skocpol (1979) sees
revolutions as the result of intense competition for military and economic power with other
states, forcing them to undertake costly domestic reforms to increase their competitiveness. In
cases where the dominant class had an independent economic base, it opposed reforms, leading
to splits in the regime. The landed elite in China and France had no interest in supporting costly
armies and extensive bureaucracies, and subsequently overthrew the state. In Russia, conflicts
with more powerful adversaries simply crushed the infrastructure of the monarchy, creating a
14

Skocpol’s work has since been criticized on a variety of grounds. First, scholars have questioned the overly
deterministic nature of her model, where structural conditions all but preclude choice (Laitin and Warner, 1992).
Second, authors have applied her model to other cases with limited success. The Mexican Revolution, for example,
occurred despite the absence of a threatening international environment (Knight, 2001). Finally, Geddes (1990)
critiques Skocpol’s case selection. While Skocpol discusses contrasting cases at two points in her chain of
arguments, she fails to do so for the claim that external military competition has contributed to all revolutionary
outbreaks (Geddes, 1990: 143). As Geddes points out, many countries have encountered threatening external
conditions throughout history, yet revolutions remain rare.

29

massive disgruntled peasant class that eventually mobilized against the regime. While the
Russian upper class lacked an independent economic base, the existence of autonomous peasant
villages explains the occurrence of revolution in this case.
Yet structural theories came under increasing criticism following a number of revolutions
from the 1970s through the 1990s. Revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, as well as anticolonial struggles in the Third World, challenged structural
analyses in two ways. First, the class-based understanding of revolutions in structural theories
was incapable of explaining multi-class coalitions toppling regimes in a variety of these cases
(Goodwin, 1989). As a consequence, researchers studying the more recent revolutions
emphasized the role of individuals for revolutionary mobilization and objectives, thus shifting
the focus from structural elements to conscious agency. Wood (2003), for example, provides a
micro-level analysis of the peasant insurgency during El Salvador’s civil war. She suggests that
two path-dependent processes – patterns of past state violence and the proximity of insurgent
forces – created the necessary conditions for peasant mobilization in rural El Salvador. However,
campesinos only mobilized when they also developed emotional and moral commitments to the
cause. Wood (2003) finds that participants in the insurgency differed from nonparticipants in
their view of participation as a moral commitment to social justice and as a demonstration of
their outrage at government authority.
Second, revolutionary struggles in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seemed
to provide a new model of revolution, where the breakdown of the regime was coupled with
mostly nonviolent transitions to more democratic regimes (Diamond and Platter, 1993). As a
response to this changing nature of revolutions, a new research area covering a variety of events
such as democratization, revolutions, rebellion, protests, riots, and civil wars emerged under the
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label “contentious politics” (McAdam et al., 2001). In this research, scholars of revolutions and
social movements are combining insights from both research areas, realizing that many of the
processes underlying them are similar (Goldstone, 2001).
More generally, the social movements literature focuses on the causes of movement
mobilization, but – as in research on contentious politics - does not usually distinguish between
violent and nonviolent movements. Theoretical arguments on movement formation are similar to
approaches emphasizing grievances and opportunity structures (Gurr, 1970, 2000). Early
approaches on grievances were later appended by arguments emphasizing the need for
opportunities to rebel. The resource mobilization theory argues that movement formation is a
result of changes in the opportunity structure (Jenkins, 1983). Liberalization of an authoritarian
regime could function as one such change and result in movement formation as a response to the
possibility of renegotiation of authority.
Finally, a small literature in comparative politics addresses the subject of violence during
elections in newly established democracies. Chaturvedi (2005) expects that the potential for
violence at election time is lower as the number of undecided voters increases, an argument
similar to that of Przeworski (1991). However, this model has not been tested empirically.
Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) and Wantchekon (1999) expect variation in the probability of
violence depending on which party controls the threat to violence. When the stronger party has
the means to use force, and the threat of using force is serious, voters will overwhelmingly
choose the strong party (presumably to reduce the risk of violence after elections). Preliminary
evidence from post-conflict elections in Liberia and El Salvador supports their argument, but no
systematic tests are conducted. Allison (2006) finds that the performance of armed opposition
groups in post-conflict elections is a function of the groups’ success during the armed struggle.
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Based on a sample of Central American countries, groups successful in the military competition
are found to be more likely to do well in post-conflict elections. This evidence seems compatible
with Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) and Wantchekon (1999), as voters may support these
groups out of a fear of continued violence.

Bargaining Theories of War
While political explanations of civil war in the international relations literature have
emphasized opportunity structures, the security dilemma, and elites’ diversionary motives, the
argument advanced here analyzes regime change as a bargaining process. Bargaining theories of
war have generally analyzed inefficient outcomes (such as war) as the result of informational
and/or commitment problems (Fearon, 1995).15 After a brief discussion of arguments
emphasizing informational effects, I will evaluate approaches to the commitment problem in
more detail.
In a seminal article, Fearon (1995) analyzes three rationalist explanations for war, one of
which highlights informational problems. Bargaining inefficiencies arise when actors have
private information on their payoffs to prevailing in a conflict and have incentives to hide this
information (since it can provide a military advantage during confrontation). These incentives to
misrepresent can make bargaining difficult and undermine nonviolent signaling. The use of
force, while inefficient, can function as a credible means of revealing private information on
capabilities, thereby facilitating a war-ending agreement. Work on informational problems has
flourished over the past decade. Yet, as Fearon (2004) and Powell (2004) point out,
informational problems provide a poor account of prolonged conflict. One potential explanation

15

Fearon (1995) also suggests issue indivisibilities may lead to violent conflict, although he remains skeptical of this
rationalist explanation.
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for this can be found in Goemans (2000) analysis of war duration and termination. Goemans
(2000) argues that battle victories increase leaders’ demands and elites’ expectations therefore
fail to converge.
Commitment problems are the second cause for inefficient outcomes in the bargaining
literature. Recent research by Powell (2004, 2006) shows that issues as diverse as war,
secessionist conflicts, civil war resolution, public debt, inefficient democratic decision-making,
and administrative ineffectiveness can be understood in terms of a commitment problem. In all
instances, actors fail to locate more efficient solutions to the bargaining problem at hand and are
therefore left with a suboptimal provision of the good, or “pie,” in pursuit. This inefficiency is
explained by the inability of involved actors to credibly commit to an agreement, since they may
have incentives to renege and thus gain from defection.
In an article focused primarily on conflict between states, Fearon (1995) identifies three
types of commitment problems arising in (1) preventive wars, (2) preemptive attacks resulting
from first-strike attacks, and (3) wars involving issues that impact future bargaining power.16 In
an application to interstate war, Powell (2006: 169) extends this research by indicating a
common mechanism in all three scenarios. Large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power
create a commitment problem and therefore increase the risk of war. Following a power shift, a
weakened state must offer concessions large enough to deter its strengthened opponent, yet such
offers are not credible given that the state may regain its strength in the future. Fearon (1996)
shows that commitment problems arise when objects in dispute are determinants of future
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Fearon points out that while anarchy plays an important role for these problems, it differs from the role of anarchy
in security dilemma models. Anarchy becomes relevant only when “opportunities for action imply that one or both
sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains, which, if they were enforceable, would be
mutually preferred to war” (1995: 401).
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bargaining power. States may prefer fighting in the present if committing to a settlement could
decrease their bargaining leverage in the future.
Also focusing on interstate relations, Prins and Daxecker (2008) argue that commitment
problems hinder rival states from terminating costly and competitive relationships. Rivalry is
characterized by fear and mistrust, and rival states fail to reach mutually beneficial agreements
out of fear of reneging. The authors argue that the adoption of liberal institutions such as
democracy or membership in international organizations should help overcome fears of future
exploitation and solve the commitment problem. Results show that the combined effect of
democracy and development, change to democracy, and membership in international
organizations that include dispute-settlement mechanisms increase the probability rivalry
termination as hypothesized. Research by Bapat (2006) analyzes bargaining between states and
terrorist organizations as a commitment problem. He expects that states’ ability to monitor
agreements and impose moderate costs on terrorist groups increases the chances for negotiated
settlements. In an analysis of terrorist events from 1968 to 1991, he shows that host governments
that impose costs that are neither too low nor too high are more likely to form credible
commitments.
Other authors apply the commitment problem to incidents of internal violence (Fearon
2004; Walter, 2002). In Fearon’s analysis of peripheral insurgencies and coup attempts, a shortterm shock to government capabilities “gives coup plotters or rebels a window of opportunity”
(Fearon, 2004: 290). While the ruling elite may want to grant concessions in order to buy off a
rebellion, such a commitment is incredible since the government expects to regain its strength in
the future, and civil war can occur.
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Analyzing civil war termination, Walter (2002) argues that civil war settlements fail
frequently because of an inability of participants to commit to the terms of the agreement. This is
because the demobilization of military forces as well as the future distribution of power within
the state is not yet consolidated when settlements are signed. Combatants, therefore, have
incentives to renege on the terms of a settlement, since they may fear the use of military force or
attempts to gain hegemonic control by the opponent. Solutions to the commitment problem, in
consequence, will depend on the adoption of power-sharing agreements as well as the presence
of third-party actors. Guarantees of power-sharing and third-party support will reduce actors’
fears of exploitation and therefore increase the likelihood of a peaceful civil war settlement.
Walter’s (2002) arguments are supported in a quantitative analysis of the post-WWII era and an
in-depth study of two cases. Using data on 72 civil wars for the 1940-1992 period, she shows
that third-party guarantees and power-sharing pacts were crucial for the peaceful implementation
of settlements to the war. An analysis of the negotiating process during Zimbabwe’s and
Rwanda’s civil wars shows that post-treaty security questions played an important role for
successful settlements. The UN’s failure to extend third-party support as promised, then,
explains the tragic breakdown of the peace process in Rwanda.
Finally, regime change itself has been analyzed as a commitment problem (Nalepa, 2005;
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Acemoglu and Robinson’s work on political transitions
identifies conditions under which regimes fluctuate between democratic and authoritarian
regimes because of actors’ inability to commit. They expect that unequal societies are particular
prone to such fluctuations. In highly unequal societies, fiscal policy can vary greatly between
different regimes, thus creating incentives for groups to mount a coup, or start a revolution. In
the model, two groups, the rich and the poor, compete for political control and the setting of the
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tax policy. When economic conditions are bad and the poor are in power, they want to offer the
rich enough to avoid a coup, but cannot do so since they are unable to commit to future tax rates.
The same scenario unfolds when the rich are in power and economic conditions worsen,
resulting in iterations of highly unstable regimes.
A similar picture arises in transitions to democracy and the use of transitional justice
against the outgoing authoritarian regime. Nalepa (2005) argues that promises by democrats not
to prosecute the old regime are incredible following a transition to democracy, thus resulting in a
commitment problem. Once autocrats give up power, they have no guarantee that the new regime
will abide by its promises, and such uncertainty should keep them from stepping down in the
first place. The above situation can be observed empirically, such as in Hungary’s or Poland’s
transition to democracy. Possible sources of credibility, according to the Nalepa (2005), arise
from the extent of divisions between Anticommunists and Liberals, collaboration of Liberals
with the ancient regime, the likelihood of regime implosion, and public support for transitional
justice (Nalepa 2005: 42).

Towards a Dynamic Theory of Civil War
In this chapter, I have reviewed key theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in the
literature on civil wars. This final section provides a brief synopsis of the main arguments and
summarizes them in a table. I conclude with a preview of the theoretical argument developed in
the next chapter. The study of civil wars, as pointed out earlier, straddles international relations
and comparative politics, thus challenging the traditional demarcation line between the two
research areas. Traditionally, international relations researchers have focused on conflict between
states, but interest in civil war has increased greatly since the end of the Cold War (Sambanis,
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2002). While comparative scholars have long studied rebellion, revolutions, or other instances of
violence at the domestic level, recent theoretical and empirical contributions by international
relations scholars have spurred tremendous development and growth of the field.
Nevertheless, several theoretical and methodological challenges persist. First, unlike wars
between states, civil wars lack a stable set of actors. Therefore, researchers need to consider the
question of how and why violent opposition emerges, an effort that has begun only recently
(Gates, 2002). Second, since the absence of authority is not a permanent condition at the
domestic level, the applicability of international relation theories such as neorealism is limited.
Finally, a disconnect between theoretical arguments and empirical testing exists. While
economic theories of civil war provide increasingly detailed accounts of individual, i.e. microlevel behavior, much theoretical testing uses states, i.e. macro-units, as the primary units of
analysis.
This chapter identifies three distinct explanations of civil war onset. First, economic
theories stress the importance of economic cost-benefit calculations or inequality for the onset of
civil war. One set of explanations, based on rational-choice approaches, expects that civil war is
the result of utility calculations, where actors weigh the opportunity cost of rebellion (Grossman,
1995; Hirschleifer, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Skaperdas, 2002).
Empirical evidence confirms that countries with low economic development, weak state
capacity, and abundant natural resources have increased probabilities of civil war (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Addison and Murshed, 2002; Buhaug and Gates, 2002;
De Soysa, 2002). A second explanation argues that grievances caused by economic inequality
result in feelings of deprivation and, in turn, violent mobilization (Gurr, 1970, 2000). Little
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empirical support, however, has been generated for this argument (Sambanis, 2004b; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004).
Second, ethnic theories argue that while ethnicity functions as a bargaining and
enforcement mechanism facilitating cooperation within groups, the absence of such a mechanism
between different ethnic groups increases the probability of conflict (Horowitz, 1985; Gates,
2002; Caselli and Coleman II, 2006). Empirical evidence for a linear relationship between ethnic
heterogeneity and civil war, however, is mixed (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler,
2004). Researchers have developed three explanations to account for this inconsistency. First,
Reynal-Querol argues that ethnic polarization rather than diversity in itself increases the
probability of conflict. Secondly, authors have hypothesized a conditional relationship between
ethnicity and conflict, where ethnic diversity becomes salient only when other factors increasing
conflict propensities are present (Blimes, 2006). Finally, Sambanis (2001, 2004a) expects that a
linear relationship between ethnicity and conflict holds only for identity wars, which are believed
to be fundamentally different from non-identity civil wars.
Political explanations can be separated into three distinct categories. One argument
emphasizes grievances and opportunity structures (Hegre et al., 2001; Gurr, 2000). States in the
middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum are expected to experience more grievances, and
therefore, a greater likelihood of civil wars. In addition, regime change opens up a window of
opportunity for rebellion and for this reason also increases the probability of fighting. Empirical
studies have found support for the expected relationship between instability and civil war, yet are
inconsistent on the effect of level of democracy (Fearon and Laitin, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler,
2004; Buhaug, 2006). A second explanation views civil war as a result of leaders’ diversionary
tactics (Snyder, 2000; Figuerdo and Weingast, 1999). In this argument, weakened leaders
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manipulate people’s fears by appealing to nationalism which in turn leads to violent conflict.
While the motives of leaders cannot be subjected to empirical scrutiny, implications of this
argument have found little empirical support (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003; Chiozza et al, 2006).
Lastly, the security dilemma, prominent in international relations, has been applied to the
domestic sphere (Posen, 1993; Walter, 1999). When domestic authority breaks down, uncertainty
among actors triggers militarization and the occurrence of conflict. Such arguments, however,
border on tautology as the collapse of the domestic equilibrium is a defining feature of any civil
war. One would need to know more on the types of events that cause the breakdown of authority
for this approach to be useful.

Table 1: Main Theoretical Arguments on Civil War Onset
Theory

Argument

Authors

Economic

1. Civil war is the result of utility
calculations – when the opportunity cost
for rebellion is low, the probability of civil
war increases.

Grossman (1995)
Hirschleifer (1995)
Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Skaperdas (2002)
Gurr (1970, 2000)

2. Grievances such as economic inequality
cause feelings of relative deprivation and
increase the likelihood of civil war.

Empirical
Evidence
strong

weak

Ethnicity

Ethnicity functions as an enforcement
mechanism within ethnic groups - the
absence of such mechanisms between
different groups leads to a higher
probability of conflict.

Horowitz (1985)
Gates (2002)
Caselli and Coleman II (2006)

mixed

Political

1. Political grievances and changes in the
political opportunity structure result in a
greater probability of civil war.

Gurr (1970, 2000)
Gupta et al. (1993)
Hegre et al. (2001)
Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Snyder (2000)
Figuerdo and Weingast (1999)

mixed

Posen (1993)
Walter (1999)

not tested

2. Threatened leaders appeal to
nationalism and encourage violence to
divert from their weakness and stay in
power.
3. Absent a central enforcement authority,
groups are uncertain over their status and
militarize to protect themselves.
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weak

In addition, a brief review assessed contributions in the comparative literature on social
movements, revolutions, democratization, and elections and violence. With the partial exception
of the study of revolutions, most research does not explicitly address the occurrence of
violence.17 Colomer’s (2000) and Prezeworski’s (1991) studies of democratization mention
violence as one possible outcome of the transition process, but do not elaborate on the conditions
for its occurrence. Research on elections and violence focuses primarily on post-conflict
elections and is thus seemingly applicable to only a small set of cases (Wantchekon, 1999;
Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000; Allison, 2006). In theories of revolution such as Skocpol’s
(1979), only cases experiencing widespread violence are included in the analysis. However, the
in-depth nature of her argument combined with the narrow definition of revolution make it
difficult to be extended to a large set of cases.
Economic theories of civil war and arguments stressing ethnicity are similar in the fact
that they emphasize variables that change little or not at all over time. Variables such as resource
wealth, the ethnic makeup of a state, relative poverty, or economic inequality exhibit little to no
variation over time. While these factors may help us understand why some countries have a
higher baseline probability of civil war as compared to others, they don’t explain much about
why a country moves from a stable political and economic system to war.18 Civil wars, however,
are dynamic events, and an explanation of civil war should take into account the occurrences
triggering the use of force.

17

As mentioned earlier, the question of whether violence is a defining characteristic of revolution has arisen since
the peaceful “revolutions” in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union challenged the conventional wisdom
(Goldstone, 2001).
18
Butler (2005) stresses this point in their social network analysis of the Nicaraguan civil war, but argue that the
country-year nature of the datasets used is the root of the problem. Yet it seems possible to identify dynamic events
and integrate them into a country-year format.
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Political theories of civil war do a better job at identifying changes that result in a shift
from peace to war.19 Arguments on political opportunity structures specifically address the
importance of change, arguing that changes in these structures (such as a regime change)
represent discrete events that can trigger the use of force (Hegre et al., 2001). In a similar
argument, Fearon and Laitin (2003) expect that political instability provides an opportunity for
rebellion. Instability and regime change are emphasized repeatedly as the cause of domestic
conflict, and empirical studies have shown strong and consistent support for these propositions
(Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). While these arguments better explain war as the outcome of a
dynamic, strategic process, two problems remain.
First, the processes of regime change and civil war may be endogenous. The occurrence
of a regime change may already entail the use of force, rather than precede the actual outbreak of
violence. Particularly problematic is the fact that most studies use the Polity project’s data to
identify instances of regime change or political instability (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Fearon
and Laitin (2003), for example, use changes in Polity’s composite democracy scores to indicate
whether a regime change occurred. Included in these changes, however, are periods of
“transition” and “interregnum”, indicating a collapse of domestic authority. As Marshall and
Jaggers (2005: 17) describe, “interregnum” is “most likely to occur during periods of internal
war” and thus can hardly be seen as an exogenous cause of conflict. Second, Hegre et al. (2001)
claim that regime change provides an opportunity for conflict, yet it seems that actual regime
change indicates the endpoint of such opportunity, rather than the beginning.20 The opportunity
19

Arguments on the level of grievances usually emphasize the high level of grievances present in semi-authoritarian
regimes (Hegre et al., 2001). While a country’s level of democracy shows greater variation than many of the
variables emphasized in economic or ethnic explanations of civil war, many semi-authoritarian regimes have
exhibited great stability in the past.
20
Part of the problem may stem from confusion over what the term “regime change” in fact means. The empirical
test used in Hegre et al. does not measure actual leadership change; rather, it measures fluctuation in democracy
scores.
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to challenge the regime should be greatest when the first signs of a loss in power for the
incumbent regime appear, thus before the regime actually changes.
The argument developed in detail in the following chapter, though stressing the dynamic
and strategic element of civil war as do other political theories, avoids both problems elaborated
above. The explanation put forward here views civil war as the result of a commitment problem.
Following Powell (2004), I expect that rapid shifts in the domestic distribution of power create a
commitment problem and thus an increased probability of civil war. The comparative politics
literature on regime change provides examples for such power shifts. Economic decline, the
death of a leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of power have been
identified as instances triggering regime change (Geddes, 1999a; Colomer, 2000; Przeworski et
al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003). By focusing on the effect of these shocks
on civil war, I develop an argument that takes the dynamic and strategic nature of civil war
seriously, but avoids the problems elaborated above. First, a focus on shocks, rather than regime
change, steers clear of potential endogeneity problems. Coups and assassinations, for example,
often entail violence, and thus cannot be seen as independent causes of civil war. Secondly,
shocks to the incumbent government’s power seem to be a more natural starting point for
bargaining between government and opposition than actual regime change itself. I expect that
opportunities for violence are greatest prior to the renegotiation of political power, not once
authority has been handed over to a new government.
Placed squarely in the larger literature on commitment problems, this dissertation makes
two contributions to existing research. First, it models leadership weakness as a commitment
problem that can result in civil war in the domestic arena. Shocks to government capabilities
represent a shift in the domestic distribution of power and thus can provide a valuable empirical
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referent for the commitment problems described in Powell (2004, 2006). This research identifies
economic decline, the death of a leader, defeat in war, and changes in the international balance of
power as events triggering regime weakness, and, in consequence, civil war. Second, while work
on commitment issues provides a compelling explanation of interstate or intrastate war
occurrence, it does not lay out the conditions under which actors can avoid such inefficiency
even when external conditions suggest otherwise. Although shocks to the government represent
large and rapid shifts in the distribution of power, nevertheless examples for peaceful transfers of
power exist. The subsequent theoretical chapter outlines the commitment problem during
leadership weakness and presents possible solutions.
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Chapter 3: Critical Events and the Commitment Problem
In this chapter, I further develop how shocks to the domestic distribution of power can
lead to commitment problems and, subsequently, civil war. The chapter proceeds as follows. A
first section explores which cases are most pertinent for this analysis. The literature on regime
transitions in comparative politics identifies critical events such as economic decline,
international war defeat, the death of a dictator, and changes in the international balance of
power as causes of regime breakdown. A second section elaborates when and how these critical
events shift the domestic balance of power and trigger competition for power among relevant
actors in society. While the weakened regime and opposition groups could gain from negotiating
a settlement, they lack the ability to make credible commitments. This is because both actors
have incentives to renege on agreements in the future, and these incentives hinder cooperation in
the present. A third section investigates possible solutions to the commitment problem, expecting
that (1) the organizational structure of regime and opposition and (2) the distance between actors
influences actors’ ability to credibly commit.

Identifying Critical Events
Following a shock or critical event that leads to a dramatic shift in the distribution of
power, bargaining between actors can result in commitment problems (Fearon, 2004; Powell,
2006). More specifically, a shift in capabilities leads to bargaining between actors, and
credibility problems obstruct the negotiation of peaceful agreements. The argument developed
here expects that precisely these conditions arise when a critical event shifts the domestic
balance of power. A shock to government capabilities weakens the current leadership and leads
to bargaining over authority within the state. However, to translate this argument into a testable
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proposition, it is necessary to know more about the types of events constituting such shocks.
What events represent such sudden changes in the domestic balance of power?
The breakdown of authoritarian and democratic regimes is triggered by critical events, or
shocks. Colomer (2000), for example, points out that regime change is provoked by a significant
crisis of the regime, thus modifying actors bargaining power and inducing them to develop new
strategies of behavior. The literature identifies economic decline, international war defeat, the
death of a dictator, and changes in the international balance of power serve as these shocks and
can trigger regime change (O’Donnell, 1973; Geddes, 1999a; Colomer, 2000; Przeworski et al.,
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003). For example, all transition specialists argue
that economic decline increases the likelihood of authoritarian and democratic breakdown, and
this expectation has been supported in quantitative analyses (Prezworski et al., 2000). Similarly,
the death of a leader or defeat in an international conflict opens up space for a renegotiation of
authority within the state, resulting in bargaining over the domestic distribution of power.
Finally, changes in the international balance of power, such as a crisis in a foreign imperial
power, will have comparable repercussions. During the period of 1985-1991, reforms in the
Soviet Union promoted major changes in Eastern European satellite states and resulted in the
eventual collapse of the USSR itself (Colomer, 2000).
While the extant research on regime collapse is not per se interested in the consequences
these shocks have on bargaining inefficiency between political groups within society, it can help
in locating the cases most relevant for the analysis here. The period following such shocks,
preceding a potential handover of authority, bears the greatest potential for violence. This
emphasis on the weakening of government authority is different from existing explanations of
the relationship between political instability and conflict. Previous research has not paid clear
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attention to timing issues, usually identifying actual regime change as the catalyst for conflict.
Hegre et al. (2001), for example, argue that regime change increases the opportunity for conflict.
In contrast, this research expects that opportunities for violence are greatest when a shock
weakens government authority, thus prior to a renegotiation of political power.21 The period
preceding a transition to democracy or a reversal to authoritarianism is dominated by strategic
interaction and bargaining and should be distinguished from later phases in the process. The
relation of forces among actors will be much clearer once the initial transition period is over, and
institutions will constrain possible interactions among actors.
The above review of the transition literature demonstrates clear parallels between the
scenarios addressed by Powell (2006) and Fearon (2004) and the focus of this research. Similar
to Powell’s (2006) explanation of commitment problems arising between states due to power
shifts, critical events change the distribution of power within states and open up space for
bargaining. The following theoretical section elaborates in detail on the bargaining inefficiencies
occurring in such situations.

The Two-Sided Commitment Problem
When a critical event weakens the position of the incumbent government, challengers can
compete for a redistribution of domestic authority. Actors will contend for a share of power, yet
uncertainty over the prospective distribution of forces prevails, and opposition groups will

21

While the empirical test used in Hegre et al. (2001) can be reconciled to an extent with the focus on shocks in this
paper, a disconnect between their theoretical argument and the empirical analysis persists. Hegre et al. claim that
regime change presents an opportunity for violent mobilization. It is likely, however, that the opportunity for
mobilization would be greatest when the regime’s weakness first becomes apparent, not once a new regime has
taken power. To operationalize the concept of regime change, the authors create a variable that measures
fluctuations in polity scores. While such fluctuations may correspond to a concept such as political instability more
broadly, it is doubtful that it measures actual regime change.
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attempt to secure future influence. Immediately following a shock to government capabilities, at
least two groups compete for a piece of the domestic pie.22
However, the competing parties cannot anticipate the outcome of the bargaining process,
and the relevant actors do not know ex ante whether agreements on sharing power can be
negotiated. The incumbent regime would like to protect its vital interests and future access to
power, but has to offer some benefits to challengers in order to buy off a potential rebellion. The
government thus has incentives to make concessions following a weakening in its power, yet
such commitments seem incredible given its earlier behavior.23 If the destabilized regime was
unwilling to transfer power in the past, how can the opposition know whether it is serious about
transferring authority, or is simply attempting to provide temporary buyoffs? Opponents of the
regime may worry that the regime’s offers are merely an attempt to appease opposition groups,
which will then be followed by the re-establishment of hegemonic control once the regime
recovers from its weakness. The incumbent government faces a credibility problem, being unable
to commit to outcomes it has tried to avert in the past.
22

It is assumed here that at least one group within society will challenge the current leadership in situations of
regime weakness. While there may be cases in which no challengers are present, one should expect that individuals
within the elite would take advantage of the leadership’s weakness. The empirical literature on the relationship
between regime change and the probability of violence confirms this suggestion, indicating a positive and significant
relationship between instability and rebellion using different operationalizations of the concepts (Tarrow, 1998;
Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Zanger, 2000). Finally, the common definition of politics as the struggle
of groups for authority also seems to lend some credibility to the assumed existence of a challenger to state
authority.
23
Why would leaders - at least in authoritarian regimes - not use repression rather than offer concessions? First,
repression is likely a constant in authoritarian regimes. When faced with a major challenge to their leadership,
dictators cannot simply pursue the same strategy, and need to offer some benefits or perks to opposition groups.
Second, research suggests that the strategies of concession and repression are not mutually exclusive, and are often
used simultaneously. Franklin (2006) points out that theorists use the same explanatory variables to explain both
phenomena. Rasler’s (1996) analysis of the Iranian revolution shows how the Shah and his government used both
concessions and repression as a response to popular mobilization. Importantly, the combined use of repression and
concession likely exacerbates the credibility problems emphasized in this research. How could the opposition trust
that the government’s offers are sincere when it also arrests and jails its followers? Finally, while leaders may be
tempted to apply particularly harsh repression when faced with a challenge to their power, empirical evidence shows
that this strategy usually backfires. Schatzman (2005) demonstrates that the use of repression increases the
probability of violent rebellion. Similarly, Francisco’s (2005) analysis of government massacres indicates that harsh
repression results in backlash mobilization, and thus contributes to the eventual demise of dictators.
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A brief discussion of events during Marcos’ dictatorship in the Philippines illustrates this
scenario. Following the 1972 imposition of martial law, Marcos came under increasing pressure
to grant authority to the Muslim independence movement that had emerged in the region of
Mindanao. Faced with an open rebellion by the armed wing of the insurgent movement, the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Marcos administration attempted to negotiate an
autonomy agreement with the MNLF (May, 2002). While the initial agreement was signed by
both parties, the MNLF pulled out of talks when negotiations stalled over the implementation of
concessions by the Marcos regime. The insurgents were wary of the government’s true
willingness to implement the terms of the agreement, essentially being “forced to rely on Marcos
to agree to and help implement an arrangement that was contradictory to the essence of his
government.” MNLF leaders “had to trust him (Marcos) to give them governing powers,” yet his
government lacked the ability to establish such credibility, as Marcos had incentives to renege on
the terms of the agreement (Noble, 1981: 1104). When Marcos subsequently announced his
decision to hold a plebiscite over autonomy in the proposed region, the MNLF boycotted the
referendum and resumed its armed insurrection (May, 2002). While admittedly anecdotal, this
example serves to illustrate the fundamental problem encountered by weakened regimes and
their opponents. Strained by increasingly open opposition to his regime, Marcos attempted to
buy off a rebellion through concessions, yet these attempts were ultimately rejected as incredible
by the insurgent movement.
In addition to the commitment problems encountered by the government, a similar
situation arises for the opposition. Based on its expectation to be more powerful in the future, the
opposition has an incentive to renege on agreements in order to itself gain hegemonic control of
the state. Emboldened by the current weakness in regime capabilities, opposition movements will
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attempt to secure power to enact favorable policies and programs. While opposition groups
would like to accept concessions offered by the government, they can use this increased
bargaining power by reneging on a settlement in later interactions with the government. The
weakened regime will anticipate this behavior, and thus be increasingly anxious to maintain its
influence. Governments, in consequence, may be reluctant to transfer power, fearing that such
transfers may empower their opponents to make even greater demands in the future (Fearon,
2004: 298 fn.43).
Georgia’s experience following its independence from the Soviet Union can serve as an
example for this situation. Included as part of the new Georgian republic were the three regions
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Abjaria, and all three regions were able to preserve autonomy
rights in Georgia’s first elected government (Cornell, 2002). When Georgia’s first elected
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a coup d’état in 1992, however, activists in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia saw an opportunity to push for even greater self-determination. In
the summer of 1992, Abkhaz militants took over the region’s capital and declared its formal
independence from Georgia. This was followed by military action of Georgian forces, and a
yearlong civil war between government and separatists ensued (Jones, 1997). This brief
discussion of Georgia’s post-independence history shows that during times of government
weakness, challengers can feel strengthened and place ever-increasing demands on a destabilized
leadership. In the Georgian case, the granting of autonomy rights did not satisfy the requests of
an emerging separatist movement. The Abkhaz’ declaration of independence led to the
government’s use of force as an attempt to hold on to its power and defuse future challenges to
its power. In other words, Georgia’s leadership was concerned that any additional concessions
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would lead to further demands by the separatist movements, ultimately threatening the territorial
integrity of the newly independent state.
The commitment problem encountered during leadership weakness, therefore, is a twosided one. Both government and opposition groups suffer from credibility problems, which
hinder their capacity to negotiate agreements. Lacking the ability to fashion credible
commitments, both the incumbent regime and the opposition have the option to achieve their
preferred outcome through the use of force (Powell, 2004). The government may use military
force in an attempt to hold on to power and to avoid increasing demands by the opposition in the
future. The opposition, on the other hand, could choose violence because offers by the weakened
regime are not considered sincere. The use of force, however, is inefficient because it is costly,
uses resources, and destroys some of the flow of benefits available (Fearon, 1995, 2004; Powell,
2004, 2006). To avoid such inefficiency, actors need to make credible guarantees to share power
in the future. They are unable to do so since they have incentives to renege on agreements once
they recover from temporary weakness (for the government) or achieve greater strength (for the
opposition). It is therefore expected that the commitment problems caused by shocks to
government capabilities increase the probability of civil conflict.
H1: A shock to government authority increases the probability of civil war.

Making Credible Commitments
Under what circumstances can actors overcome the credibility problems elaborated in the
preceding section? The main emphasis will be put on the importance of actors’ institutional
structure and the distance between them in the bargaining process.
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Although commitment problems hamper actors’ ability to fashion mutually enforceable
agreements during leadership weakness, the empirical record presents instances of bargaining
after shocks in which actors avoided resorting to arms and succeeded in establishing regimes
with mechanisms for power sharing.24 In the recent transitions in Central and Eastern Europe,
Gorbachev’s shift to a policy of non-intervention into the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact
allies triggered intense bargaining between the old elite and opposition forces in the satellite
states. The peaceful outcome of this process shows that actors can devise strategies that allow
them to cooperate and transition without the use of force. Communist elites discussed the terms
of the power transfer with members of the opposition at so-called “round tables” (Welsh, 1994).
These negotiations led to the establishment of compromises acceptable to both sides, and the
redistribution of power was settled peacefully. Similarly, economic decline and increasing
international pressure forced the South African apartheid regime to enter negotiations with
opposition groups in the late 1980s. Despite the occurrence of a shock that could trigger the use
of force, the country subsequently went through a largely peaceful transition with built-in
mechanisms of power sharing, resulting in its first democratic elections in 1994. This outcome
was even more surprising given that the country was long thought to be home to intractable
political conflicts (Jung et al., 2005).
Yet little is known on how political leaders can enhance their credibility and reduce the
potential for violence following a shock to their authority. I develop an argument that specifies
how (1) the institutional structure of government and opposition groups and (2) the distance
between them affect their ability to commit credibly to peaceful agreements.25

24

The occurrence of a shock does not necessarily lead to regime change, but theoretical expectations and empirical
evidence suggest a strong relationship between both concepts (Przeworski et al., 2000).
25
A possible objection is that neither the incumbent regime nor opposition groups may have a true interest in
sharing power. While it is certainly true that bargaining may result in the establishment of an authoritarian regime,
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Bargaining for Authority
Following the weakening of domestic authority at the center, government and opposition
groups compete for a favorable distribution of power. While cooperation and power-sharing may
be mutually advantageous and avoid costly conflict, the use of military force remains on the
bargaining table since both actors suffer from credibility problems. Government leaders may
expect to regain their strength in the future and hence have incentives to renege on temporary
concessions to the opposition. Equally, the opposition may hope to be more powerful, making
the government fearful of attempts to achieve control of the state.
What factors are expected to explain variation in actors’ commitment abilities in the
bargaining process? First, it is argued that the institutional structure of incumbent regimes
impacts elites’ ability to negotiate peaceful settlements. Leaders of regimes with low
expectations of political survival in future governments are hypothesized to suffer from greater
credibility problems. Second, the credibility of opposition movements will be evaluated
according to the cohesiveness of their organization. Groups that lack clear, cohesive
organizations will have difficulty to maintain control over radical elements, and should therefore
be less able to guarantee compliance. Finally, the distance between government and opposition
actors will also influence actors’ commitment abilities. Actors that are far apart from each other
(because of ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences) will have greater difficulty
overcoming commitment problems than groups that lack such contentious variation. Solutions to
the commitment problem must therefore focus on the organizational structure of government and
the opposition and on the distance between relevant actors.

one cannot assume an outcome of one or another type of regime ex ante. In addition, a shock implies that there is at
least temporary uncertainty over the future distribution of power, where neither actor can immediately prevail. A
weakened regime can attempt to buy off opponents with benefits or perks and establish a broadened dictatorship, but
cannot simply seize power without bargaining (Przeworski, 1991).
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Leadership Type
The institutional structure of the regime in power will influence whether a weakened
government can negotiate a peaceful outcome in the bargaining process. The institutional
differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes are well established in the
literature. Yet, in addition to the distinction between these two basic institutional types,
important variations can be found within authoritarian regimes, and these variations will be
evaluated here in regard to actors’ ability to make credible commitments. Non-democratic
regimes differ significantly in decision making procedures, access to political office, leadership
choice and succession mechanisms, as well as in their degree of institutionalization. More
refined typologies of authoritarian regimes are now available, and different incentives inherent in
these different types have been identified (Geddes, 1999a, b; Slater, 2003; Ulfelder, 2005; Lai
and Slater, 2006; Weeks, 2008).
The elite’s expectation of political survival in future regimes is expected to be the crucial
factor influencing its commitment abilities. Elites that cannot anticipate continued political
influence will suffer from greater credibility problems as they have more to lose in a handover of
power. Regimes in which the fate of the ruling elite is closely tied to the fate of the leader will
feel threatened by a potential transition and can be ousted only with the use of force.
Military and personal regimes depend on a relatively small group of supporters that
receive particularistic benefits in exchange for enforcement (Geddes, 1999a). Regimes relying on
narrow segments of the population will, on average, face greater difficulty in making credible
commitments to power-sharing. This is because elites maintain control through repressive tactics
rather than co-optation and therefore cannot expect to receive political support from significant
parts of society once opposition groups demand a share of power. They feel threatened by
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challenges to power, as they cannot expect to survive politically in a new regime and are
therefore more likely to block a takeover with force. Military and personalist regimes have little
to offer when attempting to negotiate concessions with opposition groups, since their hold on
power is based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the population.
These two types of authoritarian regimes, therefore, feature winning coalitions that are
much smaller than single-party or democratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003).
Accordingly, elites feel highly threatened when a crisis weakens their grip on power, and fear
punishment in the case of a regime transition. Haggard and Kaufmann (1995), for example,
argue that military regimes in crisis situations have greater difficulty negotiating favorable exit
terms than single-party regimes. Similarly, since personalist dictatorships “exclude all but a tiny
proportion of elites from sharing the fruits of power” they are unable to offer credible
concessions when faced with domestic pressure (Goldstone, 2001: 149). Bratton and Van De
Walle (1997: 84) point out that personal dictators “are unlikely to initiate political liberalization
or relinquish power without a struggle, they have to be forced out”. Their inability to credibly
share power, thus, increases the probability of armed conflict.
Military and personalist regimes further tend to be less institutionalized than single-party
and democratic regimes, not having developed mechanisms to penetrate large parts of society
(Lai and Slater, 2006). This limitation reduces their chances for participation in future
governments, since their organizations cannot easily be transformed into political parties. When
an international event, economic crisis, or war defeat forces personalist or military regimes to
negotiate with the opposition, they will have little prospect of maintaining even partial control in
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the future and will attempt to thwart the transition process with violence. Concessions promised
by personalist and military leaders will therefore not be credible. 26
Single-party regimes differ from military and personalist regimes in that they incorporate
significant segments of society into the regime through the party organization. In addition, the
party ventures into many areas of social life, allowing for the inclusion of large parts of the
population. Through the party organization, leadership successfully co-opts and controls social
groups. The single-party regime in Kenya, for example, uses “the lure of state jobs to buy off
opposition politicians” (Mwenda, 2003). In the case of an economic or political crisis, dominant
party regimes can adapt by broadening the base of their regimes without giving up control.27
Elites in such regimes can make use of the party organization to adjust to changing external
circumstances. The long-ruling Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as Haggard and
Kaufman (1995: 267) describe, could draw on “the organizational resources available through
the PRI to initiate wide-ranging economic adjustments”.
When single-party regimes are unable to withstand the pressure to liberalize, officials can
negotiate a transition to a regime with shared powers, rather than risking a costly military
contest. As Geddes (1999a: 141) points out, elites in single-party regimes will be inclined to
negotiate when facing pressure as they can “expect life as they know it to continue after
liberalization or even regime change”. Leaders in dominant party regimes realize that they are
26

Findings in the literature on authoritarian regimes support this argument. Research shows that personal and
military regimes face greater insecurity in their leadership tenure, having a median duration of 17.3 years (personal)
and 11.6 years (military), compared to 32.6 years for single-party regimes (Ulfelder 2005: 320). Furthermore,
leaders of military and personal regimes are much more likely to experience punishments (such as exile,
prosecution, or death) following their tenure than other leaders, which is supported empirically in the analyses
below. These findings conform to the expectation posited here.
27
This is not to say that military and personalist dictators will not attempt to buy off opponents. However, the
institutional logic of their regimes greatly reduces their ability to do so. First, personalist leaders must defend
themselves from potential rivals, and extending their circle of supporters thus threatens their hold on power. Geddes
(1999a: 132) points out that personalist dictators must constantly eliminate the most able and ambitious potential
successors. Second, the military as a group is much less permeable than a dominant party, and thus could only offer
credible concessions to challengers who are already members of the military.
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better off to negotiate and secure favorable exit terms rather than risking punishment.
Furthermore, single-party regimes possess the political organization necessary for contestation
and can therefore expect to secure a political future under a regime with shared powers at least
for the short term. Post-Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, for example,
participated quite successfully in democratic elections. The former Communist Party of the
German Republic (PDS), for example, garnered 19% of the vote in the Eastern part of Germany
in the 1994 elections (Buchstein, 1995).
Finally, it is necessary to consider the commitment abilities of democratic leaders in the
case of an economic or political shock. Democracies have constitutional or informal mechanisms
to respond to national crises that bypass normal legislative procedures. In addition, executives in
democratic regimes can choose from routine forms of legislative authority to react to critical
events. In presidential systems, the executive can issue vetoes, introduce legislation, and
pronounce decrees subject to congressional approval. Legislatures can use impeachment to
remove the executive. Prime ministers in parliamentary systems can dismiss parliaments and call
for new elections, and parliaments are able to issue votes of no confidence. Leaders in
consolidated democracies, therefore, can choose from a variety of tools when faced with
challenges to their regime. In addition, reforms undertaken by democratic leaders are credible as
the commitment problem is resolved through repeated elections. Incumbents turn over power to
their challengers after losing elections, and stable expectations over such power transfers exist.28
One may argue that newly democratic states are more susceptible to breakdown when faced with
a shock to its capabilities (Linz, 1978). Yet, given that democratic leaders in new democracies
have already committed to sharing powers with political opponents, they should suffer from

28

Supporting this intuition, Gates et al. (2006) find that democracies are significantly more stable than both
authoritarian and inconsistent regimes.
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fewer credibility problems than other types of regimes. Consistent with this notion, Linz (1978;
56-57) points out that violence rarely plays a role in the breakdown of democratic regimes.29
Democratic leaders’ behavior should therefore be similar to the expectation developed for singleparty regimes.
To conclude, I expect that personalist and military leaders suffer from greater credibility
problems than single-party or democratic rulers, problems which in turn increase the probability
of civil war.
H2: Following a shock to government authority, states with personalist and military
regimes are more likely to experience civil war than single-party or democratic regimes.

The Cohesiveness of Opposition Actors
Opposition groups also encounter credibility problems in situations of leadership
weakness. Even when a threatened regime is willing to negotiate, it may fear that granting
concessions could result in greater opposition demands in the future or even hegemonic control
by the opposition. As pointed out in the initial discussion of Georgia’s experience since
independence, fear of ever-increasing demands by opposition groups can result in the use of
military force by the threatened regime. The opposition, therefore, must find ways to signal
credibly its willingness to negotiate, and to deflect the government’s fears over future demands
or a takeover of control.
Little systematic research on opposition groups in authoritarian regimes and emergent
democracies exists (Lawson, 1993). Much of the existing literature on opposition movements
and parties focuses on consolidated democracies. This literature, however, neglects the fact that
29

Hitler, for example, came to power through legitimate elections. While violence was central to Hitler’s
maintenance of political authority, the Nazi Party secured 33 percent of the vote in 1932, and President Hindenburg
legally selected Hitler as Chancellor in 1933 (Linz, 1978: 56).
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such groups exist and operate in noncompetitive regimes. While in some regimes these groups
function clandestinely and are excluded from the political process, other authoritarian regimes
allow for the presence of legal opposition parties. Critical for this analysis is the credibility of
opposition groups during government weakness. Which types of movements will be able to
credibly signal their commitment to cooperation with the incumbent regime?
It is argued here that the organizational structure of opposition groups will affect their
ability to cooperate when the government is weakened. Groups with cohesive, developed
organizational structures are expected to signal more credibly their commitment to a regime with
shared powers.30 This is because opposition groups are often divided into moderate and radical
challengers, and groups without developed organizational structures cannot limit radicals’
demands (Kalyvas, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Lacking the institutional strength to punish
defectors, weakly organized groups cannot deflect the regime’s fear of greater demands in the
future. Groups without clear leadership or a cohesive organization cannot signal resolve to a
negotiated settlement, thus hindering the prospect for cooperation (Kalyvas, 2000). In a
comparison of Belgium’s and Algeria’s democratization, Kalyvas (2000) finds that the presence
of a hierarchical, centralized challenger party in Belgium deflected fears of a radical takeover of
the old regime. Conversely, Islam’s decentralized, vertical organizational structure led to
competition between radical and moderate forces within the opposition during Algeria’s short
experiment with democracy in the early 1990s. Quandt (1998) points to leadership struggles
within the Islamist movement, where the rhetoric of Islamist leader Ben Hadj “seemed
considerably more extreme than Madani’s” (Quandt, 1998: 58). Fearful that the opposition

30

The focus on the cohesiveness and organizational strength of opposition creates obvious measurement problems,
especially for quantitative analysis. Unorganized groups lacking a strong party organization are expected to be less
credible, but the presence of such groups will be difficult to measure in large-N analysis. These measurement
problems will be discussed in more detail below.
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movement would renege on its commitment to a democratic regime and establish an Islamist
state, the military canceled election results and took up arms against the Islamists.
This intuition is consistent with insights from the study of ethnic conflict, where only
strong, hierarchical organizations that can effectively police extremists succeed in inducing
compromise for cooperation (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). Pointing to the relative prevalence of
interethnic cooperation, Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that the organizational structure of
groups plays a crucial role for the outbreak of conflict. Groups with dense social networks and
interactions allow for in-group policing, and radicals threatening interethnic cooperation can be
identified and sanctioned (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 719). Yet when institutional arrangements
allowing for in-group policing are absent, defection can lead to the breakdown of cooperation in
the form of spiraling violence.
In addition to the organizational structures emphasized above, links to existing social
institutions can further enhance the credibility of opposition movements. Ties to established
institutions such as churches or unions make compromise more likely as they provide additional
credibility and legitimacy to a movement.31 Such linkages can signal to the government that
moderates are in control, as existing institutions tend to ally with forces that will maximize their
political impact (Kalyvas, 2000: 391).
The Polish Solidarity movement, for example, had a strategic partnership with the
Catholic Church, which lent legitimacy to the movement (Meardi, 2005). Collaboration with the
Catholic Church, a hierarchical, conservative, and risk-averse institution, signaled that moderate
31

A possible objection is that the effect of such linkages will depend upon the nature of the respective institution.
North’s work on institutional stability, however, suggests that institutions are generally status-quo oriented.
Consequently, it is unlikely that preexisting social organizations would establish linkages with extremist groups. In
addition, the appeal of radical groups stems at least in part from marketing themselves as “anti-establishment”
alternatives to existing, more moderate groups and organizations. For example, research by Adams et al. (2006)
shows that extremist parties that moderated their positions are punished at the polls. Therefore, it is likely that links
to established institutions function as a signal of moderation.
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forces were in control, and thus helped to reduce Communists’ fears of radical demands.
Conversely, opposition groups lacking ties to other institutions, such as the Islamist movement in
Algeria’s regime transition, cannot convincingly commit to power-sharing and democracy
(Kalyvas, 2000). Islam’s structure is “loose and decentralized with no clergy, and religious
discourses and idioms compete on several levels” (Kalyvas, 2000: 389). The movement failed to
establish linkages to preexisting social institutions and could not convince the regime that
moderates were in control. Fearing an Islamist takeover of the state, the military canceled
election results and the country descended into a long civil war. An analysis of social movements
in Israel, South Africa, and Northern Ireland by Meyer (2004) comes to a similar conclusion. The
author finds that groups considering contact with existing institutions as “neither feasible nor
desirable” were more likely to engage in violent protest activity (Meyer, 2004: 177).
Cohesive opposition groups with ties to existing organizations, therefore, are expected to
be able to make credible commitments, and these characteristics consequently reduce the
probability of civil war.
H3: Following a shock to government authority, states with cohesive, organized
opposition groups are less likely to experience civil war.

While the above discussion concentrated on the independent influence of government and
opposition structures on the incidence of civil war, different institutional configurations will
likely result in different conflict propensities. If a regime that is unable to commit (such as a
personal dictatorship) encounters a cohesive and unified opposition, its promises to grant
concessions will not be deemed credible, and the probability of peaceful resolution decreases. A
similar scenario ensues when a weakened regime that could make credible commitments faces an
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opposition group lacking clear authority structures. While the leadership could credibly devolve
authority, it will not do so out of fear of reneging by the opposition, and either actor may choose
violence to compel an opponent to its preferred outcome.
Furthermore, it is easily conceivable that variation in the institutional structure of
government and opposition groups can result in a number of outcomes apart from the war and
peace dichotomy emphasized here. Civil wars, in the end, are rare events, and the absence of war
does not convey a uniformity of outcomes. Democracies, for example, will likely respond with
policy change and reform when experiencing economic crises or other shock events, whereas
single-party leaders may choose repression. Since the focus on civil wars does not allow for such
distinctions, more fine-grained distinctions should be developed in future research. Highlighting
civil wars, however, restricts the focus to the most violent, costly, and destructive of possible
outcomes and therefore seems worthwhile in its own right.

The Distance between Government and Opposition
The discussion of the government’s and the opposition’s institutional structure
emphasizes actor-specific elements that affect their ability to commit credibly. It thus neglects
the fact that divergence in actors’ preferences may also impact the bargaining process. When
government and opposition groups have widely different preferences over what types of
agreements are acceptable, bargaining can break down because the range of possible negotiated
outcomes is too small.32 In the domestic arena, divergent preferences may arise from ethnic,
religious, ideological, or economic differences between the relevant actors.

32

One may argue that divergent preferences can preclude bargaining if no area of overlap between actors’ win-sets
exists. In the past, Fearon (1995) has suggested that conflict over indivisible goods can lead to such a scenario.
Powell (2006: 171), however, argues that the costliness of fighting ensures that a bargaining range exists even if the
dispute concerns an indivisible issue. In addition, Schelling (1960, 1966) points out that much bargaining is implicit.
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Putnam’s (1988) work on win-sets makes a similar point in the area of international
political economy. He expects that the size of negotiators’ win-sets (the range of possible
negotiating outcomes) and the areas of overlap between these win-sets influence the likelihood
of an agreement. When there is no overlap between negotiators’ win-sets, bargaining breaks
down as no acceptable agreements can be found. Applying this argument to the domestic arena,
societies with greater differences are less likely to have overlapping win-sets. If government and
opposition exhibit greater distance due to ethnic or other differences, acceptable agreements may
not exist.33
The role of competing preferences in the occurrence of violence is stressed in research in
the area of regime change and civil war. Examining different actor constellations during a
transition to democracy, Przeworski (1991: 83-87) argues that conflicting preferences over the
organization of political life can result in bargaining breakdown, and that may mean civil war. If
actors are diametrically opposed on what type of institutional system should be adopted, no winset exists, and cooperation becomes impossible. Similarly, Hirschleifer (1995) notes that parties’
divergent preferences can develop into opportunities for civil war. In this scenario, contrary
preferences reduce the bargaining range, and actors choose conflict when it is expected to be
more lucrative than peace (Hirschleifer, 1995, Sambanis, 2002). Yet largely unanswered
remains the question of what types of actors suffer from such opposed preferences.
Ethnicity is suggested as a possible cause of civil war in much of the literature.34 While
shared ethnic identity provides a mechanism for trust and enables cooperation for members of an
Tacit bargaining, therefore, may have occurred in cases of negotiation failure that are claimed to stem from
indivisible issues.
33
When win-sets do overlap, smaller areas of overlap do not necessarily indicate that agreements are more difficult
to achieve. If win-sets, for example, intersect in a single point, negotiators should immediately settle on the single
possible agreement. If the area of overlap is small, a negotiator with a small win-set may in fact experience a
bargaining advantage, as the actor with the larger win-set can be “pushed around” to accept an agreement favoring
his opponent (Putnam, 1988: 440).
34
See Sambanis (2002) for an overview.
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ethnic group, the presence of ethnic divisions can complicate collaboration across different
ethnic groups (Sambanis, 2002). Scholars disagree on whether ethnic fragmentation,
polarization, or dominance is the appropriate operationalization of the concept. Some authors
argue that ethnic fractionalization should be positively related to conflict, claiming that the
presence of multiple small groups increases the probability of secessionist movements
(Horowitz, 1985; Buhaug, 2006). Others speculate that countries with ethnically dominant or
polarized groups are at the greatest risk of violent domestic conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Societies dominated by two large groups rather than many
diverse ones are more prone to violent rebellion, since the coordination costs of rebellion are
smaller. Empirical results on the relationship between ethnicity and civil war are inconsistent,
with results varying across different operationalizations of the key concepts (Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006).
The effect of ethnic differences on commitment ability is of concern here. When
domestic authority is weakened in countries with large numbers of ethnic groups, compromise
may be more difficult to achieve since government and opposition groups will likely split across
ethnic lines. Ethnicity works as one possible source for diverging preferences among actors,
which in consequence limits the bargaining range. If members of one group see themselves as far
apart or polarized from others, a commitment to negotiation becomes less likely, increasing the
probability of conflict. Political instability also helps explain why ethnic diversity has divergent
effects on conflict propensities. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) point out, many ethnic groups
coexist peacefully for extended periods, yet at times conflict breaks out and quickly spirals out of
control. As long as the institutional equilibrium is stable, ethnic differences should not result in

63

the use of force, yet when the renegotiation of authority becomes feasible, such differences can
exacerbate the commitment problem present during leadership weakness.35
Apart from ethnic differences, ideological and economic differences also may generate
preference divergence, and subsequently civil war. Yet, as Gates (2002: 122) points out, ethnic
differences should be expected to present a more salient cleavage, as ethnicity is difficult to
change and therefore unlikely to result in significant group defections. Furthermore, empirical
studies to this date have not confirmed a significant effect of ideological distance or inequality
on the probability of civil war (Sambanis, 2004b).36 For the theoretical and empirical reasons laid
out above, I therefore focus on ethnic distance as one possible source of preference divergence.
Ethnic differences, I hypothesize, will increase commitment problems between the relevant
actors during regime change and, in consequence, the risk of civil war.
H4: Following a shock to government authority, states with high ethnic fractionalization
are more likely to experience civil war.

35

As a corollary, high ethnic fractionalization may also impact the cohesiveness of opposition actors. During regime
weakness, groups in such societies will find it more difficult to make credible commitments as the presence of many
small groups makes it difficult to form a cohesive opposition with clear leadership.
36
Sambanis (2004b) points out that one reason for the non-finding regarding economic inequality may be that it is
related to the probability of political instability, which has been shown to increase the risk of civil war.
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Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses
Concept

Associated
Hypothesis

Expectation

Expected
Direction

Leadership Weakness

Hypothesis 1

A shock to government authority increases
the probability of civil war.

+

Leadership Type

Hypothesis 2

+

Opposition Cohesion

Hypothesis 3

Following a shock to government authority,
states with personalist and military regimes
are more likely to experience civil war than
single-party or democratic regimes.
Following a shock to government authority,
states with cohesive, organized opposition
groups are less likely to experience civil war.

Ethnic Distance

Hypothesis 4

Following a shock to government authority,
states with high ethnic fractionalization are
more likely to experience civil war.
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+

Chapter 4: Empirical Test I: Critical Events and the Threat of Civil conflict
In the preceding chapter, I argued that shocks to government capabilities create a
commitment problem for relevant actors within the state. I then focused on potential solutions to
such credibility problems by emphasizing the organizational structure of actors and the distance
between them. This chapter tests the theoretical arguments against data on civil conflicts and
civil conflicts for the 1960-2004 time period. The analysis aims to answer two questions: First,
do critical events such as economic crisis, the death of a leader, or defeat in war increase the
probability of civil conflict, as outlined in the theoretical section? Second, do the factors put
forward to alleviate the commitment problem influence the likelihood of civil conflict as
hypothesized?
This chapter proceeds in five parts. The first part outlines the structure of the dataset used
to test the empirical expectations. In the second part, I briefly summarize the empirical findings
to be presented in the subsequent section. The next two parts present empirical results for the
different statistical models. Each of these parts includes a discussion of the statistical
methodology, the operationalization of variables, and empirical results. The first part analyzes
whether shocks in fact increase the probability of civil conflict. In the subsequent part, a
selection model is constructed to investigate the effect of leadership type, opposition cohesion,
and the distance between actors on actors’ commitment abilities. A final section summarizes
results and gives a short preview of the next chapter.
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Data
Goemans et al.’s (2006) data base on political leaders is used to create a dataset for
testing the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter.37 In these data, leaders, rather than
countries, are the primary unit of analysis. This choice was made for two reasons. First, a
growing body of research emphasizes how leaders, not states, are the primary actors in
international politics (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003, 2004a, b; Enterline and Gleditsch, 2000,
Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Decisions in international relations are made by
government leaders, not states, and rates of leadership survival differ across regimes. Second,
using states rather than leaders would significantly reduce the number of cases available for the
analysis, since countries can have multiple leaders who hold office during the same year. This
would lead to the exclusion of cases in which leaders experienced political instability or
challenges to their authority, which are the most important observations for the substantive focus
of this analysis. The unit of analysis in this dataset is the leader-year, including one observation
for each leader and year for the 1960-2004 period. The first hypothesis, investigating the basic
relationship between shocks to the government and civil conflict, is tested using a dataset for all
leader-years. The final three hypotheses, analyzing solutions to the commitment problem for
weakened leadership and opposition, are tested on data including only cases that experienced
political instability.

Summary of Findings
The empirical findings confirm the hypotheses outlined in the theoretical section. First,
shocks increase the probability of civil conflict, lending support to the expectation that actors
suffer from commitment problems when faced with a weakening of government authority.
37

Data are available online at http://mail.rochester.edu/%7Ehgoemans/data.htm. Version 2.5 is used here.
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Critical events such as economic decline, defeat in interstate war, and the end of the Cold War
represent sudden shifts in power, resulting in commitment problems for government and
opposition. All three types of events significantly increase the probability of civil conflict,
confirming the first hypothesis. Second, solutions to the commitment problem outlined in the
previous chapter are corroborated. Hypotheses 2 and 3 stated that the organizational structure of
leadership and opposition will influence actors’ commitment abilities. As laid out in hypothesis
2, personalist and military regimes are more likely to experience civil conflict after a weakening
of government authority. The expected effect of the cohesiveness of opposition groups is also
confirmed in the statistical analysis. I show that states with cohesive and organized opposition
groups have a lower probability of experiencing violence following critical events. The fourth
hypothesis argued that greater distance between actors reduces the bargaining range, and in
consequence increases the probability of civil conflict. Findings show that greater ethnic
heterogeneity does in fact result in a greater risk of violence. Finally, a Heckman selection model
is used to account for potential selection effects between factors influencing the probability of a
shock and the probability of civil conflict respectively. Results indicate a correlation of the
disturbance terms, thus confirming the selection model as an appropriate modeling choice.

A Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil Conflict
Methodology
The first hypothesis argues that leadership weakness increases the probability of civil
conflict as a result of the commitment problem. To test this hypothesis, data on all leader-years
for the 1960-2004 time period are included in the analysis, resulting in more than 7,700
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observations.38 Probit analysis is used to investigate the relationship between leadership
weakness and civil conflict. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, civil conflict
onset, probit analysis is an appropriate estimation method.
Dependent Variable
The onset of civil conflict is the dependent variable in the probit model. Entry dates for
leaders are available in Goemans et al.’s (2006) data base on political leaders. Data on civil
conflict onset come from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Project and are described in Gleditsch et
al. (2002).39 Armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility which concerns
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at
least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state”
(Gleditsch et al., 2002: 619). The Uppsala dataset on armed internal conflict uses a lower
threshold, 25 battle-deaths per year, than the Correlates of War (COW) project, which specifies
that a civil conflict must involve 1,000 battle deaths in a single year (Sarkees, 2000: 129). While
the data also provide information on interstate conflicts, I only include internal armed conflicts
and internationalized internal armed conflicts in this variable. The civil conflict onset variable is
dichotomous and coded 1 for years with an onset of internal armed conflict, 0 otherwise.
I believe that a lower threshold on battle-deaths is useful for several reasons. First, a low
threshold reduces endogeneity problems. A large body of research highlights the effect of
economic conditions on the probability of civil conflict. Civil conflict, however, has also been
shown to negatively impact economic growth. Using a high battle-death threshold, therefore,
runs the risk of demonstrating the negative effects of civil conflict on economic development,
since fighting may have started long before a conflict reaches 1,000 battle-deaths. The argument
38

The number of cases in the probit model is smaller because of missing data in some of the independent variables.
Data are available at http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-ArmedConflicts-Dataset.
39
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developed here expects that critical events such as economic decline increase the potential for
civil conflict. It is important to avoid the possibility that these shocks are the result of civil
conflicts, and a lower battle-death threshold is therefore more appropriate. Second, a lower
battle-death threshold is attractive because it does not exclude conflicts that may be major for
countries with small populations. Finally, as war is a relatively rare event, the inclusion of a
larger number of conflicts also solves statistical problems associated with the analysis of rare
events data (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
However, to ensure that results are not driven by the definition of civil conflict employed
here, I also use data on civil conflicts using the 1,000 battle-death threshold to define civil
conflict onset. The data are described in Gleditsch (2004) and use the same coding criteria for
intrastate wars as the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees, 2000: 129). Cases are then
updated based on Gleditsch and Ward’s (1999) list of independent states and Uppsala data on
armed conflict for the post-1997 period.40
Independent Variables
The first hypothesis investigates whether the occurrence of critical events increases the
probability of civil conflict occurrence. I argued that shocks such as economic decline, war
defeat, the death of a leader, or changes in the international balance of power constitute power
shifts that weaken incumbent governments. While such shocks create incentives for government
and opposition groups to bargain, credibility problems keep them from committing to negotiable
agreements. I construct four separate variables to operationalize the concept of a “critical event,”
or “shock.”
First, I include a measure that indicates whether a country experienced a period of
recession, or economic decline. Researchers in comparative politics argue that economic decline
40

Data are available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/expwar.html.
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increases the likelihood of authoritarian and democratic breakdown, and this expectation has
been supported in quantitative analyses (Prezworski et al., 2000). I use data on economic growth
from the World Bank Development Indicators to operationalize this concept. The standard
definition of recession is a decline in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) for two or more
consecutive quarters.41 Since quarterly data on GDP growth rates are not available for a large set
of countries, states with negative growth rates during a given year are defined as being in
recession. I create a dummy variable coded 1 if a country experienced a decline in GDP growth
during a given leader-year, 0 otherwise.
Defeat in interstate war is the second indication of leadership weakness operationalized
in this paper. Data on interstate wars provided in the Correlates of War (COW) project include
information on war outcomes.42 Specifically, the data include a variable indicating whether a
country was on the winning or losing side of a conflict. I constructed a dichotomous variable
coded 1 if a leader was on the losing side of an interstate war during a given leader-year, 0
otherwise. For the period of 1960-2004, 28 leaders experienced defeat in international wars.
Third, I have argued that the death of a leader while in office constitutes a shift in the
regime’s power and will trigger a bargaining process between followers of the incumbent regime
and opposition. Data for leader deaths are available in the Goemans et al. (2006) data.43 I include
a measure of death in office, coded 1 for leaders that died of natural causes while in office, 0
otherwise. In the time period analyzed here, 99 leaders died in office.
41

While this is the standard newspaper definition, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) uses a more
complex procedure to define recession in their data on the U.S. business cycle. The NBER definition considers the
depth and duration of economic decline, includes a broader set of indicators than GDP, and uses monthly indicators.
Data for the United States are available at http://www.nber.org/.
42
Data are available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/.
43
The variable available in Goemans et al. (2006) codes whether a leader left office because of regular loss, natural
death, irregular loss, or deposition. I construct a dummy variable coded 1 for leaders that died of natural causes
while in office, 0 otherwise. While irregular leadership exit (due to assassinations or coups) or depositions also
indicate bargaining over power, they often imply the occurrence of domestic violence, and are therefore endogenous
to a model of leadership weakness and civil conflict.
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Fourth, changes in the international balance of power can weaken the domestic
distribution of power and open up space for bargaining. While “change in the international
balance of power” is difficult to operationalize in a large-N setting, the upheaval triggered by the
end of the Cold War presents an instance of such changes. Reforms in the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s led to crises of legitimacy and subsequent regime changes in the Central and Eastern
European satellite states, followed by the eventual collapse of the USSR (Colomer, 2000). To
account for this change in the balance of power, I include a dichotomous variable coded 1 for the
years 1990-1995, 0 otherwise.
Finally, I created a variable combining all four of these event types. This measure is
labeled “shock” and is a dummy variable created from the four previously described indicators.
It is a dichotomous measure coded 1 for countries experiencing recession, war defeat, leader
death, and/or changes in the international balance of power, 0 otherwise.
The operationalization of political instability used here differs from earlier research.
Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, operationalize instability by
measuring fluctuations in polity scores.44 While this measure gauges variation in states’ level of
democracy, it fails to identify the precise conditions triggering a bargaining process between
actors for a share of authority. Hegre et al. and Fearon and Laitin argue that political instability
opens a window of opportunity for potential rebellion, but the variable used to measure this
concept is rather abstract. This research operationalizes the shocks identified as causes of regime
change in the comparative literature, and can thereby more accurately identify opportunities for
rebellion.
In order to control for alternative explanations of civil conflict, several variables are
added to the model testing the first hypothesis. To allow for comparability with earlier research, I
44

The composite polity score is a 21-point scale ranging from most autocratic to most democratic.
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will use covariates similar to those of Hegre et al. (2001). First, the polity score, a measure
accounting for the level of democracy, is added to the model.45 The squared term of this variable
is also included in order to allow for the curvilinear relationship proposed by Hegre et al. (2001).
Second, the level of economic development is expected to influence the risk of civil conflict
occurrence. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) show that the probability of civil conflict is reduced by
increases in GDP per capita, as the economic opportunity costs for rebels from fighting become
greater.46 To control for economic development, I include a variable measuring GDP per capita
per leader-year.47 Because of high skewness, this variable is log-transformed. Conforming to
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) finding, increases in GDP per capita are expected to lower the risk
of internal war.
To account for temporal dependence in the model, I follow Beck et al.’s (1998) advice
and include cubic spline variables in the probit models presented below.48 To ensure that results
are not influenced by the particular set of control variables employed, I also present models
without the control variables. Finally, I discuss results on the relationship between leadership
weakness and civil conflict using a battle-death threshold of 1,000.49 Table 3 provides summary
statistics for the independent variables used in the probit model.

45

The composite score ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Data come from the Polity IV
project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. The variable used here is called Polity 2, designed to
facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. This variable revises the combined annual
polity score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority codes” (i.e., 66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).
46
Hegre et al. (2001) also include a squared GDP per capita variable based on earlier research by Collier and
Hoeffler (1998). Since Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do not hypothesize such a relationship, I did not include a
squared term.
47
GDP data come from the the World Development Indicators 2004.
48
Coefficients for the spline variables are not reported to conserve space.
49
Results are presented in table 6 in the appendix.

73

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Probit Model
Variable Name

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Description

Civil conflict (25 battle deaths)

0.03

0.16

0

1

Coded 1 for armed conflict onset

Civil War (1,000 battle deaths)

0.01

0.12

0

1

Coded 1 for civil war onset

Recession

0.18

0.38

0

1

Coded 1 for recession

War Defeat

0.004

0.06

0

1

Coded 1 for defeat in interstate war

Death in Office

0.013

0.11

0

1

Coded 1 for leader death while in office

End of Cold War

0.15

0.36

0

1

Coded 1 for years 1985-1995

Critical Event

0.37

0.58

0

1

Coded 1 for recession, leader death, war
defeat, and cold war

Democracy Level

0.24

7.49

-10

+10

Composite autocracy-democracy score

Democracy squared

56.3

32.4

0

100

Composite autocracy-democracy score,
squared

Economic Development

1.5

0.57

0.72

4.23

GDP per capita, logged

Results
The first model presented here includes four variables measuring the effect of different
types of shocks on the probability of civil conflict. Results for this model are presented in the
first column of table 4 and show strong support for the expected relationship between leadership
weakness and the probability of civil conflict. The variable measuring whether a country
experienced a recession is positive and significant (z=4.48, p<0.01), indicating that economic
decline indeed increases the potential for violence. Undergoing a recession results in a 0.02
increase in the probability of internal armed conflict, which equals a 109% increase (all other
variables held constant). This result supports the expectation that critical events weakening the
incumbent government create commitment problems and increase the risk for violence.
War defeat is the second variable employed to operationalize the concept of a critical
event. It was argued that defeat in war signals the government’s weakness to opposition groups,
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which in turn leads to bargaining over power. The coefficient for this variable is significant and
positive (z=3.43, p<0.01), thus supporting the expectation that war defeat generates credibility
problems among actors and thus increases the likelihood of civil conflict. The substantive effect
of war defeat is immense. The probability of civil conflict onset increases by 0.15 when war
defeat is varied from 0 to 1, representing a 774% increase.

Table 4: Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil conflict (25 battle-deaths)
Variable Name

Shock

Model 1
Estimate
(Robust
S.E.)
0.324***
(0.07)
1.12***
(0.327)
-0.302
(0.383)
0.238***
(0.076)
—

Model 2
Estimate
(Robust
S.E.)
0.238***
(0.078)
1.189***
(0.33)
-0.246
(0.387)
0.272***
(0.086)
—

Democracy Level

—

Democracy Squared

—

Economic
Development
N

—

-0.002
(0.006)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.289***
(0.094)
5,217

Recession
War Defeat
Death in Office
End of Cold War

6,796

Model 3
Estimate
(Robust
S.E.)
—

∆
Probability
Model 1

∆
Probability
Model 2

∆
Probability
Model 3

+0.021

+0.014

—

—

+0.155

+0.17

—

—

—

—

—

—

+0.015

+0.017

—

0.267***
(0.053)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.281***
(0.094)
5,217

—

—

+0.016

—a

—a

—a

—a

—a

—a

—

-0.017

-0.015

Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Columns 4-6 show the marginal effect of
the significant variables on the probability of civil conflict. Variables are varied from one standard deviation below
their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. All
other variables were held at their mean or modal values. Probabilities were calculated using the mfx command in
Stata 9.2.
a
Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

The end of Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda provides an illustration of this finding.
Following Uganda’s defeat in the war against Tanzania in April of 1979, Uganda witnessed a
“winner-takes-all” struggle between members of the old regime, the Ugandan National
Liberation Front (UNLF, formed by Ugandans in exile), and followers of former President
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Obote, Uganda’s leader after independence in 1962. While the UNLF moved quickly in setting
up the National Consultative Council, it represented only the more radical elements within the
UNLF and excluded pro-Obote groups from the government (Gertzel, 1980). In addition, years
of arbitrary personal rule had left the new government with an institutional and political vacuum
as well as a crippled economy. Following a string of temporary leaders, former President Obote
was reinstalled as the country’s leader in late 1980, but this move was vehemently opposed by a
UNLF faction led by Museveni, which started a six-year guerilla war against the Obote regime.
The third variable used to measure the occurrence of a shock is the death of a leader.
When a leader dies during his term in office, one should expect intense bargaining between
members of the old regime and opposition groups over the future distribution of power. While
peaceful agreements may be mutually preferable, both groups have incentives to renege on
agreements, and these incentives can lead to bargaining inefficiencies and fighting. The
coefficient for this variable, however, is negative and fails to meet conventional levels of
statistical significance. Therefore, I cannot support the expectation on bargaining inefficiency
and violence after leader death.
There are two possible reasons for this finding. First, especially in cases where the death
of the leader is foreseeable, instability and violence may in fact precede the leader’s death.
Second, many regimes have pre-arranged succession arrangements that may reduce the potential
for violence following the death of a leader. However, whether such arrangements will be
adhered to after a leader’s death will vary across different types of regimes.50 Single-party
regimes, for example, have the organizational structure of the party to arrange for an orderly
transfer of power. Four out of seven Soviet Union leaders, for example, died of natural causes
50

To account for this possibility, I create a variable measuring a leader’s death in office in personalist and military
regimes only. While the coefficient for this variable was positive, it nevertheless failed to reach conventional
significance levels.
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while in office, but the party organization swiftly and effectively installed successors. In military
and personal regimes, on the other hand, the death of a leader should have much greater
destabilizing effects (Geddes, 1999a). Following the death of dictator, pre-established succession
mechanisms are often ignored, or successors do not survive long in office. Marcello Caetano,
chosen by Portuguese dictator Salazar as his successor, was thrown out of office four years after
Salazar’s death.
Finally, the comparative politics literature also identifies changes in the international
balance of power as instances related to leadership weakness and regime change. This concept is
operationalized with a measure accounting for the destabilizing effects of the end of the Cold
War. As hypothesized, the coefficient is statistically significant and positive (z=3.13, p<0.01).
The probability of civil conflict increases from 0.02 to 0.035 when the indicator is varied from 0
to 1 (and all other variables are held constant), which equals a 73% increase. The collapse of a
foreign tutorial power evinces the current government’s weakness and thus results in bargaining
over a new distribution of authority. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the
subsequent end of the Cold War divide have therefore triggered increased probabilities of civil
conflict. Violent struggle in the Caucasus, for example, demonstrates how shocks to the balance
of power can lead to conflictual outcomes.
The second model presented in table 4 includes control variables similar to those of
Hegre et al. (2001). Results for the variables testing the first hypothesis are very similar to those
of the first model. Recession, war defeat, and the end of the Cold War significantly increase the
probability of civil conflict, thus strongly supporting hypothesis 1. As in the previous model,
however, a leader’s death in office has no significant effect on the likelihood of armed conflict.
The control variables included in the second model perform mostly as expected. I find support
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for the curvilinear relationship between level of democracy and civil conflict, as indicated by the
negative and significant coefficient for the squared democracy term (z=-3.98, p<0.01). This
confirms research by Hegre et al. (2001). The variable measuring economic development shows
a negative and weakly significant relationship between GDP per capita and the risk of civil
conflict occurrence (z=-3.05, p<0.001). When varied from one standard deviation below its mean
to one standard deviation above (and all else held constant), the probability of civil conflict
decreases by 0.016, or 55%. This finding is consistent with expectations by Collier and Hoeffler
(2000).
The third model in table 4 uses the variable combining all four types of shocks. The
measure combines economic decline, defeat in war, leader death in office, and the end of the
Cold War into a single dichotomous variable. While death in office failed to have a significant
effect on the probability of civil conflict, it is included in the measure for theoretical reasons.
Consistent with the evidence in the first model, the occurrence of a shock significantly increases
the probability of civil conflict (z=4.23, p<0.01). The likelihood of civil conflict increases by
0.02 if the variable is varied from 0 to 1 (with all other variables held constant), which equals an
86% increase. The first hypothesis, therefore, is supported using individual types of shocks and
the measure combining all four types of events. Among the control variables, the curvilinear
relationship between the level of democracy and civil conflict is confirmed in the second model.
The coefficient for the squared democracy variable is negative and significant at the 99%
confidence level. A negative and significant relationship between economic development and the
probability of civil conflict is again confirmed in the second model.
Finally, I also tested the expectation developed in the first hypothesis using data on civil
wars with more than 1,000 battle-deaths per year. Results are presented in table 7 in the appendix
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and are largely consistent with the above results. Economic decline and war defeat significantly
increase the risk of civil war using a higher battle-death threshold. As in the models discussed
above, the variable measuring whether a leader died in office is not significantly related to civil
war onset. The dichotomous variable accounting for the end of the Cold War fails to meet
conventional levels of statistical significance, contradicting the findings in the models using a 25
battle-death threshold. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a large
number of new states with small populations. As mentioned earlier, conflicts with fewer than
1,000 battle deaths would arguably be major for such states, and the exclusion of such cases may
drive the non-finding for this variable.

A Selection Model of Critical Events and Civil conflict
Methodology
Thus far, this paper has emphasized the commitment problems following shocks to
government authority, not addressing whether the causes of such critical events could be related
to the model. Since the absence of domestic authority is not a constant feature of the domestic
political arena (as in the international system), the reasons leading to regime weakness in the first
place may well be related to the likelihood of violence following such shocks. It seems
reasonable to expect that factors related to the collapse of regimes are not independent from
whether subsequent interactions between relevant actors turn violent.
The literature on civil conflicts has generally failed to account for such selection effects.
Sambanis’ (2004b) and Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) investigations of the effects of economic
inequality on civil conflict are partial exceptions. Both works suggest that the reason for the nonrelationship between inequality and civil conflict in many studies may in fact be a result of an
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omitted intervening variable, political stability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that inequality
in fact is related to political instability, although their research suffers from the use of an
instability measure that also includes the use of force. Sambanis’ (2004b) measure of instability
does not include violent incidents, yet while demonstrating that inequality is related to
instability, he fails to then relate instability to civil conflict, hence omitting the second stage of
the model.
A growing body of research on conflict between states, however, emphasizes the
importance of such selection effects and proposes various solutions to these problems (Reed,
2000; Lemke and Reed, 2001; Fearon, 2002; Sartori, 2003; Boehmke et al., 2006). Lemke and
Reed (2001), for example, argue that the causes of war between international rivals (a small
group of states that fight repeatedly) are related to the formation of such rivalries. The decision
to enter a rivalry, therefore, is not independent from the decision to fight once a rivalry has
started. Using a selection estimator, the authors present evidence for a significant relationship
between the two stages (Lemke and Reed, 2001).
Nonrandom sample selection - situations in which factors influencing actors’ choices also
affect whether the outcome in question is observed - is present in many political phenomena,
such as war onset, revolution, crisis escalation, rivalry termination, and civil conflict settlements.
When selection effects are present, not accounting for them makes it impossible to know whether
the results present true relationships, or simply are the result of selection bias.
To allow for a correlation between factors influencing the occurrence of a shock and the
subsequent onset of civil conflicts, I specify a set of two equations in which unobserved factors
are accounted for in the error term. The selection equation considers the causes of shocks to
government authority such as economic crises, the death of a leader, war defeat, and changes in
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the international balance of power. The outcome equation analyzes the causes of civil conflict
following these critical events, thus only including cases that experienced shocks. When
selection effects are present, the error terms in both equations will be correlated.
To appropriately model possible selection effects, I employ a Heckman selection model,
also known as a probit model with sample selection, or censored probit (Heckman, 1979; Dubin
and Rivers, 1989). This model uses a two-stage estimator to account for non-random sample
selection. Since the onset of civil conflict after shocks may be systematically related to the cause
of such shocks itself, the Heckman model is a useful modeling technique. This model estimates
the effect of independent variables for both the selection and the outcome stage of the model and
also estimates the correlation of errors between the two stages.
Hypotheses 2 through 4 investigate solutions to the commitment problem arising during
political instability. Specifically, I analyze the effects of the institutional structure of government
and opposition and the distance between actors on the probability of civil conflict occurrence.
Since the purpose is to evaluate the solutions to the commitment problem outlined in chapter 3,
only cases that experienced shocks are included in the second stage of the Heckman model,
which predicts the likelihood of civil conflict onset. I use the variable combining all shock events
to identify the set of cases for this analysis. This results in approximately 1,800 observations.51
Dependent Variables
In the first stage of the Heckman model, the selection equation, the variable indicating
whether a shock occurred is used as the dependent variable. As outlined earlier, this variable
codes whether leaders have experienced critical events such as recession, war defeat, death, or

51

As a result of missing cases in some of the independent variables, the number of uncensored observations in table
4 is slightly lower.
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changes in the international balance of power while in office.52 The variable is coded 1 if a leader
experienced a critical event, 0 otherwise. In the second stage of the model, the outcome equation,
civil conflict onset is the dependent variable. Data for this variable come from the Uppsala
Armed Conflict Project (Gleditsch et al., 2004). Only cases that experienced shocks, the
dependent variable in the selection stage, enter the outcome equation.
Independent Variables
Selection Equation: The first stage of the Heckman model predicts the probability of a shock.
While the hypotheses highlighted in the theoretical section focus on the outcome stage,
predicting the probability of civil conflict, I develop a simple model predicting shocks to avoid
potential selection bias. Two variables commonly associated with the probability of political
instability are a country’s level of democracy and economic development (Epstein et al., 2006).
The polity score is added to the model as a measure of the level of democracy.53 The squared
term of this variable is also included in order to allow for the curvilinear relationship. To
measure the effect of economic development, I include a variable measuring GDP per capita per
country-year.54
In addition, several variables included in the outcome equation of the model are also
expected to have an effect on the probability of a shock. These variables are described in more
detail in the section on independent variables in the outcome equation below. First, Geddes
(1999a) and Ulfelder (2005) expect that the stability of regimes varies across different types of
52

While it would be preferable to analyze all event types independently, the small number of cases for two types
(defeat in war and leader death in office) makes it necessary to combine them into a single measure. As a
consequence, the model includes events that may be poorly predicted by the independent variables included. In
particular, the model includes no variables (such as age) that would be useful predictors of leader death. To ensure
that this is not influencing the results, I also specified models that excluded the variables measuring leader death and
the end of the Cold War, respectively. Results, however, were very similar to the ones presented.
53
The composite polity score ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Data come from the
Polity IV project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
54
GDP data come from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2, available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ and the World
Development Indicators 2004.
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authoritarian regimes. Specifically, personalist and military regimes are expected to be less stable
than single-party regimes.55 Dummy variables for the different types of authoritarian regime
types, described in more detail below, are included in the first stage of the model. Second, the
organizational structure of opposition groups may well have an effect on the probability of
regime change. If cohesive, organized opposition groups exist in society, we should expect that
challenges to the regime are more likely. A dummy variable indicating the presence of
opposition parties is added to the selection equation.
Outcome Equation: The outcome equation of the Heckman model predicts the probability of
civil conflict following a shock and is the main focus of this analysis. The second hypothesis
expects that personalist and military regimes are more conflict prone following a critical event
because of their heavy reliance on a small support circle and a high probability of post-transition
punishment.56 To test this hypothesis, I use data on authoritarian regime types by Geddes (1999a,
b) as well as updates by Ulfelder (2005) to create four separate dummy variables.57 The first
variable indicates a personalist regime, coded 1 for regimes in which a leader “has consolidated
control over policy and recruitment in his own hands” (Geddes, 1999a: 20), 0 otherwise.
Authoritarian regimes are considered military when a group of officers influences decisions of
policy choice and appointment. The second dummy variable, therefore, is coded 1 for military
regimes, 0 otherwise. Single-party regimes, characterized by a single party that controls

55

Ulfelder (2005: 320) shows that personal and military regimes face greater insecurity in their leadership tenure,
having a median duration of 17.3 years (personal) and 11.6 years (military), compared to 32.6 years for single-party
regimes.
56
The Goemans et al. (2006) data include a variable indicating leaders’ post-tenure fate, which allowed me to
investigate whether personalist and military leaders do in fact face more severe consequences after they leave office.
A frequency table comparing the percentage of leaders that were punished (through exile, prison, or death) to those
that were not punished showed that 74% and 53% percent, respectively, of all personalist and military leaders
experienced punishment, compared to 37% of single-party leaders.
57
Not all regimes are coded as pure types in Geddes’ (1999a) and Ulfelder’s (2005) list of authoritarian regimes.
Hybrid regimes, which comprise about one-third of the data, were coded according to the first characteristic
indicated in the data. A single-party/military regime, for example, is thus included as a party regime in this paper.
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accession, policy choice, and local-level organizations, are the third category included in the
model. The fourth dichotomous measure comprises democracies (all non-authoritarian regimes),
and is excluded from the model as the baseline category.
The third hypothesis focuses on the commitment problem encountered by the opposition.
Here, opposition movements that are cohesive, are organized hierarchically, and thus have clear
leadership responsibilities are expected to have improved abilities to commit to a peaceful
agreement. In addition, I hypothesized that movements with links to existing organizations have
better commitment abilities. Systematic data on the organization of social movements or
opposition groups are not readily available, especially for noncompetitive regimes. Many
noncompetitive regimes, however, allow for the existence of opposition parties, thereby
approximating the characteristics outlined above. First, the existence of formal party
organization implies a certain degree of organization as well as the presence of a leadership
structure. Second, party organizations often venture into many areas of social life, thereby
forging ties with existing social institutions. Data on opposition parties were collected from
various editions of the Political Handbook of the World, which provides information on
governing and opposition parties in all countries for the entire time frame under analysis (Banks
et al., 2007). A dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of one or more formal
opposition parties was created. The variable is coded 0 for countries without opposition parties, 1
for states with one or more parties.58

58

While Banks et al. (2007) occasionally provide data on the age or size of parties, which might work better as
proxies for cohesion, this information is not available systematically. I also considered counting the number of
parties rather than creating a simply dichotomous measure, but it is questionable whether the listing of parties is
exhaustive, especially for earlier editions of the Handbook. To ensure that the data are not biased toward democratic
regimes, which are arguably more likely to allow for opposition parties, I conducted cross-tabulations comparing the
existence of opposition parties across different regime types. The results show that 79% of anocratic regimes (polity
scores between -5 and +5), and 24% of autocratic regimes (polity scores < 5) allow for the presence of opposition
parties.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Heckman Selection Model
Variable Name

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Description

Civil conflict (25 battledeaths)

0.03

0.16

0

1

Coded 1 for civil conflict onset

Personalist Regime

0.13

0.33

0

1

Coded 1 for personalist regimes

Military Regime

0.07

0.26

0

1

Coded 1 for military regimes

Single-Party Regime

0.21

0.4

0

1

Coded 1 for single-party regimes

Opposition Party

0.65

0.47

0

1

Coded 1 for regimes with opposition party

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.38

0.28

0.001

0.92

Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index

Critical Event

0.37

0.58

0

1

Coded 1 for shock

Democracy Level

0.24

7.49

-10

+10

Composite autocracy-democracy score

Economic Development

1.5

0.57

0.72

4.23

GDP per capita, logged

Personalist Regime

0.13

0.33

0

1

Coded 1 for personalist regimes

Military Regime

0.07

0.26

0

1

Coded 1 for military regimes

Single-Party Regime

0.21

0.4

0

1

Coded 1 for single-party regimes

Opposition Party

0.65

0.47

0

1

Coded 1 for regimes with opposition party

Outcome Equation

Selection Equation

In the fourth hypothesis, it was argued that greater ethnic distance negatively impacts the
credibility of actors. To test this expectation, I use data on ethnic fractionalization provided by
Fearon and Laitin (2003). While recent research emphasizes the importance of ethnic
polarization rather than fractionalization, the data collected by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) are available only for 138 countries. Such a limitation would severely reduce the number
of cases in the analysis. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index represents the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the
same ethnolinguistic group, where increases in the ELF indicate greater diversity.
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I include spline variables to correct for temporal dependence. Spline variables are based
on a variable measuring the years since the last civil conflict onset for the outcome equation, and
a variable measuring the number of years since the last shock for the selection equation,
respectively. Results for cubic splines are not reported. Summary statistics for dependent and
independent variables included in the Heckman selection model are presented in table 6.

Results
Table 6 presents the results of the Heckman model of civil conflict occurrence after a
shock to government authority. The model is useful for studying phenomena that deal with
interrelated processes. The first stage models the probability of a shock, whereas the second
stage identifies factors related to the occurrence of civil conflict. In keeping with the main focus
of the analysis, results of the outcome equation, predicting the likelihood of civil conflict, will be
discussed first. The results for the outcome stage of the model presented in table 6 show strong
support for the hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapter.
The second hypothesis, expecting that countries with personal and military regimes are
more likely to experience civil conflicts than other regime types, is upheld in the empirical
analysis. The coefficient for personal regimes is positive and significant, albeit only at the 90%
confidence level (z=1.70, p<0.1). In substantive terms, varying the personal regime variable from
0 to 1 results in an increase in the probability of civil conflict from 0.03 to 0.04, equaling a 21%
increase. Military regimes are also more likely to experience civil conflict than single-party or
democratic regimes, as hypothesized in the theoretical argument. The coefficient for military
regimes is positive and significant and the probability of civil conflict increases by 0.02, or 51%,
when the variable is varied from 0 to 1 (all other variables held constant). This confirms the
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expectation that regimes in which the survival of elites is threatened by a shock are more likely
to use force than other types of political regimes.
The overthrow of the military regime in the Dominican Republic of 1965 provides an
example of the dangers inherent in such regimes. Having come into power by overthrowing the
democratically elected government of Juan Bosch a few years earlier, the military junta led by
Cabral, lacking support of broad segments the population, relied heavily on the consent of a
small group of high-ranking military officials and oppression of the general population. Amid
growing unrest and opposition, the junta promised to reestablish the Constitution in 1964, yet
this promise was not seen as credible by opposition groups given that the Cabral regime had
come to power by ousting a democratic regime. As a result, mass demonstrations “erupted in
Santo Domingo as a large number of citizens, especially youths, rallied in majestic outrage to
support the revolution” (Wedge, 1969: 186). Responding with “unprecedented violence” the
military regime strafed the National Palace and began a full-scale attack on the National City,
helped further by U.S. intervention on the side of the military regime (Ferguson, 1973: 522).
This illustration, while admittedly anecdotal, helps to show how the location of bargaining
agreements is hindered by the organizational structure of the outgoing regime.
The logic developed here, furthermore, runs counter to other assessments of military
regimes. Geddes (1999a: 136) argues that military regimes are “more likely to negotiate orderly
transitions,” yet this expectation is not supported by the empirical evidence presented here.
Relaxing the widely accepted assumption that leaders want to remain in power, Geddes argues
that military officers value internal order and territorial integrity more than staying in office and
therefore will “step down before conditions in the country have reached crisis” (Geddes, 1999a:
136). Yet contrary to this assumption, not all military regimes have scheduled their own
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departures. The Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-1983, for example, was ousted without
negotiation following severe economic decline and defeat in a war against a much stronger ally.
Furthermore, while is true that military regimes have lower survival rates, it is not clear that they
stem from officers’ desire to simply restore order and return to the barracks. The Argentine junta,
for example, claimed in 1976 that it had “no fixed term, only objectives” (“no tiene plazos sino
objetivos”), and wanted to stay in power for 10-15 years (Munck, 1985: 85; Pion-Berlin, 1985:
55). Rather, the shorter life span of military regimes originates from their inability to extend
authority beyond the inner circle of military officers. As indicated in the theoretical chapter, the
military as a group is less permeable than elites in other regime types, and thus cannot grant
authority to outside groups. Dictators in uniform, therefore, cannot grant credible concessions
when challenged in their power. The theoretical argument combined with empirical evidence
presented here, therefore, questions Geddes’ evaluation of military leaders’ motives.
The organizational structure of opposition groups was the focus of the third hypothesis. I
argued that opposition groups with cohesive organizational structures are more credible in the
bargaining process, and this credibility reduces the probability of civil conflict. Empirical results
confirm this argument. The coefficient for the variable used to operationalize this concept is
negative and statistically significant (z=-2.12, p<0.05), showing support for hypothesis 3.
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Table 6: Heckman Selection Model of Critical Events and Civil Conflict (25 battle-deaths)
Variable Name

Model 4
Estimate (Robust S.E.)

∆ Probability
Model 4

0.123*
(0.076)
0.345***
(0.091)
0.124
(0.082)
-0.126**
(0.059)
0.208**
(0.105)

+0.007

Outcome Equation
Personalist Regime
Military Regime
Single-Party Regime
Opposition Party
Ethnic Fractionalization

+0.017
—
-0.002
+0.025

Selection Equation
-0.005
—a
(0.003)
Democracy Squared
-0.003***
—a
(0.001)
Economic Development
-0.043
—
(0.035)
Personalist Regime
-0.106
—
(0.064)
Military Regime
-0.316***
-0.11
(0.07)
Single-Party Regime
-0.211***
-0.08
(0.062)
Opposition Party
0.135**
+0.05
(0.052)
-0.963 ***
Rho
(0.003)
(S.E.)
nd
5,136 (1,762)
N (2 stage)
Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Column 2 shows the marginal effect of the
significant variables on the probability of civil conflict and leadership exit. Variables are varied from one standard
deviation below their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for
dichotomous variables. All other variables are held at their mean or modal values. Probabilities were calculated
using the mfx command in Stata 9.2 for the selection and outcome equation.
a
Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
Democracy Level
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The diverging experiences of regime breakdown in Chile in the early 1970s and late
1980s nicely illustrate the effects of opposition cohesion. In the late 1980s, Christian Democrats,
Socialists, groupings on the Christian left and a new faction within the Socialist party formed a
united opposition that also planned to form a joint governmental coalition following general
elections in 1989 (Cavarozzi, 1992: 208-225). Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy in the
late 1980s thus can be credited to the unified appearance of opposition elites. This peaceful
outcome of the negotiation process can be contrasted with Chile’s institutional breakdown and
subsequent civil war in the early 1970s. The violent military takeover in 1973 is widely seen as a
consequence of the division between the left and Christian Democrats and their failure to reach a
compromise agreement (Cavarozzi, 1992: 221).
In substantive terms, the probability of civil conflict decreases by 5% when the
opposition variable is varied from 0 to 1. While arguably a small substantive effect, it may result
from a less than perfect operationalization of the concept at hand. The last chapter stressed how
the cohesiveness of groups and connections to existing social organizations should enhance the
opposition’s credibility. The measure employed, however, does not provide precise information
on the number, size, or age of opposition parties, the unity of party leadership, or the degree of
institutionalization in society. Such information is either not available at all, or only on a caseby-case basis in Banks et al.’s (2007) Political Handbook of the World, especially for the earlier
years in the time period analyzed here.
The next hypothesis anticipated that relations between groups in society would impact the
probability of civil war after a critical event.59 Here, I argued that greater ethnic distance between
groups limits the range of negotiable settlements and should therefore increase the risk of
59

I also investigated possible interaction effects between the cohesion of opposition groups and ethnic diversity. In
particular, I expected that a high degree of ethnic diversity would exacerbate the effect of opposition cohesion. The
interaction term, however, was not statistically significant.
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violence. Measured as the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the positive and significant
coefficient supports this expectation (z=1.97, p<0.05). Apart from statistical significance, the
substantive effect of ethnic diversity on civil war is large. Varying the fractionalization index
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above (and all else held
constant), the probability of civil conflict increases from 0.02 to 0.05, or 110%. This result also
helps explain some of the inconsistencies in empirical studies of the relationship between ethnic
diversity and civil war (Sambanis, 2002). While ethnic fractionalization does not exert a
significant effect on the probability of civil conflict in many studies on ethnicity and conflict, it
increases the likelihood of violence during government weakness. In this sense, ethnic
fractionalization is not a constant cause of conflict, but becomes salient once the existing
equilibrium is challenged and groups bargain over a redistribution of power. The above finding
is also consistent with recent research that suggests an indirect relationship between ethnic
diversity and the probability of civil war (Blimes, 2006).
Ethnic strife in Chechnya and several former Soviet republics following the collapse of
the USSR is consistent with this explanation. Gorbachev’s resignation signaled the loss of the
state’s coercive and persuasive ability and opened up space for rebellion in this multi-ethnic
empire. In 1991, ethnic Chechens declared formal independence from Russia, which responded
with force in 1994 (Matveeva, 2007).
Finally, the Heckman model is based on the assumption that the processes determining
leadership weakness and civil conflict are not independent.60 The rho parameter estimates the
correlation between the two dependent variables’ disturbance terms. The coefficient for rho is

60

Heckman (1979) and Greene (2000) emphasize the importance of a robust selection equation when using the
Heckman procedure. The covariates in the selection equation perform reasonably well, correctly predicting 75% of
the variation in the shock variable.
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statistically significant, indicating that the factors resulting in violence after critical events are
related to the causes of such shocks (z=-4.77, p<0.01).
Results in the first stage of the model, predicting the probability of critical events leading
to leadership weakness, are largely consistent with expectations in research on regime stability.
Regimes in the middle of the democracy-autocracy spectrum are more likely to experience
critical events, as can be seen in the negative and significant coefficient of the squared
democracy variable (Hegre et al., 2001; Gates et al., 2006). Highly democratic and highly
authoritarian regimes, therefore, have a lower chance to experience instability, or critical events.
Secondly, the effect of economic development, measured as GDP per capita, is not significant.
Changes in the level of economic development have no discernable impact on the probability of
shocks. Overall, results in table 6 support the modeling technique chosen and also demonstrate
support for the hypotheses developed in the theoretical section.
To conclude, results presented in this chapter largely support the theoretical expectations.
The first set of statistical models shows that shocks to government authority increase the
probability of civil conflict, thus supporting the argument on commitment problems during
leadership weakness. Critical events such as economic decline, defeat in war, and/or crises in a
foreign tutorial power send a sign of weakness to opposition forces and lead to bargaining for
authority. Yet both actors suffer from credibility problems because of incentives to renege on
agreements in the future, and these incentives increase the risk of violence.
The models presented thereafter investigate solutions to this commitment problem. Here,
I demonstrate that certain types of actors have greater difficulty in making credible
commitments. Threatened leaders in personalist and military regimes (given their exclusionary
nature and slim chances of political survival in more broadly based regimes) suffer from greater
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credibility problems than single-party or democratic regimes. Empirical results confirm this
hypothesis, indicating that such regimes have higher conflict propensities. In addition, I
anticipated that opposition groups with cohesive organizational structures can more credibly
commit to negotiated agreements. Empirical findings show that states with established
opposition parties are less likely to experience civil conflict. Finally, I show that the distance
between relevant actors also influences the probability of violent outcomes. When actors have
divergent preferences (because of ethnic, religious, ideological, or economic differences), the
location of peaceful agreements is more difficult. Confirming this argument, results show that
countries with high ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to see armed internal conflict following
a critical event. Taken together, the arguments and findings presented in chapters three and four
offer a comprehensive explanation for the complex causal path between political instability and
civil conflict. I have shown how the effects of critical events are filtered through existing
political institutions of the incumbent government, organizational features of opposition groups,
and the ethnic composition of society.61
The subsequent chapter presents a second, small-N empirical test for the hypotheses
outlined in chapter 3. Certain implications of the theoretical argument lend themselves to smallN comparisons that allow for detailed process-tracing. The analysis of the hypothesized effects
of organizational features on actors’ ability to make credible commitments, for example, is
difficult to operationalize in a large-N quantitative analysis. This concept will gain from
examination in narrative detail. In the next chapter, the argument on opposition groups

61

The findings thus confirm earlier case-study research on the relationship between political instability and civil
war. A case study of Chechnya and Dagestan by Andrienko and Shelley (2003) demonstrates how regional
differences in political institutions and ethnic composition resulted in secessionist violence in one case but not the
other.
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developed in the theoretical chapter is evaluated by analyzing bargaining after shocks in Chile
and Algeria.
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Chapter 5: Empirical Test II: Critical Events, Opposition Cohesion, and Civil War in
Algeria and Chile
The theoretical chapter outlines how critical events alter the domestic balance of power in
countries, result in commitment problems, and subsequently increase the probability of civil war.
The chapter then shows how the effect of these critical events is mediated by the type of
government, the institutional structure of opposition groups, and the level of polarization
between groups. The statistical analysis conducted in the preceding chapter provides valuable
support for the arguments developed in the theoretical section. Findings indicate that shocks
indeed make the onset of civil war more likely. In addition, the institutional structure of
governments, the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and the distance between groups influence
actors’ credibility and the likelihood of civil war as hypothesized.
Quantitative research has the advantage of producing general results with external
validity, but lacks the descriptive accuracy, internal validity, and ability to disentangle causal
processes possible in qualitative research (King et al., 1994; Poteete and Ostrom, 2005).
Qualitative analysis is better suited for process-tracing, for exploring critical junctures that shape
processes of change, and for providing more nuanced insight in the findings of quantitative
studies (Tarrow, 2004). As George (1979: 46) points out, only a detailed analysis of a single case
can “establish whether there exists an intervening process, that is, a causal nexus, between the
independent variable and the dependent variable.”
Criticizing the heavy reliance on statistical models in the study of civil war, Sambanis
(2004a) stresses the need for case studies to address several shortcomings in formal-quantitative
models of civil war. Case studies, Sambanis (2004a: 260) claims, can help identify causal
mechanisms, detect measurement problems, discover new variables and highlight interactive
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effects between variables neglected in statistical models. Furthermore, case studies can alleviate
the gap between micro-level theories and macro-level empirical tests common in the literature on
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
While the trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative approaches are well-established
in the literature, scholars increasingly perceive these approaches as complementary rather than
antithetical (George, 1979; King et al., 1994; Tarrow, 2004; Poteete and Ostrom, 2005).
Increasingly, research combines quantitative and qualitative research to maximize the leverage of
empirical tests.
The goal of this chapter, then, is to test the theoretical arguments developed in chapter
three by conducting an in-depth analysis of actual cases. Since the importance of critical events
on regime stability is well established in the comparative literature, the case-study analysis
focuses on solutions to the commitment problem outlined in the theoretical section. Three
concepts are expected to influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments in the wake of
political instability. First, regimes with small support networks have greater difficulty credibly
committing since leaders feel highly threatened by a potential loss of power. Second, opposition
groups lacking a cohesive and unified organizational structure cannot credibly signal a
commitment to negotiated agreements. Finally, groups that are polarized across ethnic
dimensions have difficulty credibly committing since the trust built through shared identity
within groups is missing among them.
Testing the implications of all three theoretical concepts in a small-sample setting,
however, would require a set of six case studies in which all three concepts are varied
independently from each other. The chapter will focus on the organizational structure of
opposition groups for three reasons. First, existing research on internal violence often neglects
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the role of dissident groups. This is largely a function of the difficulty in accounting for these
actors in a large-N context. Second, the indicator used to operationalize the institutional structure
of opposition groups in the statistical analysis is far from ideal. The presence of opposition
parties undoubtedly indicates a certain level of organizational cohesion and thus roughly
approximates the conditions outlined in the theoretical concept. Yet the measure is unable to
evaluate precisely how the internal dynamics of opposition groups influence their credibility. In
addition, it cannot tell us how these internal dynamics impact the relations with other opposition
groups. Opposition groups marked by internal competition will likely have greater difficulty
establishing alliances with other parties. Finally, the theoretical arguments also emphasize
linkages to existing social organizations. Certain parties are more likely to have such ties (such
as Christian Democrats with the Church, or Social Democrats with unions), yet a dichotomous
measure indicating the presence or absence of opposition groups cannot tell us much about these
linkages. Third, the theoretical concept regarding opposition groups extends upon Kalyvas’
(1999) research on religious parties in emerging democracies by showing that the organizational
features of opposition groups matter outside a religious context. Kalyvas (1999) investigates how
the cohesiveness of religious parties affects their credibility by comparing two cases where such
parties have received electoral mandates. He argues that religious challengers suffer from greater
credibility problems since their program includes the rejection of liberal democracy as a
principle. It is, however, plausible that the cohesion of opposition forces, whether religious or
not, will influence their credibility when faced with the opportunity of gaining control of the
state.
Following the method of “focused, structured comparison” outlined in George (1979),
the next sections examine the theoretical argument on opposition groups in detail. I analyze how
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the institutional features of opposition groups can affect the commitment problem caused by
critical events. The purpose of the case comparison is to explain the occurrence of civil war as a
function of opposition groups’ institutional structure. The cases to be studied, therefore, must
have experienced critical events that triggered a period of liberalization. As King et al. (1994:
139) point out, nonrandom sample selection is appropriate in small-N analysis since random
selection can easily fail to capture the full range of variation on the variables of interest. To allow
for causal inference, I chose cases that exhibit variation on the key independent variable of
interest while other independent variables of interest are held constant (George, 1979; King et
al., 1994). This case selection strategy thus corresponds to a “most similar systems” design
(Prezworski and Teune, 1970). For the purposes of this study, cases should show variation in the
institutional structure of opposition groups (the key independent variable of interest), but should
be similar with respect to leadership type and ethnic polarization (the remaining independent
variables).
Based on this logic, Algeria and Chile were selected for analysis. Both countries
experienced critical events that triggered bargaining over power in the late 1980s. As laid out in
the theoretical argument, the occurrence of a critical event leads to commitment problems
between government and opposition. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s led to a massive
increase in Algerian debt and shortages of essential goods. Discontent over growing inequality
and unemployment culminated in a popular uprising in October 1988 and resulted in
liberalization measures by the incumbent regime (Lowi, 2005). In Chile, a sharp economic
downturn in 1982-1983 put the military regime in a vulnerable position for the upcoming
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plebiscite over General Augusto Pinochet’s continued stay in office (Valenzuela, 1999: 229).62
The cases are also similar with respect to the other key independent variables of interest. With
respect to leadership type, both countries were governed by military regimes when political
liberalization occurred. Since achieving independence in 1962, Algeria was formally governed
by a single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN, however, was never a party in
the traditional sense, but “in reality, and in the first place, an army” (Roberts, 2003: 40).63
Following the collapse of democracy in Chile, the country was abruptly transformed into a
military regime, and coup leader Pinochet soon made it clear that he did not intend to return
power to civilian rule (Valenzuela, 1999). In addition, neither country displays significant ethnic
or religious fractionalization.64 The cases differ significantly, however, in the institutional
structure of opposition groups. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the dominant
opposition party, was marred by internal divisions and tensions between radical and moderate
elements (Roberts, 1994; Ciment, 1997; Quandt, 1998; Kalyvas, 1999). In addition, the FIS
failed to establish coalitions with other opposition parties (Roberts, 1994; Martinez, 2000).
Opposition leaders in Chile, however, united behind a single goal and presented their coalition as
a clear and unified alternative to the Pinochet regime (Cavarozzi, 1992; Valenzuela, 1999).
The chapter proceeds as follows. For each of the two cases, I provide a discussion of
historical events leading up to political liberalization. A subsequent section analyzes how
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The economic crisis undercut Pinochet’s central claim for his regime’s legitimacy, namely the economic stability
and growth achieved initially. The crisis, while not immediately resulting in a struggle for power, contributed to the
reassertion of political parties and the opposition’s success in the 1988 referendum.
63
Algeria is classified as a military/single-party regime in Geddes (1999b).
64
Algeria’s ethnic fractionalization index is at 0.43, its religious fractionalization at 0.01. Chile’s index on ethnic
fractionalization is at 0.14, the religious fractionalization index at 0.19. While Algeria’s degree of ethnic
fractionalization is slightly higher than Chile’s (with Berbers being the most significant minority), Algeria’s civil
war was fought between Arabs, thus lacking an ethnic dimension.
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organizational features of opposition groups influenced the probability of civil war, the
dependent variable of interest, in each case.

Political Liberalization in Algeria
To place the economic crisis of the 1980s and Algeria’s subsequent liberalization in
context, it is necessary to briefly outline the evolution of the political system since independence.
I will first discuss the war of independence and its immediate aftermath. I will then proceed to an
analysis of the Houari Boumediénne regime and the consequences of Arab nationalism and
socialism for Algeria’s economic and political development. After Boumediénne’s death, his
successor Chadly Benjedid was faced with increasing economic and social problems, caused by
statist policies of the past and a global decline in oil and gas prices in the 1980s. A popular
uprising in 1988 convinced him to push forward political liberalization unprecedented in
Algerian history. However, when the Islamist party scored election victories in municipal and
parliamentary elections, the military stepped in and cancelled the results. The move was
followed by violent resistance and gave way to a year-long civil war.
Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962 after a six-year war fought by the
National Liberation Front (FLN), a coalition of a variety of groups with a predominantly secular
orientation. The FLN, however, was “united only in their common struggle against the French,”
and violent competition over the future direction of the party emerged immediately after
independence (Ciment, 1997: 40). Radical Ben Bella emerged as the FLN’s leader and proposed
Arab nationalism and socialism, but was ousted after a series of erratic policy shifts (Joffe,
1997).
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The 1965 takeover by army commander Boumediénne did not produce major ideological
changes, as both men favored statist economics, one-party politics, and an anti-imperialist
foreign policy (Ciment 1997). Yet the coup d’état marked the beginning of the military’s
assertion of control and the decline of the FLN as an independent political force (Ciment, 1997:
41; Quandt, 1998: 28). From 1965 onwards, the military’s preeminent position as a decision
maker became increasingly apparent. The military became the chief arbiter of the FLN’s internal
conflicts and took a decisive role at critical moments such as Boumedienne’s death in 1978. The
Boumediénne regime, benefiting from high levels of economic growth due to oil and natural gas
exports, pushed through a rapid industrialization program (Quandt, 1998). Centralized economic
planning and the importation of sophisticated technology, however, failed to deliver full
employment and economic equality. Throughout the 1970s, the regime maintained public
support through the provision of social services and its claim to legitimacy based on the FLN’s
role in the revolutionary struggle (Ciment, 1997). Boumediénne’s sudden death and increasing
economic problems, however, eroded these sources of support (Vandewalle, 1992).
The military quickly installed Chadli Benjedid, a colonel with little role in the Algerian
revolution, as his successor. Benjedid inherited the economic and social problems of his
predecessor. Increases in population size coupled with economic stagnation and bureaucratic
inertia led to severe housing shortages, a lack of consumer goods, and inadequate public services
(Ciment, 1997: 45). The administration responded with economic liberalization and the
privatization of economic enterprises, the nationalization of oil and gas corporation, and the
agricultural sector. These reforms, however, were undertaken arbitrarily, created new
monopolies, and did nothing to change Algeria’s dependence on oil and gas exports. A series of
crises turned into an increasingly explosive situation. First, a conflict over the role of the Arab
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language arose at the University of Algiers (Ciment, 1997). The regime defused the crisis by
speeding up the process of Arabization of the education system and the state. Second, a
progressive family code was rejected by conservative elements within the regime in the mid1980s and replaced with a code that “revived many of the traditional features of the patrilineal
family and relegated women to the legal status of minors in society” (Knauss, 1987: 125). Third,
and most importantly, global oil and natural gas prices collapsed in the mid-1980s. With oil and
gas exports constituting approximately 60 percent of total revenue in the 1980s and 1990s, the
effects of the price collapse were devastating for Algeria (Lowi, 2004: 224). The government
restricted imports, limited capital investment to projects already underway, and cut social
services such as free health care and subsidies on food. These actions led to an increase in
unemployment, reaching 26 percent in 1986, created food shortages, and produced conditions
ripe for social unrest (Ciment, 1997: 50).
Once the effects of the economic crisis affected large parts of the population, localized
protests and strikes started to occur sporadically. In October 1988, a large popular uprising
forced the government to react (Lowi, 2004: 226). The government declared a state of
emergency, sent in the army, and dissolved the protests with force. Surprisingly, however, the
crushing of popular opposition was followed by a political opening unprecedented in Algerian
history. At the FLN congress in November, President Benjedid pushed through a new
constitution that established a separation of powers, civil liberties, and freedom of expression,
association, and assembly (Quandt, 1998: 47). In a national referendum in February 1989, the
constitution was adopted by 73 percent of voters. In July 1989, a new law on political parties was
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issued, and “by early 1991, over fifty had obtained official recognition” (Ciment, 1997: 51). The
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) soon turned out to be the most popular of all opposition groups.65
The Benjedid administration proceeded by scheduling municipal elections for June 1990,
to be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections. The electoral law adopted by the
government “seemed designed to favor the largest party, presumably the FLN” (Quandt, 1998:
51). However, in a stunning defeat, the FIS scored a resounding victory in the local elections.66
The FIS received 34 percent of all votes cast, giving it a majority in local governments because
of the skewed electoral rules (Quandt, 1998). The election victory gave the FIS organization a
boost and threw the governing FLN into turmoil. Sensing its increasing power, the FIS pushed
for early parliamentary elections and Benjedid eventually agreed to hold elections in June of
1991. Yet when the FLN passed a new electoral law that again disadvantaged opposition parties,
the FIS took its grievances to the streets and called for a “general and unlimited strike” (Willis,
1996). Prime Minister Hamrouche stepped down under increasing pressure, and President
Benjedid rescheduled elections for December 1991. The results of the first round of
parliamentary elections, however, mirrored the outcome of municipal elections. The FIS received
47 percent of the vote, although a large number of spoiled and blank ballots showed that only 25
percent of all eligible voters had supported the FIS (Quandt, 1998: 60). Nevertheless, the victory
gave the FIS a clear majority in parliament. Faced with a government takeover by an Islamist
party, the military stepped in, forced Benjedid to step down, cancelled the election results, and
banned the FIS (Ciment, 1997: 55-58). The military’s seizure of power was met with violent
resistance by the Islamists, and Algeria soon descended into an eight-year civil war.
65

Interestingly, the law explicitly prohibited parties based on religious, ethnic, or regional affiliation, and therefore
should not have permitted the recognition of the FIS and other religious and ethnic parties. It is unclear why the
administration failed to outlaw them, although Roberts (1994) and Quandt (1998) speculate that the FLN was hoping
to “play the Islamist card.”
66
Voter turnout was relatively low with 63% of all eligible voters participating (Quandt, 1998).
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Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Algeria
The following sections analyze how the institutional structure of opposition groups helps
explain the conflictual outcome in the Algerian case. As argued in the theoretical chapter, the
cohesiveness of opposition groups and their connections to other social institutions are expected
to impact the opposition’s ability to make credible commitments. Because of the religious nature
of Algeria’s main opposition party, the FIS, a brief discussion of Islam’s role in Algeria’s recent
history follows. I then conduct a detailed analysis of the origins of the FIS, its organization and
internal dynamics, and its ties to other organizations in Algerian society. A subsequent section
focuses on other relevant opposition groups and investigates the level of cooperation between the
FIS and other opposition parties.
Prior to independence, Algeria’s Islam was largely separated into two distinct spheres:
Maraboutism, the charismatic Islam of the saints, which was practiced mostly in the countryside
by peasants and country dwellers, and the reformist Islam of the ulemas, which emphasized the
fundamentals of doctrine as contained in scripture (Roberts, 1994a: 432-433; Ciment, 1997: 81).
Maraboutic Islam was successfully co-opted by the French colonial regime and therefore became
a natural target for a nationalist and religiously motivated movement of Islamic reform. Under
the leadership of Shaykh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, many of the ulemas began to support a
reformist program and “established the supremacy of a modernist, scripturalist, puritanical, and
tacitly nationalist Islam at the expense of the old-time religion of the saints” (Roberts, 1994a:
433). Islamist reformers had a powerful influence on the emerging FLN, which pledged to
pursue its goals within the framework of Islamic principles. After independence, reformist Islam
became the official religion of the independent state. The regimes of Ben Bella and
Boumediénne successfully co-opted the ulemas by providing Islam with state support, such as
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government-sponsored building of mosques and religious education in schools (Ciment, 1997:
83). The FLN succeeded in making Algeria Islamic in its basic cultural orientation, but in
practice the country was governed much more like a secular socialist regime (Quandt, 1998: 27).
In this sense, the regime nationalized Islam, just as it had nationalized the oil industry and the
press (Roberts, 1994: 434). Unlike many other Middle Eastern countries, the compromise
between ulemas and the Algerian state avoided the opposition between Arab nationalism and
Islamic belief.
This subordination of Islam proved quite successful until the 1980s. In the early 1980s,
a small dissident group of ulemas became increasingly critical of the regime and received
support from fundamentalist groups in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Roberts, 1994a). Although the
state had a monopoly on the organization of religion, the dissidents subverted it by establishing
“free mosques” outside the government’s control. After independence, the state had built a large
number of mosques, yet lacked imams to properly staff them. Since many of these mosques
remained unfinished, the state did not claim authority over them, and dissident ulemas took over
more than 2,000 such mosques by the mid-1980s (Roberts, 1994a; Quandt, 1998; Entelis, 1994).
Islamic activism, however, engaged in little open opposition or extra-institutional protest
during this time, and religious activity was largely limited to preaching in the mosques (Hafez,
2004: 44). Prior to the protests of October 1988, fundamentalist Islam was a “variegated and
nebulous movement on the fringe of political life” (Roberts, 1994a: 439). Thus, the 1988 protests
were not the result of an Islamist movement that had long secretly planned a takeover of the
state. As Quandt (1998: 49) points out, “no one claimed that Islamists were behind these
demonstrations at the outset.” Rather, the protests were spontaneous and popular and lacked a
clear leadership. Yet two Islamic fundamentalists, Hachemi Sahnouni and Ali Belhaj,
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immediately recognized the opportunity to take advantage of popular discontent and further their
message (Ciment, 1997: 92). They recruited a prominent academic, Abassi Madani, who,
together with Belhaj, would soon emerge as one of the leaders of the Islamist movement. In
February 1989, they formed the Islamic Salvation Front. While the Benjedid administration had
initiated political liberalization in late 1988, parties were not yet allowed, and the FIS remained
small and quasi-clandestine at first. Once the law on the freedom of parties was passed in
September 1989, the FIS was officially recognized as a party.
Formally, the FIS was governed by a hierarchical organizational structure. At the national
level was the Maljis al-Shura (Consultative Council). The Maljis al-Shura had five dependent
national commissions, and this structure was replicated at the administrative and communal level
(Roberts, 1994a: 448). Yet information on the institution’s composition or functioning is
nonexistent, suggesting that it was practically irrelevant. No statutes or regulations for its
operation were published, and “meetings were held in private at irregular times“ (Takeyh and
Gvosdev, 2004: 45). The FIS never produced a list of official representatives in the Maljis alShura, nor did it lay out its decision-making procedures (Ciment, 1997: 93). In practice,
supremacy was enjoyed by Madani and Belhaj, who officially were listed only as “spokesmen,”
The two leaders represented two very important albeit quite different constituencies of the FIS.
Madani was a moderate, Western-educated university professor and represented the moderate
and political wing of the FIS. Born in 1931 and part of an older generation of university
graduates, he was “willing to compromise with modernism” (Ciment, 1997: 94). Originally a
member of the FLN, he broke with the party later in his life and established a strong Islamist
presence at the University of Algiers (Roberts, 1994b: 449). Belhaj, on the other hand, was first
and foremost a man of religion. Born in 1956, he was a high school teacher of Arabic and a lay
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preacher who represented impoverished, desperate, and mostly younger voters of the FIS.
Known for his fiery and militant rhetoric, he offered a radical critique of the Western world and
pursued a total overhaul of the Algerian state (Entelis, 1994: 67).
The dual nature of the FIS leadership succeeded in appealing to a large number of
Algerians. Small merchants, civil servants, and college graduates were the predominantly
moderate constituency of the party. These groups struggled with the consequences of the
economic crisis and sought an accountable and representative government. The other wing of the
FIS was composed of young men suffering from increased unemployment (Takeyh and
Gvosdev, 2004: 46-47). This duality, however, created serious problems for the party in
signaling its intentions to the FLN and other groups in society. The contradictions and fissures
within the FIS can be underlined by evaluating public statements of both leaders. In his speeches,
Madani repeatedly stressed his party’s commitment to democracy and the willingness to
cooperate with other parties:
“Pluralism is guarantee of cultural wealth and diversity needed for development.
Democracy, as we understand it means pluralism, freedom, and choice.” (Takeyh and
Gvosdev, 2004: 46)
“We will leave the word to the people. Whether we are in power or not,
democracy means diversity, choice, and freedom. We have promised this, God
willing, and keep our promise.” (Reuters, 16 June 1990)
“We are not egoists. We feel no aggressiveness toward the FLN, since in those
regions where we did not present lists of candidates, we called on people to vote
for the FLN.” (Libération, 14 June 1990)
Remarks made by Ali Belhaj starkly contrast with Madani’s:
“Yes to pluralism within an Islamic framework. But if today Berbers, communists
and all others are going to express themselves our country is going to become a
field of competing ideologies at odds with the belief of our people.” (Reuters, 7
March 1989)
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“We will not barter shura [consultation] for democracy. It is Islam which has
been the victor, as always, not democracy. We did not go to the ballot boxes for
democracy.” (Le Monde, 17 June 1990)
“As for the secularists, pseudo-democrats, atheists, feminists, francophones, and
other evil doers, the day we gain power, we’ll put boats at their disposal which
will take them home to their motherland, France.” (Lloyd, 2006: 186)
“When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be
ruling.” (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2004: 46)

The ability of the FIS to appeal to diverse constituencies was also reflected in the
party’s lenient membership criteria. The FIS distinguished between sympathizers,
supporters, and activists. It did not require sympathizers or supporters to renounce their
association with other religious or political groups, nor did they have to follow the
leadership’s commands (Labat, 1995: 187). The FIS, in consequence, represented a
variety of Islamic tendencies. As Roudjia (1995: 74-75) points out, “the FIS must be
considered a melting-pot for very diverse factions which have little more in common than
Islam and the desire to put an end to a political situation in Algeria.” Yet, as with the
contradictions inherent in the party leadership, this inclusiveness came at a price. The
unity of the FIS was precarious because it rested on an alliance of a diverse collection of
forces (Taykeh, 2004: 47).
Apart from tensions apparent in the party organization and leadership, the party also
failed to produce a coherent agenda. The party never published a detailed program and publicly
only made bland assurances of restoring prosperity and order. The closest the party came to an
official program was the presentation of a 15-point platform in April of 1990. The points were
rather vague and mostly political in content. Only three points were Islamist in nature, including
a call for sharia, a moderate proposal regarding the role of women, and a demand for educational
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reform in line with Islamist thought. Traditional values of Islamist movements were “veiled in
the blandest possible language and introduced very low down on the list” (Roberts, 1994a: 455).
Lacking a coherent program and cohesive party organization, contradictions soon appeared in the
FIS’ policy positions. First, the FIS abandoned its initial opposition against “godless Baathism”
and embraced a pro-Iraqi position during the First Gulf War. While this decision was supported
by the moderate wing of the party, it weakened Madani’s position relative to the strictly Islamist
element on other issues. Second, influenced by its moderate wing, the FIS had endorsed liberal
economic policy, which was essentially the position of the FLN since Benjedid. This position,
however, meant that the FIS had little different to offer to the urban poor it claimed to represent.
In need of a radical political project to divert attention from this issue, the FIS repeatedly stated
its intent to establish an Islamic republic once elected to power (Roberts, 1994a: 456).
In addition, the FIS did not develop ties to established social institutions such as unions
or religious organizations. This failure, however, is most likely the result of circumstances
outside the FIS’ control. First, the FLN under Boumediénne had successfully co-opted all
independent social institutions, including unions and student organizations (Ciment, 1997: 4041). Tight control by the authoritarian regime made it impossible for the FIS to establish such
linkages. Second, the absence of ties to religious organizations stems from the nature of Islam
rather than the FIS’ intent. Sunni Islam lacks a religious hierarchy and is egalitarian in nature
(Ciment, 1997: 74; Quandt, 1998: 102). The FIS, therefore, could not improve its credibility by
establishing linkages with existing institutions.
After the FIS won a majority of seats in municipal elections in June 1990, the tensions
between radical and moderate elements in the party became increasingly eminent. Councils now
controlled by the FIS suspended mixed education in schools, prohibited the sale of alcohol,
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limited the ability of women to work and instructed them to wear the veil, and banned popular
music festivals. Yet at the same time, the moderate wing restated its commitment to democracy
and good relations with the West. Madani declared: “Algeria is not Iran, or Saudi Arabia. All we
want is a return to our traditional values.” (The Economist, August 4, 1990: 31).
Strengthened by the election results, the FIS demanded early parliamentary elections
(originally not scheduled until 1992). Benjedid eventually gave in and scheduled the election for
June 1991. However, the passing of a new electoral law, designed to disadvantage opposition
parties, mobilized radical elements in the FIS. The FIS responded by calling a general strike and
engaged in violent confrontations with security forces (Ciment, 1997: 56). The Benjedid
administration postponed the elections to December and eventually quelled protests by
establishing a new prime minister. The December election, however, resulted in another FIS
victory. Algeria was now faced with a government takeover by a group that had failed to clearly
establish its commitment to democracy. The military intervened, cancelled election results, and
used force against the Islamists.
Taken together, the above discussion of the FIS’ organizational structure highlights how
internal divisions contributed to the occurrence of violence in the Algerian case. The party’s
leadership and public support was divided into a moderate and a radical wing and lacked an
organizational entity that could resolve conflicts between the two. As Kalyvas (2000) notes, this
outcome is in part an unfortunate consequence of Islam’s egalitarian nature. Quandt (1998: 102)
similarly argues that “there is no single interpretation of what Islam requires of its followers. As
has been frequently noted, there is no formal hierarchy in Sunni Islam, nothing comparable to the
papacy as a source of infallible interpretation.” Absent a strong, hierarchical religious authority,
the FIS represented a mix of divergent interpretations of Islam. Some of its currents were
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moderate, some radical, but the party lacked an organization that could force it to speak with one
voice. Finally, the absence of ties to existing institutions further put the FIS’ credentials into
question, which may have influenced the military’s decision to intervene and cancel election
results.
Of over fifty parties that registered after the passage of Algeria’s law on parties in July
1989, the FIS clearly dominated the opposition during Algeria’s period of political liberalization.
I will now briefly discuss other relevant opposition parties and then investigate the level of
cooperation between these parties and the FIS. Among opposition parties, one important
distinction is between religious and secular parties. There were two religious opposition parties
of national importance. First, the Hamas party under Mafhoud Nahnah was an Islamist group
close to the Egyptian-based Muslim brotherhood (Quandt, 1998: 50; Tahi, 1995: 209). Second,
Abdallah Djaballah, who had organized Islamist student protests in Constantine, founded his
own party An-Nahda. Both parties were relatively moderate, but with a clearly Islamist message
and goals similar to those of the FIS. Why did these parties fail to cooperate with the FIS and
unite against the regime? Roberts (1994a: 450) suggests that the FIS itself brushed such
competitors aside out of fear of inhibiting “its confrontational posture vis-à-vis the FLN.”
Incorporating these parties would have weakened Madani’s and Belhaj’s leadership position
within the FIS and threatened the outlook and posture of the party towards the regime. Another
explanation is suggested by Tahi (1995: 209), who argues that Hamas and An-Nahda “were
created by the regime in order to split the Islamist movement.” Similarly, Ciment (1997: 95)
suggests that the praise Hamas received for its moderate message “led many to assert that Hamas
is, in fact, a creation of the FLN.” Both parties failed to garner a significant number of seats in
municipal and parliamentary elections and had little influence thereafter.
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Two secular parties, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and the Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD), played a role nationally. While both parties had clear regional strongholds in
the Berber-dominated part of Algeria, they competed nationwide in municipal and parliamentary
elections (Ciment, 1997: 118-122). The FFS was a social democratic party founded under Ben
Bella’s dictatorial regime, and is probably the only Algerian party that consistently upheld its
commitment to democracy (Tahi, 1995: 211). This commitment, however, made the FFS an
unlikely coalition partner for the radical elements in the FIS. The RCD was a strongly
nationalist party that promoted cultural nationalism in the Berber region with little appeal for
Arab Algerians (Ciment, 1997: 122). Tahi (1995: 206) argues that the RCD was in fact a
construct of the FLN regime, designed to play a clientelist role in the Berber region and to
destabilize the FFS.67
Non-fundamentalist voters that did not want to support the FLN thus had few options to
consider during Algeria’s short experiment with democracy. The FFS represented democratic
values, but appealed mainly to ethnic Berbers. All other relevant opposition groups were
suspected of collaborating with the FLN regime, thus leaving people with few electoral choices.
It is a subject of debate whether these suspicions originated in the FIS in an attempt to weaken its
competitors, or whether they truly were satellites of the incumbent regime (Roberts, 1994a; Tahi,
1995). What is evident, however, is that the lack of cooperation between opposition groups was
clearly detrimental for the opposition’s position relative to the government. The internal
divisions of the FIS and the lack of cooperation between the FIS and other opposition parties
seriously weakened the opposition’s credibility as a viable alternative to the FLN regime.
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The RCD’s support for the regime’s decision to cancel election results lends credibility to this argument (Volpi,
2003: 52).
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Chile’s Transition to Democracy
When studying Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989, it is necessary to understand
what led to its breakdown in the early 1970s. I will first discuss events leading to the election of
Allende as President in 1970 and the military coup in 1973. A subsequent section summarizes
key developments during Pinochet’s military rule. It is followed by a description of the
reemergence of democracy.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chilean party system witnessed increasing polarization.
Electoral reforms adopted in 1958 greatly limited cross-party bargaining and thereby contributed
to system polarization (Valenzuela, 1989). The reforms coincided with a decrease of electoral
support for the right and the emergence of Christian Democrats as an alternative center party
(Valenzuela, 1999). A decline in peasant living standards combined with increasing Church
intervention greatly expanded Christian Democrats’ support base. From 1957 to 1965, electoral
support for the Christian Democratic Party increased from 9.4 to 42.3 percent (Scully, 1995). In
consequence, party leaders increasingly questioned the logic of coalition governments that had
dominated Chilean politics and, as Scully (1995: 121) describes, adopted a “camino proprio (goit-alone) formula,” The behavior of Christian Democrats alienated the parties on the left and
right and thus undermined the possibility of electoral coalitions.
As a result of this polarization, the three major party blocs were unable to strike preelectoral coalitions in the run-up to the 1970 presidential election. Socialist candidate Allende,
supported by a coalition of leftist parties called Popular Unity, won the election by a plurality of
36.2 percent. His victory only provided him with a narrow margin over the votes received by the
rightist and the Christian Democratic candidates (Valenzuela, 1999: 218). In need of majority
support for the accession to the presidency, Christian Democrats supported the left in confirming
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Allende. However, the lack of majority electoral support and the absence of a majority coalition
supporting him in Congress seriously weakened Allende’s position (Scully, 1995). In addition,
his own electoral coalition was divided over the future institutional framework of Chile. As
Valenzuela (1999: 219) describes, “important elements in the coalition were openly committed
to a revolutionary transformation of Chilean politics.”
Fearing the establishment of a Communist system in Chile, sectors on the right organized
against the leftist coalition, and mobilization quickly spiraled out of the control of party elites
(Scully, 1995). Allende, believing that his coalition could prevail by using state power, passed a
series of redistributive economic measures that increased inflation and led to economic
problems. By 1973, competition had become so intense that conflicts increasingly spilled on the
streets. When congressional elections held in the same year yet again failed to produce a decisive
victory for either of the competing blocs, the armed forces stepped in and a military junta took
power.68
The military declared a state of emergency and held mass raids. An estimated 1,500
people died in the months after the coup.69 The military junta prohibited public meetings,
restricted personal movement, put Congress into recess, and suspended all political and party
activities (Caviedes, 1991). In 1974, General Augusto Pinochet was selected as president of the
Junta and named President of the Republic the same year. He quickly consolidated his position
within the army by retiring officers that were suspicious of him and promoting others loyal to his
rule (Valenzuela, 1999: 223). A free enterprise economy was the cornerstone of his rule, and the
privatization of national industries rendered powerful unions ineffective. By 1977, Pinochet had
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In addition, U.S. efforts to undermine the Allende government contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation
(Valenzuela, 1999: 220).
69
The estimates are from the Organization of American States, Commission of Human Rights “Informe Sobre la
Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en Chile,” Washington, D.C.: 1985.
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created a tabula rasa in the institutional, economic, and political spheres of the country, and
wanted to complement it with a new constitution (Scully, 1995). The Constitution included
provisions for an eight-year transitional period until the return of free elections, prohibited
parties on the left, and abolished local and provincial governments. As Valenzuela (1999: 226)
points out, the result was “a hyper-presidential regime with sharply reduced prerogatives for
Congress.” The military, nevertheless, felt the need to create a semblance of legality and
subjected the Constitution to a national referendum. The document, however, was negotiated
behind closed doors, lacked any input from political opposition groups, and was not made public
until a few weeks before the plebiscite (Caviedes, 1991).
The referendum revealed almost 70 percent of popular support for accepting the
Constitution, providing a boost to the military regime. Opposition groups – forced to operate
clandestinely - had failed to offer workable alternatives and remained beset by the divisions that
had led to the breakdown of democracy. The collapse of Chile’s economy in the mid-1980s,
however, triggered a protest movement that led to the reassertion of political parties (Valenzuela,
1999: 227). In the months prior to the 1988 referendum outlined in the Constitution, thirteen
opposition parties formed an alliance named Concertación. To the surprise of many, particularly
within the government, voters rejected Pinochet with a margin of 54.7 percent to 43.0 percent
(Scully, 1995: 124). This outcome, however, put opposition leaders in a difficult situation. They
had won the vote by emphasizing the illegitimate and undemocratic nature of the regime. Yet the
military still controlled the armed forces, and as Valenzuela (1999: 231) describes, the
opposition “feared that they might renege on the promise of holding free and open presidential
elections if they felt overly threatened.” To encourage compromise, the opposition accepted the
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1980 constitution, but negotiated a set of amendments to remove some of its undemocratic
features.
In response to this defeat, the Pinochet regime adopted an electoral formula tailored to
favor its supporters in the upcoming elections. Yet the same coalition of parties united behind a
single slate of candidates for congressional elections and nominated a single candidate for
president. The Concertación’s candidate, Patricio Aylwin, won the presidency. In addition, the
coalition won a majority in the House.70 General Pinochet accepted the outcome of the plebiscite
and elections, at least in part because he did not have to fear for his immediate survival. The
1980 Constitution guaranteed him continued powerful influence, as it allowed him to remain
commandant of the armed forces and head of the army (Oppenheim and Borzutzky, 2006).
Chile’s first democratic government maintained solid economic growth, confronted human rights
violations, and undertook further democratic reforms. The Aylwin administration successfully
reestablished Chile’s democratic traditions, and in 1998, Pinochet finally stepped down as head
of the army.

Opposition Cohesion and the Probability of Civil War in Chile
The following sections analyze how the cohesiveness of opposition parties in Chile
influenced the country’s peaceful transition to democracy. A first section focuses on the internal
dynamics of Chile’s main opposition parties. It is followed by an analysis of the cooperation
between these parties during the Pinochet administration. A final section discusses the influence
of opposition groups’ ties to other social institutions, such as the Catholic Church and trade
unions.
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The alliance did not gain control of the Senate because of the presence of designated senators appointed by the
military regime (Valenzuela, 1999: 232).
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Prior to the military coup in 1973, the Chilean party system was characterized by a threeway division among parties on the left, the center, and a conservative but democratic right
(Navia, 2006). Christian Democrats represented the political center, and Communists and the
Socialist party were the most important groups among leftist parties. Parties on the right
identified closely with the coup and reacted favorably to the establishment of military rule. As a
result, rightist parties ceased to exist as organizations once the military took over power
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986: 207). The imposition of a political recess on parties had
major consequences for the parties on the left and Christian Democrats.
Leftist parties, which had constituted Allende’s government coalition, were the ones most
heavily repressed by Pinochet’s regime. Many leaders of the Communist and Socialist parties
had fled into exile, and many of its remaining members were jailed, tortured, or killed. Among
the parties on the left, the Communists were best prepared to deal with the consequences of
authoritarian rule. Established in 1922, the party was banned for most of the 1950s and thus had
considerable experience with clandestine operations (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991: 272). The
party was able to prevent infiltration and maintain their organizational unity despite the threat of
arrest. Moreover, exiled party leaders in Moscow communicated with the rank and file through
radio broadcasts (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). Yet a crisis resulted when party leaders
(probably influenced by Moscow) adopted an insurrectionist strategy aimed at the violent
overthrow of the Pinochet regime. Some local leaders objected to this strategy, and the violent
message contributed to the isolation of the party from the anti-regime efforts by more moderate
groups (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986).
The Socialist party experienced the most significant leadership and programmatic
struggles after the coup. The party had suffered from internal divisions since its foundation in

117

1933. As Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 277) write, they “had been rent by disputes between
members who favored reformist policies and an electoral route to power and those who
advocated a violent overthrow of the ‘bourgeois’ state.” During Allende’s three-year reign,
competition between these two forces contributed to his government’s difficulties. The militant
sector was represented in the appointment of Carlos Altamirano as secretary general of the party,
whereas party leader Clodomiro Almeyda stood as moderating force. After the coup, this
division contributed to the emergence of several factions and consumed much of the energy of
party leaders and followers. Combined with the harsh repression and fear of persecution by the
Pinochet regime, the void created by dead and exiled leaders lasted for years. However, after a
Communist assassination attempt against Pinochet failed in 1985, moderates within the Socialist
party eventually gained the upper hand. Ricardo Núnez, leader of the moderate wing, called for
the “construction of one great Socialist party” and pressed for a return to democracy (Constable
and Valenzuela, 1991: 294). This shift within the Socialist party was crucial for the
reestablishment of the party’s internal cohesion and its participation in the coalition of parties
that eventually succeeded in ousting the military regime.
The political center in Chile’s political system was represented by the Christian
Democratic Party. Generally, Christian Democrats enjoyed greater autonomy in their activities
under authoritarianism than parties on the left. Their unique position was a function of the
party’s opposition against the Allende government, which they shared with the military regime.
Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986: 208) write that the Christian Democratic Party’s leadership
initially supported the coup “as the inevitable outcome of what it saw as the Popular Unity
government’s errors, ambiguities, and creeping totalitarianism.” Christian Democrats, however,
never supported the regime’s claim that the Chilean crisis was one of regime and society. By the
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mid-1970s, it became clear that the military was not willing to transfer authority to a civilian
government in the foreseeable future, and the party leadership broke with the regime (Constable
and Valenzuela, 1991: 282). The government responded with increased repression against the
party, and several of its leaders were killed or forced into exile. Nevertheless, oppression against
the Christian Democrats never rose to the levels experienced by parties on the left. Strong ties
with the Catholic Church and democratic parties in Europe provided it with a certain level of
immunity and also contributed positively to the maintenance of the party structure (Constable
and Valenzuela, 1991). This allowed the party to renew its leadership, hold frequent meetings,
and engage in consultation with party members, thus preserving its internal cohesion (Valenzuela
and Valenzuela, 1986).
While the preceding section emphasizes the internal structure of Chile’s key opposition
parties, relations between them were decisive for the opposition’s ability to present itself as a
unified, viable, and credible alternative to the Pinochet regime. In the years immediately after the
coup, opposition parties were marred by the polarization and discord that had led to the
breakdown of democracy. The first sign of cooperation that crossed party lines was the so-called
Group of 24, which was founded in 1978 and included members of all parties, including
Communists and Conservatives (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986: 220). The group’s goal was
to develop a counterproposal to the Constitution developed by the military regime. The group
lost its purpose, however, when the Constitution drafted by the government was adopted in the
1980 referendum. In 1983, a sharp economic downturn triggered a spontaneous protest
movement that resulted in a rapprochement of opposition parties. A shared history of oppression
by the military regime combined with the economic downturn reduced the historic divide
between Socialists and Christian Democrats (Scully, 1995: 123). The two parties formed the
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Democratic Alliance, which called for an immediate return to democracy. In 1985, the same
parties joined forces in the National Accord for the Transition to Democracy. While both
attempts failed to materialize, they nevertheless underlined parties’ newfound capacity to
cooperate.
The upcoming plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued stay in office (as mandated by the 1980
Constitution) put opposition parties in a difficult situation. In particular, Socialists were divided
on whether the plebiscite presented a valuable tool for popular mobilization, or whether
participation would simply further legitimize the regime (Valenzuela, 1999: 228). Yet after the
failed assassination attempt against Pinochet, radical forces calling for a violent overthrow were
increasingly sidelined. Eventually, all opposition groups except the Communists decided to
participate in the referendum.71 Some smaller parties registered first, followed by Christian
Democrats and Socialists. Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 301) write that “by 1988, Socialist
groups were actively committed to the No campaign – and working together for the first time in
ten years.”
In the run-up to the referendum, the key problem for opposition groups was to unify their
disparate forces and reassure voters of their ability to bring about peaceful, democratic change.
In early 1988, a coalition of thirteen parties formed the Concertación for the No. Participation in
the alliance ranged from conservative rightist groups to Christian Democrats in the middle to
Marxist parties on the far left (Caviedes, 1991: 44). This broad spectrum of parties gave the
coalition increased coherence and credibility. The coalition for the No vote emerged victorious in
the plebiscite. Yet its success in the referendum meant that the coalition needed to transform
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The decision on whether to participate was hotly debated within the Communist Party. When party officials
reiterated the need to pursue a violent overthrow of the regime in a meeting, Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 302)
quote a rank and file member’s objection as follows: “An election is a form of a struggle too, and we feel we must
do everything possible to defeat the dictatorship.”
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itself into a coalition that could actually govern. The Concertación had to unite behind a
consensual candidate for president and agree on single slates for congressional seats (Garreton,
1990: 69; Caviedes, 1991: 56). After lengthy negotiation, parties on the left agreed to nominate
Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party, as the Concertación’s presidential
candidate. In exchange, leftist parties were promised ample representation on Senate and
Chamber tickets. The Communist Party presented an additional obstacle for opposition forces. Its
refusal to participate in the coalition had the potential to undermine the opposition’s united
electoral front. Yet in the end, Communists and the Concertación agreed to run a single master
slate. Communists would compete separately in a number of races in return for supporting the
coalition’s candidates elsewhere. In his final appearance before the presidential election,
presidential hopeful Aylwin asserted the Concertación’s message: “Never again will our
differences convert us into enemies.”72 Aylwin won the election with 55% of the vote, and the
Concertación dominated Chilean politics over the next 20 years.
In addition to the internal organization of parties and the cooperation between them, ties
with existing social institutions also contributed to the credibility of Chile’s opposition coalition.
Many have emphasized the important role played by the Catholic Church in Chile’s transition to
democracy (Garreton, 1986; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986; Smith, 1986; Constable and
Valenzuela, 1991; Lies, 2006). Initially, historic ties between the Catholic Church and the
military resulted in an ambivalent position regarding the military coup. Nevertheless, the Church
refused to publicly legitimize the regime. Over the years, the Church became increasingly critical
of Pinochet’s rule, in particular regarding its human rights violations and its economic policies
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). Past proximity, furthermore, allowed the Church to continue
its operations relatively free from government interference. The Catholic Church thus took over
72
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important functions previously provided by collapsed social institutions (Smith, 1986: 277). It
also created a host of institutions to support its activities. One such institution was the Vicariate
for Solidarity, which provided legal defense against human rights violations. Others were soup
kitchens, neighborhood organizations, mothers’ clubs, and the like (Valenzuela and Valenzuela,
1986: 215).
Among political parties, Christian Democrats had the closest ties to the Church hierarchy
and thus benefited the most from the institutional networks provided by the Church. “Help from
Catholic foundations,” Constable and Valenzuela (1991: 283) describe how the Church allowed
“party leaders to behave as if they were respected professionals, maintaining a solid party
structure and creating institutes to keep research and debate alive.” Christian Democratic party
leaders and the Church’s Cardinal Fresno also became key facilitators of the emerging
compromise between political parties. In early 1985, Cardinal Fresno arranged a series of private
meetings with politicians from various parties, which eventually led to the acceptance of the
National Accord (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991). However, Christian Democrats were not the
only party that developed close relations with the Church. Its involvement in human rights and
social issues led to closer identification of the working class with the Church. Members of leftist
parties were the main victims of persecution by the regime, and the Church’s role in the
prosecution of human rights violations created important ties with supporters of Communist and
Socialist parties (Smith, 1986: 285). This collaboration of Christian Democrats and sympathizers
of leftist parties in Church-sponsored programs made important contributions to reconciliation
between both groups. As Smith (1986: 293) points out, “such a process of practical cooperation
is paving the way to greater mutual respect across party lines, respect that was sadly lacking in
the last months of the Allende regime.”
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While less influential than the Catholic Church, party ties to labor unions also played an
important role for Chile’s peaceful transition. The adoption of a free market economy and
subsequent privatization of state industries weakened the role of unions. In addition, the military
passed a series of decrees that limited the representation of the rank and file’s interests (Barrera
and Valenzuela, 1986). Nevertheless, unions provided valuable organizational space for political
parties restricted by an authoritarian regime. Prior to the military coup of 1973, labor unions very
strongly reflected the tripartite division of the party system in Chile. Yet after the military
takeover, developments toward an organized opposition to the regime occurred in unions before
they did in political parties. In December of 1975, the ten most prominent leaders in the Chilean
labor movements (thereafter known as the Group of Ten) formed an ongoing group to discuss,
develop, and coordinate their position towards the junta (Barrera and Valenzuela, 1986: 243).
The group sent open letters to the military junta, criticizing the government. Over time, a greater
number of union organizations joined the group, and its importance increased.
Ties with the Catholic Church and labor unions, therefore, contributed to the peaceful
outcome of the Chilean transition. The hierarchical structure of these organizations contributed
to the development of a unified, cohesive, yet moderate opposition against the Pinochet regime.

Conclusions about Algeria and Chile
Analysis of opposition groups during Algeria’s and Chile’s transition processes reveals
the influence of group cohesion on the probability of civil war. The theoretical chapter argued
that cohesive and hierarchical groups are better at making credible commitments. Analyzing this
concept in narrative detail shows support for the argument and also provides a more nuanced
picture of the causal nexus.
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During Algeria’s experiment with democracy, the main opposition party suffered from
internal divisions, organizational deficiencies, and the lack of a clear program. The FIS was
unable to define itself as a unified and credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. Internal
contradictions, in addition, made it difficult for the party to achieve cooperation with other
opposition parties, which would have increased its potential to form a coherent and credible
coalition against the government. Finally, the party did not develop ties to existing social
institutions. This failure was partly a result of successful cooptation of social organizations by
the military regime and partly a function of the decentralized nature of Sunni Islam. When the
FIS scored surprise victories in municipal and parliamentary elections, the government feared
that radical elements would soon take over and establish an Islamist state. The military thus
canceled election results and attempted to reestablish control by using force.
In the Chilean transition to democracy, parties were able to overcome divisions and
polarization that had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the early 1970s. Socialist
groups, long beset by internal tensions, united behind a moderate message after a failed coup
attempt on Pinochet’s life. This development opened up the door for negotiations with Christian
Democrats. Parties in the center and on the left eventually formed a united, cohesive coalition
against the military regime.73 Moreover, party ties to the Catholic Church and unions also
facilitated the emergence of a unified opposition. The Church, while traditionally closer to the
Christian Democrats, attracted Socialists because of its engagement in human rights issues. The
hierarchical structure of the church organization also helped moderate the Socialist position.
Both Christian Democrats and Socialists cooperated with unions, which provided important
organizational space in an otherwise repressive regime.
73

Communists did not participate in the Coalition for the No, which opposed the Pinochet regime in the referendum.
Yet members of the coalition were able to negotiate an agreement with the Communists for the subsequent
presidential and congressional elections.
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The case studies also provide a more nuanced understanding of the theoretical concept. In
particular, the cases show the consequences of internal divisions within parties on the probability
of cooperation between them. Evidence from both countries suggests that intra-party frictions
reduce the ability of inter-party cooperation. In Algeria, competition between a moderate and a
radical wing within the FIS limited the party’s ability to collaborate with other groups. Similarly,
cross-party bargaining in Chile was difficult until tensions within the Socialist camp were
resolved. A more comprehensive data collection effort on opposition groups, in particular with
respect to the number of parties, their key organizational features, and the consequences of these
features on the interactions between them would be valuable.
Are there alternative explanations that account for the divergent outcomes in the cases as
well as or better than the argument put forward here?74 The review chapter outlined two political
explanations for the relationship between political instability and civil war. First, arguments
claim that instability provides an opportunity for violent mobilization. Yet this approach cannot
explain why political instability resulted in violent mobilization in one case but peaceful
bargaining in the other. A second line of arguments expects that diversionary motives drive the
use of violence by political leaders. In the Algerian case, little evidence for such strategizing
exists – why would leaders initiate liberalization and hold elections twice before attempting to
divert attention from threats to their leadership? In addition, the argument fails to explain why
the Chilean military regime decided to hand over power without engaging in the use of
diversionary force.
More generally, arguments have emphasized the role of economic factors and ethnicity
on the probability of civil war. One economic explanation sees civil war as the result of utility
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Two explanations brought forward in this study (the institutional structure of regimes and ethnic polarization)
were held constant for the analysis and thus cannot account for the variation in the dependent variable.
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calculations. In poor countries, the opportunity cost of civil war is low, increasing the probability
of rebellion. Yet Algeria’s GDP per capita in the late 1980s was almost as high as Chile’s.75 A
second argument expects that grievances caused by economic inequality raise the risk of
violence. However, Algeria’s level of inequality in the late 1980s was actually lower than
Chile’s.76 Finally, arguments on ethnicity expect that ethnic fractionalization and/or polarization
increase the potential for inter-ethnic tensions and thus result in greater probabilities of civil war.
Yet neither Chile nor Algeria exhibit significant ethnic divisions, and Algeria’s civil war lacked
an ethnic dimension (Lowi, 2004: 222).
In addition to the theoretical approaches discussed above, objections might be raised with
regard to the Islamist nature of Algeria’s opposition. The compatibility of Islam with democracy
is still the subject of debate. However, there are examples of Islamist parties that have
participated in elections and even taken on mandates peacefully. One recent case is the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which won a majority in the 2002 elections. Related to
this point, one might argue that Chile’s long experience with democracy and the absence thereof
in Algeria drive the outcomes in both cases. Yet contradicting this argument is the fact that Chile
experienced a violent takeover by a military regime not long before its return to democracy. The
coup resulted in more than 1,000 deaths over a few months in late 1973. While prior experience
with democracy has long been established as an important variable for democratic success
(Huntington, 1991), democracy alone seems insufficient to avoid the onset of violence. In
particular, the absence of precisely the conditions contributing to Chile’s peaceful transition in
the late 1980s had led to democracy’s violent breakdown 17 years earlier. Polarization between
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Algeria’s per capita GDP in 1988 is $4,345 compared to Chile’s $4,684. Data come from the Penn World Tables,
version 6.1. Data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php.
76
Chile’s GINI index for 1988 is 54.5, compared to Algeria’s at 39. Higher numbers indicate greater inequality.
Data come from Deininger and Squire (1996).
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parties on the left, center, and right had resulted in democracy’s collapse. Yet when party leaders
put past divisions aside and formed a unified and cohesive opposition to the regime, a peaceful
return to democracy became possible.
The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the importance of the organizational structure
of opposition groups on the onset of violence. The analysis of Algeria and Chile lends support to
the theoretical argument, showing that organized, cohesive groups are better able to make
credible commitments. Future studies of civil war, therefore, could benefit from greater emphasis
on the role of opposition groups.

127

Chapter 6: Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that the onset of violence during times of political instability
is the result of commitment problems incurred by government and opposition groups. Following
a critical event, incumbents would like to offer concessions to other groups competing for
authority, yet suffer from credibility problems. The government may expect to regain its strength
in the future, which renders its offers to opposition groups incredible. Similarly, opposition
groups may hope to become stronger in the future, making incumbents reluctant to transfer
power. Incentives to renege in the future, therefore, limit the prospect for cooperation in the
present. Unable to make credible commitments, actors may choose to use force to establish their
preferred outcomes.
The dissertation also developed solutions to the commitment problem. The institutional
structure of the government, the cohesiveness of opposition groups, and the distance between
actors were expected to influence actors’ ability to make credible commitments. First, leaders in
authoritarian regimes that rely on a small group of supporters were argued to face greater
difficulty in making credible commitments than other authoritarian leaders. Compared to this,
leaders in single-party regimes or democracies should be more successful at securing a role in
future governments as they can make use of their party organizations and integrate newly
mobilized groups. Second, opposition movements with cohesive organizational structures and
links to existing social organizations were expected to better avoid the onset of violence.
Cohesive, hierarchical organizations are better at in-group policing and can therefore coerce
more radical opposition members and enforce compromises. Third, groups with divergent
preferences were expected have greater difficulty at making credible commitments. Ethnic
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divisions can result in competing preferences over possible agreements, reducing the possibility
of credible and peaceful negotiation.
Four tasks remain. A first section revisits key findings presented in the quantitative and
qualitative analysis. The subsequent section addresses implications of the findings for the
literature on civil wars. Implications for policymakers engaged in democracy promotion and
conflict prevention are the subject of the fourth section. The final section of this chapter offers
recommendations for future research.
Several key findings emerge from this dissertation. Empirical evidence strongly supports
the expectation regarding the conflict-exacerbating effects of critical events. The theoretical
chapter outlined how critical events weaken the government’s power and provide incentives for
incumbents to make concessions to the opposition. However, both government and opposition
have incentives to renege on such agreements in the future, which can lead to bargaining failure
and war. Using data on all countries in the state-system for the 1960-2004 period, findings
indicate that critical events influence the probability of civil war as hypothesized. Economic
crisis, defeat in international war, and changes in the international balance of power significantly
increase the probability of civil war. Commitment problems incurred by both government and
the opposition, therefore, contribute to violent conflict at the domestic level.
Expectations on the proposed solutions to the commitment problem are also supported.
First, empirical findings confirm the theoretical argument with regard to leadership type. It was
argued here that personalist regimes lack credibility because they are based on the exclusion of
the vast majority of the population. Furthermore, personalist dictators must continually put
checks on their most capable supporters to ensure their own survival, making it difficult for them
to extend their support circle. Similarly, military regimes limit leadership position to members of
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the armed forces and are therefore unable to provide access to other groups in society. Singleparty regimes and democracies, on the other hand, have mechanisms that allow for the credible
inclusion of newly mobilized groups. Results in the statistical analysis demonstrate that military
and personalist regimes are significantly more likely to experience civil war than other types of
regimes.
Second, the theoretical section expected that cohesive, organized opposition groups are
better able to make credible commitments. Groups with developed organizational structures can
punish extremists, reducing fears of reneging among government actors. In addition, ties to
existing institutions in society were argued to have a moderating influence on opposition groups.
Both expectations are confirmed in a statistical and a small-N analysis. Using a simple indicator
on the presence of opposition parties, the statistical analysis shows that groups organized as
political parties are less likely to experience civil war. The existence of a party organization
contributes to group cohesion and provides members with a hierarchical organization. In
addition, political parties often have ties to other institutions in society, such as the Church or
unions. To improve on the rough operationalization of the theoretical concept used in the
statistical chapter, a detailed analysis of historical cases was conducted as a second empirical
test. Algeria and Chile were selected as cases since the two countries exhibit significant variation
in the institutional structure of opposition groups. Findings again confirm the theoretical
argument. In Algeria, the dominant opposition party was marred by internal divisions, which
undercut the group’s credibility and contributed to the country’s descent into violence. Chile’s
key opposition parties, however, formed a unified, cohesive, and clearly identifiable alternative
to the Pinochet regime, which was crucial for the country’s peaceful transition to democracy.
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Finally, results confirm the anticipated effect of preference divergence. Groups with
competing preferences were expected to suffer from greater credibility problems. Ethnic
diversity is a possible cause for such preference divergence, as mechanisms for trust and
cooperation are absent between different ethnic groups. Statistical results demonstrate that
greater ethnic diversity significantly increases the probability of civil war, thus providing
empirical support for the argument.
The findings emerging from this dissertation suggest four important contributions to the
literature on civil wars. First, empirical findings constitute an important improvement over
existing research on the relationship between political instability and civil war. The
operationalization of political instability used here avoids the endogeneity problems present in
other research. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al. (2001) measure
instability as fluctuation in polity scores, yet these scores may already include the occurrence of
violence. Critical events occur prior to actual regime changes, thus steering clear of the inclusion
of potentially violent events.
Second, the findings of this dissertation highlight the dynamic element of civil war.
Currently, much research on civil wars emphasizes factors that exhibit little or no variation over
time. Evidence on the relationship between poverty, income, or ethnic fractionalization and civil
war are undoubtedly useful in helping us understand why some countries are more likely to
experience civil war than others. Yet such arguments have difficulty explaining what triggers a
shift from a stable political system to war. In demonstrating the conflict-exacerbating effects of
critical events, this dissertation specifically addresses the dynamic element of civil war. The
empirical section shows how economic crisis, defeat in international war, and changes in the
international balance of power can produce such shifts from peace to war.
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Third, the evidence presented in the dissertation provides empirical referents for the
power shifts highlighted in the literature on commitment problems (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2004,
2006). The dissertation shows that economic decline, war defeat, and changes in the international
balance of power constitute such power shifts, thus supplying the micro-foundations for the
causes of commitment problems in the domestic arena.
Finally, the dissertation provides empirical evidence for solutions to the commitment
problem incurred in times of political instability. While power shifts can contribute to the onset
of violence, it is shown here that actors vary in their ability to make credible commitments. The
dissertation shows empirically how different types of regimes, the cohesiveness of opposition
groups, and preference divergence between actors affect their credibility and thus the probability
of civil war.
In addition to the dissertation’s contributions to the academic literature on civil war, the
findings have important implications for policymakers and international organizations active in
the areas of democracy promotion, failed states, and/or conflict prevention. First, results suggest
the need for greater collaboration between groups engaged in the aforementioned areas.
Specifically, efforts on democracy promotion should be connected to work in conflict
prevention. While the dissertation does not focus on democratization per se, democratic
transitions are often triggered by the critical events emphasized here, thus making this study
important for the field of democracy promotion. The findings of this research confirm earlier
evidence suggesting a link between democratization and violent domestic conflict (Hegre et al.,
2001; Snyder, 2000). The adoption of democracy is a key foreign policy goal of many Western
policymakers and international organizations alike, yet the conflict-exacerbating effects of
democratization are often neglected. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
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(OSCE), for example, is a large regional organization with a prominent role in democracyrelated activities. In 2005, hostilities led to 300-500 deaths in Uzbekistan despite the OSCE’s
presence and activism in the country. The organization’s inability to react to the violence has
divided its members on the OSCE’s future, particularly in the area of democracy promotion
(Boonstra, 2007). It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the international community
should limit or end its efforts in democracy promotion.77 Rather, actors should be prepared for
the potentially conflictual outcomes. Collaboration with groups active in early warning analysis
for conflict prevention could be particularly useful.
Second, the findings presented here also imply that the international community should
put greater focus on the period preceding actual regime change. Many organizations active in
democracy promotion are most attentive to the monitoring of elections and the development of
democratic intuitions for the post-transition period. However, the dissertation shows that the
period preceding a handover of power is the most conflict prone. Violence can break out without
an actual transfer of power or transition to democracy, as illustrated in the Algerian case. The
critical events identified as causes of conflict could be useful additions to the list of proximate
causes assembled by conflict prevention specialists (Clarke, 2005). Moreover, since most
regimes today – even authoritarian ones - hold some form of elections, greater emphasis on the
pre-election period would be useful. The pre-election violence recently experienced in Pakistan
seemingly supports this notion.
Finally, the findings on possible solutions to the commitment problems can help identify
the cases with greatest potential for violence. Results show that leadership type matters, and this
77

Mansfield and Snyder (2005), for example, imply that democracy in weakly institutionalized regimes would better
be held off until more favorable conditions allow for peaceful democratization. Yet it is questionable how this could
be achieved in practice, as long as the quest for democracy emerges endogenously. In addition, as Carothers (2007)
points out, such recommendations can be used by authoritarian leaders as a convenient justification for staying in
power.
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knowledge should be helpful for the international community. In addition, the findings provide
strong evidence for the positive effect of foreign governments’ and international organizations’
support for civil society and opposition parties in authoritarian regimes. Results show that the
presence of organized, cohesive opposition parties makes a difference and can reduce the
potential for violence.
This research, however, is not without limitations. Three aspects could particularly gain
from additional research. First, a more unified approach with regard to the types of actors most
likely to commit violence would be desirable. The dissertation focuses on leadership type for the
government and the organizational strength for opposition groups. Yet it may be possible to
combine these arguments into a single expectation on institutional strength or breadth,
respectively. It is likely that moderates will gain the upper hand in groups governed by cohesive
leadership and supported by broad social coalitions, regardless of whether they represent the
government or the opposition. However, under what circumstances do groups decide to pursue
broad coalitions and hierarchical leadership? Second, a more detailed understanding of shock
events would be valuable. Different events may impact the probability of violence in diverse
ways. For example, shocks such as the death of a leader or defeat in war will likely have
immediate consequences for all actors, whereas the consequences of economic shocks may take
longer to materialize. The 1982-1983 economic crisis in Chile, for example, undermined the
legitimacy of the Pinochet regime and was crucial for the reemergence of opposition parties and
thus the transition to democracy, yet its importance did not manifest itself until the plebiscite in
1989. Finally, the dissertation neglects the role of international actors. Governments may have
friendly or belligerent relations with other actors, and the state of external affairs may have
important consequences on the effect of political instability. For example, one may expect that
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embattled leaders of states in rivalry are more likely to experience foreign intervention by
opponents. Rival states may see domestic leadership weakness as an opportunity to support
opposition groups more sympathetic to their own goals, and therefore intervene on the side of
opposition groups.
Over the course of the past several months, competition over government authority has
led to significant violence in the Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Nepal and, most recently,
Zimbabwe. In all instances, government and opposition groups bargained over the future
distribution of power, and violent fighting occurred despite its humanitarian, economic, and
political costs. It was the goal of this dissertation to develop a general explanation of the
relationship between political instability and civil war and help identify the cases most likely to
experience violent conflict. It is my hope that this research will be informative for policymakers
analyzing the violent turn of events in these recent cases.
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Appendix
Table 7: Probit Model of Critical Events and Civil War (1,000 battle-deaths)
Variable Name

Recession
War Defeat
Death in Office
End of Cold War
Critical Event
Democracy Level
Democracy Squared
Economic
Development
N

Model 5
Estimate (Robust
S.E.)
0.545***
(0.102)
0.91***
(0.3)
-0.033
(0.156)
-0.001
(0.131)
—
-0.015
(0.009)
-0.005***
(0.002)
-0.378***
(0.126)
5,217

Model 6
Estimate (Robust
S.E.)
—

∆ Probability
Model 5

∆ Probability
Model 6

+0.016

—

—

+0.042

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.311***
(0.068)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.005***
(0.002)
-0.368***
(0.124)
5,217

—

-0.007

—a

—a

—a

—a

-0.007

-0.007

Note: Coefficients for cubic splines are not presented to preserve space. Columns 3 and 4 show the marginal effect
of the significant variables on the probability of civil war. Variables are varied from one standard deviation below
their mean to one standard deviation above for continuous variables, and from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. All
other variables were held at their mean or modal values. Probabilities were calculated using the mfx command in
Stata 9.2.
a
Since the effect of democracy squared is non-linear, a linear change in probability cannot be calculated.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05

147

Vita
Ursula E. Daxecker was born in Innsbruck, Austria. She received her B.A. Equivalent from
Leopold-Franzens Universität Innsbruck in 2001 and her M.A. from the University of New
Orleans in 2003.

148

